United States v. Candelario-Santana

682 F.Supp.3d 195

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Alexis CANDELARIO-SANTANA [1], Defendant.

Criminal No. 09-427 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

Signed July 6, 2023

Scott H. Anderson, AUSA, Victor O. Acevedo-Hernandez, AUSA, David C. Bornstein, United States Attorney's Office District of Puerto Rico, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Francisco Rebollo-Casalduc, Francisco Rebollo Casalduc Law Office, San Juan, PR, Kendys Pimentel-Soto, Kendys Pimentel, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Before the Court is defendant Alexis Candelario-Santana ("Candelario")'s motion for a mistrial. (Docket No. 1806.) For the reasons set forth below, Candelario's motion is DENIED.

I. Background

During Candelario's first trial, the United States moved to dismiss counts 20 through 28, 42, and 52 "in the interest of justice." (Docket No. 933.) The United States and Candelario subsequently also agreed "to dismiss [count 46 and] the forfeiture allegation counts, that appear in the Third Superseding Indictment at pages 68 to 71." (Docket No. 957.) Ultimately, the Court dismissed counts 20-28, 42, 46, 52, and the forfeiture allegations (hereinafter, "phantom counts") pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a).

Candelario's second trial commenced on June 20, 2023. (Docket No. 1768.) The United States has struggled to articulate which counts remain before the Court, seeking to convict Candelario without a coherent understanding of the third-superseding indictment and the procedural posture of this case.

Immediately before opening statements, after the jury had been empanelled, Candelario moved to preclude the United States from referring to the phantom counts. (Docket No. 1762.) According to Candelario, "trial by jury on [these] counts cannot proceed" because the United States failed to "reindict." Id. at p. 4. He also requested that the Court redact the phantom counts from the third-superseding indictment. Id. at p. 3. The Court stated: "I believe I entered an order saying that [the previously dismissed counts] would proceed [?]" (Docket No. 1170, Ex. 1 at p. 5.) The United States answered "Yes," asserting that the grand jury need not reindict Candelario to reinstate these allegations. Id. (United States: "Where does it say [double jeopardy requires] that the United States has to indict again?")

The Court and the United States then referred to these counts in the preliminary jury instructions and opening statements, respectively. For instance, the Court informed the jury that:

Mr. Candelario is also charged with the murder of [Joan Manuel Class-Guzmán, Pedro Semprit-Santana, José Angel Hernández-Martínez, John Henry García-Martínez, Elisa Del Carmen-Ocasio, Samuel Ruiz-Martínez, Rafael Ángel Ramos-Rivera, Tina Marie Rodríguez-Otero] and the unborn child while engaged in a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances; as I mentioned, crack cocaine, powder cocaine, heroin and marijuana.

(Docket No. 1770, Ex. 1 at pp. 8-9.) This instruction alludes to counts 20 through 28, drug-related murders allegedly committed in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). (Docket No. 579 at pp. 32-40.) The Court also disclosed that:

Mr. Candelario is . . . charged in aid of racketeering activity, attempting to cause the death of Carmen María García-Santiago, a minor whose initials are O.F.M., Wilfredo Semprit-Santana, Amarilys Fonseca-Matías, and 17 other individuals who are identified by numbers: victims numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19.

Id. at p. 9 (emphasis added). Phantom counts 42 and 46 allege that Candelario attempted to murder victims 12 and 16, respectively. (Docket No. 579 at p. 57.)

The United States then proclaimed that "[this] case is about a man's quest for power, money and control, with total disregard for human life that led to the murder of 21 people, death of an unborn child, and the attempted murder of 21 other people." (Docket No. 1770, Ex. 1 at p. 18.) Without phantom counts 42 and 46, the total number of attempted murders charged in the third-superseding indictment is 19 (not 21). See Docket No. 579. The United States referenced "21" attempted murders on three occasions during its opening statement. (Docket No. 1170, Ex. 1 at pp. 18, 21 and 23.)

