United States v. Campos

79 F.4th 903

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Jaime Ignacio CAMPOS, Defendant - AppellantUnited States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Tony Renaldo Watson, Jr., Defendant - AppellantUnited States of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Alessandra Katie Stamps, also known as Brazil, Defendant - Appellant

No. 21-3524

No. 21-3646

No. 21-3677

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

Submitted: September 22, 2022

Filed: August 15, 2023

Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Central

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant Jaime Campos and appeared on the brief was Adam Daniel Zenor, of Des Moines, IA.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant Alessandra Stamps and appeared on the brief was Nova D. Janssen, AFPD, of Des Moines, IA.

Counsel who represented appellant Tony Watson Jr. was Brent D. Rosenberg, of Des Moines, IA.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee and appeared on the brief was MacKenzie Benson Tubbs, AUSA, of Des Moines, IA.

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, KELLY and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

Jaime Campos, Tony Watson, Jr., and Alessandra Stamps pleaded guilty to federal controlled substance offenses, and all three appeal their sentences. After careful review, we vacate each defendant's sentence and remand for resentencing.

I.

Law enforcement began investigating Stamps in August 2020 after learning from a confidential informant that Stamps was dealing large quantities of methamphetamine in the Des Moines, Iowa, area. Police arranged several controlled buys from Stamps over the next few months using the confidential informant and later an undercover officer. Stamps contacted the undercover officer in early January 2021 to arrange another drug purchase, and on the morning of January 7, the undercover officer called Stamps and agreed to buy eight ounces of methamphetamine.

After arranging the sale, Stamps drove to a motel in Urbandale, Iowa, to meet with Campos and Watson, who had traveled together to Iowa from Texas to supply Stamps with methamphetamine. Campos and Watson were sharing a room at the motel, and after Stamps arrived, the two met with her and provided her with the methamphetamine she planned to sell to the undercover officer.

The undercover officer arranged for the purchase to take place in the parking lot of a nearby hardware store, and Stamps drove to that location around midday with Campos in the passenger seat. After the undercover officer arrived, Stamps entered the officer's car and handed him the agreed-upon quantity of methamphetamine. Police subsequently arrested Stamps and Campos. Watson, who had left the motel in a separate car, was pulled over by law enforcement and arrested roughly 20 minutes later. Police then obtained and executed a search warrant for Campos's and Watson's motel room. During the search, officers found methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, pills containing controlled substances, a scale, packaging materials with drug residue, and a loaded handgun.

On January 21, 2021, a grand jury returned a five-count indictment charging Campos, Watson, and Stamps with one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine (Count 1); Stamps with two counts of distribution of methamphetamine (Counts 2 and 3); and Campos and Watson with one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine (Count 4) and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine (Count 5). Campos and Watson both pleaded guilty to Count 4, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and Stamps pleaded guilty to Count 3, see id.

At sentencing, the district court determined that both Campos and Watson qualified for a career-offender enhancement based on their prior convictions for "controlled substance offenses" under Texas Health & Safety Code § 481.112. See United States Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4B1.1(a), 4B1.2(b) (2021). The resulting advisory Guidelines range for each was 262 to 327 months of imprisonment. As to Campos, the district court granted a "modest" downward variance and sentenced him to 240 months of imprisonment. As to Watson, the district court granted the government's motion for a downward departure, separately imposed a downward variance, and sentenced him to 190 months of imprisonment. Stamps received a sentence of 300 months after the district court overruled her objection to two sentencing enhancements and granted her a downward variance from her advisory Guidelines range of 360 months to life.

Campos, Watson, and Stamps appeal their sentences.

II.

When reviewing a sentence, "we first determine whether the district court committed a significant procedural error." United States v. Ross, 29 F.4th 1003, 1007 (8th Cir. 2022). Such errors include "an improperly determined Guidelines range." United States v. McGrew, 846 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 2017). We review the district court's construction and application of the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error, "keeping in mind that the Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence each of the facts necessary to establish a sentencing enhancement." United States v. Guzman, 926 F.3d 991, 1000 (8th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Razo-Guerra, 534 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir. 2008)). In the absence of procedural error, we then consider "the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard." Ross, 29 F.4th at 1008 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).

We address each appeal in turn.

A.

Campos challenges his designation as a career offender under the Guidelines. A defendant qualifies for a sentencing enhancement as a career offender if, among other things, he "has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." USSG § 4B1.1(a). The district court concluded that two of Campos's prior Texas convictions qualified as predicate "controlled substance offenses." The Guidelines define a "controlled substance offense" in relevant part as any federal or state offense "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance." Id. § 4B1.2(b). And the commentary to § 4B1.2 further provides that a "controlled substance offense" includes "the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such [an] offense[ ]."¹ Id. § 4B1.2, comment. (n.1). Campos contends that his two prior Texas convictions do not qualify as "controlled substance offenses" under this definition, which is a question we review de novo. See United States v. Williams, 926 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir. 2019).

To determine whether a prior state conviction qualifies as a "controlled substance offense" for purposes of the career-offender enhancement, we apply a "categorical approach." Id. Based on the statutory elements only, we must decide whether the "state statute defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the generic federal definition of a corresponding controlled substance offense." United States v. Maldonado, 864 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v. Roblero-Ramirez, 716 F.3d 1122, 1125 (8th Cir. 2013)); see Williams, 926 F.3d at 969 ("[W]e look to the elements of the crime of conviction rather than how a particular defendant might have committed the offense."). That is, "we must presume" that a defendant's prior conviction "rested upon nothing more than the least of the acts proscribed by the state law" in question, and then determine "whether even those acts are encompassed by" the Guidelines definition of a "controlled substance offense." Maldonado, 864 F.3d at 897 (quoting Roblero-Ramirez, 716 F.3d at 1125); see United States v. Castellanos Muratella, 956 F.3d 541, 543 (8th Cir. 2020) ("To qualify as a predicate offense, [a state statute] must not criminalize more than the guidelines definition of 'controlled substance offense.' " (cleaned up)).

Campos's two Texas convictions were for violations of Texas Health and Safety Code § 481.112, which provides in relevant part that "a person commits an offense if the person knowingly manufactures, delivers, or possesses with intent to deliver a controlled substance." Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(a).² "Manufacture," "[d]eliver," and "[p]ossession" are defined in a separate section. See id. § 481.002. And as is relevant here, "[d]eliver" means "to transfer, actually or constructively, to another a controlled substance" and "includes offering to sell a controlled substance." Id. § 481.002(8).

Because § 481.112(a) proscribes "manufactur[ing]," "deliver[ing]," or "possess[ing] with intent to deliver" a controlled substance, the first step in our analysis ordinarily would be to determine whether these "alternative methods of committing the offense" are elements that define separate crimes, or whether § 481.112(a) instead "merely 'specifies various means of fulfilling the crime's elements.' " United States v. Harris, 950 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Doyal, 894 F.3d 974, 975 (8th Cir. 2018)); see Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 504-06, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016) (describing the distinction between elements and means). Texas's highest criminal court has "definitively answer[ed]" this means-versus-elements question, however. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 517, 136 S.Ct. 2243; see United States v. Fisher, 25 F.4th 1080, 1084 (8th Cir. 2022) ("When making the means-or-elements determination, we may consider authoritative state court decisions."). In Lopez v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals explained that § 481.112

provides several different means for committing the offense of delivery of a single quantity of drugs so that, no matter where along the line of actual delivery—from the offer to sell, to the possession of the drugs

...