United States v. Cardiel

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JOEY CARDIEL, Defendant.

No. 1:22-cr-00041 NODJ BAM

United States District Court, E.D. California

August 29, 2024

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND MOTION TO DISMISS

(DOCS. 28, 29, 31)

Joey Cardiel was stopped one night, while driving car belonging to someone else, because the car had expired registration. The deputy making the stop searched the vehicle and discovered he possessed and rifle and a bindle of methamphetamine. During this process, the deputy learned that Mr. Cardiel was a felon and was, therefore, prohibited from having a firearm. Cardiel was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Doc. 1)

The deputy filed a police report in which he attributed statements to Mr. Cardiel admitting he had methamphetamine in the car and on his person and that he possessed the rifle. Cardiel now moves the Court to suppress all evidence stemming from the car search and all statements attributed to him. Mr Cardiel asserts that he did not make the statements, that he did not consent to the search and that he was not advised of his Miranda rights. Mr. Cardiel contends also that the action should be dismissed because 18 USC § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional.

Because the Court determines the officers had probable cause to search the cabin of the car and the trunk, because Mr. Cardiel consented to the search of the vehicle and because the Court finds that the deputy's testimony about Mr. Cardiel's statements is credible, the motions to suppress are DENIED. Also, because the Court § 922(g)(1) is constitutional, the motion to dismiss is DENIED without prejudice.

I. Factual Background

According to his testimony, Deputy Jacob Woesner stopped the Chevy Cobalt just before midnight on January 16, 2022, for having expired registration and approached the car. Deputy Woesner asked for the driver for his license and registration, who provided them. Mr. Cardiel also told the officer his name. Deputy Woesner then asked if there was anything illegal inside the car. The deputy asked this question based upon his training and for officer safety purposes. Deputy Woesner, like all officers from the Fresno County Sheriff's Office, worked solo. The agency was “short staffed,” and once field training was completed, deputies became “solo beat officers.” Back up could be 10 to 30 minutes away, depending upon the deputy's particular beat.

Mr. Cardiel replied that there might be a little “dope” in the car. After the deputy asked him to clarify what that meant, Cardiel “explained there may some crystal methamphetamine” but did not specify where in the car the narcotics could be found. Deputy Woesner then asked whether there was anything else illegal inside the car, and Mr. Cardiel “stared at the steering wheel for a few moments before stating, ‘No, there shouldn't be.'”

By this time, Deputy Woesner he had been a Deputy for about three years. He had conducted about 1,000 traffic stops and had read the Miranda rights to suspects upwards of 200 times. Deputy Woesner had been assigned to the area where the stop occurred for about a year and was aware that it contained a “narcotics corridor” through which offenders would move drugs.

Deputy Woesner then asked Mr. Cardiel if he could search the car, and Mr. Cardiel agreed. By this time, only two or three minutes had passed since Deputy Woesner stopped the car. Deputy Woesner searched the cabin of the car but found no drugs. Because he did not find the drugs Mr. Cardiel said were in the car, he moved to the trunk to search there. Upon opening it, Deputy Woesner found a .22 caliber semi-automatic rifle. Spontaneously, Mr. Cardiel said, “Oh shit, I forgot that was in there.” At this point, only about five minutes had passed since the deputy stopped the car.

Deputy Woesner then arrested Mr. Cardiel, placed him in handcuffs, placed him in the back of the patrol car, and read him his Miranda rights from the Miranda card (Ex. 1), which he carried with him. Mr. Cardiel acknowledged understanding the rights and agreed to waive him. Mr. Cardiel then said that he wanted to be honest and that he had hid methamphetamine behind his belt. The deputy had Mr. Cardiel step out of the car, and the deputy retrieved the drugs under the belt where Mr. Cardiel indicated. Mr. Cardiel told he officer that he had about $100 worth of methamphetamine.

The deputy asked about the gun. Mr. Cardiel explained that the gun was given to him by a friend. He said he traded methamphetamine to a fellow Bulldog gang member for the rifle, but he refused to provide the person's name. The deputy ran Mr. Cardiel's name through the Omnixx Force database and discovered that Mr. Cardiel was a convicted felon.

Mr. Cardiel testified that he was driving the Chevy Cobalt, which was not his car, but which he had permission to drive. The patrol car activated its lights to pull him over, and he complied. The deputy asked for his driver's license and registration, and after Mr. Cardiel provided them, the officer returned to his patrol car. Next, the deputy returned to the Chevy and ordered Mr. Cardiel out of the car, saying he as going to search the car. Mr. Cardiel told the deputy that he was not on probation or parole and that “it's an illegal search.” Mr. Cardiel never gave consent for the deputy to search the car. Even still, the deputy searched the cabin of the car and then the trunk. He never told the officer he had drugs in the car. Once the officer searched the trunk, he discovered the rifle. The deputy did not say anything about the weapon, but then he placed Mr. Cardiel under arrest and put him in the back of the patrol car. By this time another deputy arrived and, before the incident finished, four more officers arrived.

Once he was in handcuffs, Deputy Woesner placed him in the back of the patrol car but did not at that time or at any time read him his Miranda rights. The deputy told Mr. Cardiel that he was going to jail and if he had “anything else on [him], to produce it right now so [he] won't be charged when [he gets] to the jail.” The deputy said he was “squash” it and not include whatever evidence produced in the police report. In response, Mr. Cardiel removed meth from behind his belt and gave it to the deputy. The deputy then had Mr. Cardiel step back out of the patrol car to take photos of his tattoos and asked him if he was an active gang member.

Mr. Cardiel admitted that his declaration filed with his motions, did not mention the other officers being present, did not mention that the deputy would “squash” any evidence of other crimes if Mr. Cardiel produced it, and it indicated that he “told” the deputy he had meth behind his belt, rather than that Mr. Cardiel pulling the drugs out from behind his belt.

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

A. The traffic stop was lawful.

The Fourth Amendment states, “(t)he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[T]he ‘seizure' of a ‘person,' which can take the form of ‘physical force' or a ‘show of authority' that ‘in some way restrain(s) the liberty' of the person.” Torres v. Madrid, 141 S.Ct. 989, 995 (2021) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)). Traffic stops, “even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose,” are “seizures” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore are “subject to the constitutional imperative that (they) not be ‘unreasonable' under the circumstances.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to investigatory traffic stops.”).

“A police-initiated traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the police stop the vehicle because of a ‘reasonable suspicion' that the vehicle's occupants have broken a law.” United States v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 543 F.3d 1080, 1087-1088 (9th Cir. 2008). An officer making a traffic stop “must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); see also United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren at 810. Officers must have only reasonable suspicion that a traffic infraction has occurred to make a traffic stop and the fact that the officer does not, ultimately issue a citation or even mention the traffic infraction, does not translate the stop into an unconstitutional seizure. United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 2005).

To be lawful, a traffic stop must be limited in its scope: an officer may “address the traffic violation that warranted the stop,” make “ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop,” and “attend to related safety concerns.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-355 (2015). The stop may last “no longer than is necessary to effectuate” these purposes and complete the traffic “mission” safely. Id. A stop “may be extended to conduct an investigation into matters other than the original traffic violation” so long as “the officers have reasonable suspicion of an independent offense.” United States v. Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 2019).

There is little dispute that Deputy Woesner properly made the traffic stop. The evidence demonstrates that the vehicle Mr Cardiel was driving had an expired registration, and Mr. Cardiel does not claim otherwise. The...