The United States reversed its position three days later. (Docket No. 1782.) It "now agrees that the Indictment should be redacted to eliminate Counts 20-28, 42, 46, and 52 and the Forfeiture Allegation." (Docket No. 1782 at p. 1.) The United States "believes" that the phantom counts "should not be submitted to the jury." (Docket No. 1797 at p. 2.)

Candelario moved for a mistrial on June 27, 2023, contending that reference to the phantom counts "tainted" the jury. (Docket No. 1788 at p. 2.) The United States moved to strike the motion for a mistrial, citing defense counsel's failure to "[provide] any legal authority in support of [Candelario's] request." (Docket No. 1800 at p. 1.) The Court denied both motions without prejudice, ordering the "parties to submit briefs in support of their respective arguments." (Docket No. 1802.) The United States and Candelario complied. (Docket Nos. 1804 and 1806.)

II. Mistrial Standard of Review

Candelario cites inapplicable precedent. He invokes United States v. Pérez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L. Ed 165 (1824), for the proposition that a mistrial is warranted when, "taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." (Docket No. 1806 at p. 2.) The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held, however, that the "manifest necessity test" espoused in Pérez "does not apply when the defendant has requested or effectually consented to the mistrial." United States v. DiPietro, 936 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1991); see Creighton v. Hall, Case No. 99-12215, 2002 WL 745843, at *2, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7389, at * 6 (D. Mass Feb. 12, 2002) ("The manifest necessity test only applies when a mistrial is declared without defendant's request or consent") (citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-07, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) (noting that "different considerations obtain . . . when the mistrial has been declared at the defendant's request")).

This Court possesses broad discretion in determining whether a declaration of mistrial is warranted. See, e.g., United States v. Padilla-Galarza, 990 F.3d 60, 80 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting that the appellate standard of review for denying a mistrial is a "deferential" one, and that "[o]nly in in rare instances will we . . . substitute our judgment for the trial court's first-hand determination that the interests of justice could be served without aborting a trial already in progress.") (citation omitted) (bracketed text in original); United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 285 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[The] lower court's refusal to grant the appellant's motion for a mistrial fell well within the wide encincture of its discretion").

"Declaring a mistrial is a last resort, only to be implemented if the taint is ineradicable, that is, only if the trial judge believes that the jury's exposure to the evidence is likely to prove beyond realistic hope or repair." United States v. Trinidad-Acosta, 773 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 2014) (quotation and citation omitted). Courts assess the "totality of the circumstances," considering, inter alia, the propriety of a curative instructive, the timeliness of judicial intervention, and whether the defendant "successfully rebutted the presumption that the jury [will follow] the judge's instructions." United States v. Apicelli, 839 F.3d 75, 86 (1st Cir. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted); United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 54 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that a defendant moving for a mistrial must "demonstrate the existence of some special prejudice that the court [cannot] remedy through other means") (internal citation and quotation omitted).

III. Discussion

Reference to the dismissed counts on the first day of trial is no reason to declare a mistrial. These remarks caused no prejudice, much less any prejudice warranting a mistrial. Candelario argues that the "charges against him, as explained to the jury, were multiplied, and aggravated by [the] government's opening statement and by the instructions imparted by the court." (Docket No. 1806 at p. 3.) Candelario, however, is accused of, among other offenses, participating in an illicit enterprise in violation of the Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering Activity ("VICAR") Act, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(1) and (2) (counts 2 through 10, and counts 29 through 49). (Docket No. 579.) The VICAR counts aver that Candelario murdered Joan Manuel Class-Guzmán, Pedro Semprit-Santana, José Angel Hernández-Martínez, John Henry García-Martínez, Elisa Del Carmen-Ocasio, Samuel Ruiz-Martínez, Rafael Ángel Ramos-Rivera, Tina Marie Rodríguez-Otero and an unborn child. Id. Phantom counts 20 through 28 charge Candelario with the murder of these same individuals, citing 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). Id. Moreover, these murders are listed as overt acts in count one of the third-superseding...