United States v. Capriotti

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. LOUIS CAPRIOTTI, Defendant.

Case No. 21 CR 16

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

January 22, 2021

U.S. Magistrate Judge Gabriel A. Fuentes

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

At a detention hearing held on January 21, 2021, the Court granted the government's motion to detain Defendant Louis Capriotti ("Defendant") pending his trial on a felony charge of transmitting threats by interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). The Court found that the government met its burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that no release condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the community, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), for the reasons stated in open court and upon an application of the Bail Reform Act's factors for judicial consideration per Section 3142(g) of the Act. This opinion more specifically explains the Court's reasoning.

BACKGROUND

Defendant's arrest in this matter occurred after government investigators used subpoenaed telephone subscriber and cellular location records to identify Defendant as the person who left a threatening message on December 29, 2020 on the voicemail of a member of the United States House of Representatives from the State of New Jersey. Complaint ¶¶ 19-23. The Complaint stated that the voicemail message related that if "certain persons," in the words of the Complaint, believe that, in the words of the voicemail message, "Joe Biden is going to put his hand on the Bible and walk into that f------¹ White House on January 20th, they're sadly f------ mistaken," in that Defendant was a "nine-year Marine, active duty." Id. ¶ 20. The message, an excerpt of which was played in open court, Govt. Exh. A, further stated that ""[w]e will surround the m------------ White House and we will kill any m------------ Democrat that steps on the m------------ lawn." Id. The message also is alleged to have named a former New Jersey governor, whose name was not made part of the record, and stated that Defendant would "like to put one right in [that former governor's] f------ dome." Id.

The Complaint further alleged that the December 29, 2020 voicemail was not the first time Defendant used a telephone to threaten federal officials including members of the U.S. Congress. The Complaint alleged that in February 2020, after associating Defendant with what the prosecutor described at the hearing as "dozens" of threatening calls to members of Congress between 2017 and 2020, FBI agents met with Defendant at his home in the south suburbs of Chicago, and at that interview, Defendant acknowledged making the calls that agents played back to him, agreeing that the messages could be interpreted as hateful and threatening. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. Defendant is alleged to have told the agents that he meant no "ill will" and was "just f------ with" the members of Congress. Id. ¶ 13. The agents nonetheless told Defendant "that he needed to stop making the calls in that manner and indicated that if he continued to do so, he may face charges." Id. Yet the Complaint alleged that even after being warned to stop, Defendant "periodically" continued to leave anonymous, threatening messages with members of Congress after February 2020 and into November and early December 2020. Id. ¶¶ 14-18. The threatening character of certain of these messages is illustrated by their reference to the caller being a Marine who had "killed" several "terrorists," and that certain of the Congress members who received the messages were"terrorist[s]." Id. ¶¶ 16-18. In a December 2020 message described in the Complaint, the caller added with respect to the intended recipient, a member of Congress from the State of Pennsylvania, "may [that member] choke in hell." Id. ¶ 18. This message also mentioned Vice President Kamala D. Harris, then vice-president elect. The message is alleged to have stated that to the extent the member believed that "Joe Biden" and "Kamala Harris" were "going to walk into that f------ White House" on "July 20th" (an apparent reference to the inauguration date of January 20, 2021), this belief was mistaken. Id. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that on January 6, 2021, as members of Congress were tabulating the electoral votes resulting from the presidential election of November 3, 2020, a violent mob breached the Capitol, causing a temporary delay in the counting of the electoral votes and resulting in a disturbance in which five persons perished, including a Capitol Police officer.

In addition, the information supplied to the Court by Pre-Trial Services, and included in the government's open-court proffer incorporating the Pre-Trial Services report, included a long history of Defendant's having made violent threats and having violated judicial orders of protection. Specifically, the unrebutted proffer stated that on at least four occasions from 2008 to 2014, Defendant was convicted in Illinois of misdemeanor charges of violating orders of protection. The proffered information about the conduct underlying these convictions is thin, but it was enough to add to the Court's concern about Defendant having engaged in a pattern of making telephonic threats and about his having been undeterred by judicial orders barring him from making unlawful contact with the person or persons protected under the orders. The proffer indicated that as to Defendant's first conviction for violating an order of protection, in 2008, Defendant telephoned the person protected under the order, was reminded of the order, and said, "yeah, that's a piece of paper." The proffer indicated that as to the third such conviction, Defendantleft a "belligerent" voicemail message. As to the fourth conviction for violating an order of protection, in 2014, the proffer indicated that Defendant, by then having been convicted three times for violating orders of protection, contacted the protected person and stated "just because there is an order of protection, it does not matter if I come up to you .... Is that against the law? No it isn't." Subsequently, Defendant was convicted on a state felony charge of telephone harassment in 2015 stemming from an incident in which Defendant violated an order of protection - again - and sent threatening messages to the protected person's father, stating that he would "rip" the protected person's "chest open," and that he would be "coming with guns blazing." For this offense, an Illinois court imposed a sentence of 24 months of probation in October 2016, and although that probation was terminated satisfactorily in October 2018, the record is not clear as to whether the Illinois authorities were aware that beginning in at least 2017, while the probation remained active, Defendant was making telephonic threats to members of Congress in voicemail messages he is said in the Complaint to having admitted he left.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Background: Detention and Release Under the Bail Reform Act

Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156, a defendant may be detained in custody pending trial "[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f) of this section, the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The judicial officer's conclusion that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of other persons and the community must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The Bail Reform Act generally expresses a "preference for release," in that Section 3142(e) requires the Court to consider the possibility ofless restrictive alternatives to detention. United States v. Fattah, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1136-37 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (citing United States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1991)). "In our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). In determining whether there are conditions of release which will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community, courts take into consideration the following factors set forth in Section 3142(g):

(g) Factors to be considered.—The judicial officer shall, in determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, take into account the available information concerning—

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, a violation of Section 1591, a Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device;

(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;

(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including—

A) the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and

B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law; and

(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release.

18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). If the judicial officer determines that no release conditions or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community, the Act is directory: "[T]he judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).

In addition, the Act specifies the...