United States v. Carrington

91 F.4th 252

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Theodore Macon CARRINGTON, Jr., Defendant - Appellant.

No. 22-7138

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Argued: September 20, 2023

Decided: January 23, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:21-cr-00005-UA-1)

ARGUED: Mark A. Jones, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, PA, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Carol Niemeier, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before RICHARDSON and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Heytens and Senior Judge Floyd joined.

RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge:

Theodore Carrington appeals the district court's order finding him "subject to the [civil-commitment] provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246." J.A. 301. He argues that (1) the order is invalid because he was no longer in the Attorney General's legitimate, time-sensitive custody when the court made this finding, and (2) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. But we lack jurisdiction to hear Carrington's claims on the merits. The district court's order is neither a final judgment nor an appealable collateral order. So, for these reasons, we dismiss his appeal.¹

I. Legal Framework

Carrington's appeal deals with the unfortunate reality that some criminal defendants are mentally incompetent to stand trial and are thus committed to specialized government institutions pretrial. And some of those defendants have persistent mental illnesses that make them dangerous enough to warrant their long-term commitment, even if they are not convicted of a crime. But the Constitution rightly prohibits a person from being detained indefinitely just because he falls into the former category. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972). So, to commit a criminal defendant beyond the time needed to determine whether his competency to stand trial may be restored, the government must institute civil-commitment proceedings to establish that he falls into the latter category. Id.

Two federal statutes implement these principles: 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 and 4246. The first establishes procedures for holding a criminal defendant in custody pending a determination of his competency to stand trial. The second addresses the separate civil proceedings the government must institute in order to commit him outside of § 4241's limits. The interplay between these statutes requires some unpacking.

A. Section 4241

During a criminal prosecution, either the defendant or the government may request a hearing to determine the defendant's mental competency. § 4241(a). The court must order this hearing "if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect" rendering him incompetent to stand trial. § 4241(a). Before the hearing, the court may order a psychiatric or psychological evaluation of the defendant. § 4241(b). And, at the hearing itself, the defendant is entitled to representation by counsel and is allowed to testify, present evidence, subpoena witnesses, and confront and cross-examine any witnesses who appear. §§ 4241(c), 4247(d).

After the hearing, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial, it "shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General." § 4241(d). Section 4241(d) then provides:

The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable facility—

(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; and

(2) for an additional reasonable period of time until—

(A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if the court finds that there is a substantial probability that within such additional period of time he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward; or

(B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to law;

whichever is earlier.

Id. Finally, the statute stipulates: "If, at the end of the time period specified, it is determined that the defendant's mental condition has not so improved as to permit the proceedings to go forward, the defendant is subject to the provisions of sections 4246 and 4248."² Id. (emphasis added).

B. Section 4246

Section 4246 picks up where § 4241 leaves off by providing for civil commitment of certain mentally ill persons who are a danger to the community. If the "director of a facility in which a person is hospitalized certifies" that such person is "presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, and that suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the person are not available," then the director may seek his civil commitment by filing a certificate in the court for the district where the person is confined. § 4246(a). The court that receives the certificate must then hold a hearing to verify the director's finding. Id. In the meantime, the filing of the certificate immediately stays the person's release until § 4246 proceedings are completed. Id. And once the hearing is completed, if "the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, the court shall commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General." § 4246(d).

As the statute makes clear, not every hospitalized person may face civil-commitment proceedings. Rather, § 4246 only applies to someone (1) who is "in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons whose sentence is about to expire," (2) who "has been committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d)," or (3) "against whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely for reasons related to the mental condition of the person." § 4246(a). So the subject of a civil-commitment certificate may challenge the certificate in the civil-commitment court on the grounds that he didn't fit within one of these three categories at the time the certificate was filed. If he's right, then the certificate must be dismissed for failing to satisfy the necessary elements of a § 4246 civil-commitment claim. See Curbow, 16 F.4th at 116. But § 4246(a) doesn't govern subject-matter jurisdiction; a person can waive the argument if he doesn't raise it. Id.

C. Moving from § 4241 to § 4246

Often litigated is the question of whether someone fits into the second category of hospitalized people in § 4246(a). In other words, what does it mean to say that a person "has been committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d)"?

We've interpreted it to mean that, at the time the § 4246 certificate is filed, a "person is presently committed to the Attorney General's custody." United States v. Wayda, 966 F.3d 294, 304 (4th Cir. 2020). To be presently committed to the Attorney General's custody, a person must have been committed by the criminal court pursuant to § 4241(d). Id. And the commitment order must be legitimately in effect when the certificate is filed, which in turn depends on whether the time limits in § 4241(d) have expired. See § 4241(d) (stating that a (d)(1) custody order lasts for four months and a (d)(2) custody order lasts for "an additional reasonable period of time" until a person's condition improves, if the court deems this likely, or pending charges are dismissed, "whichever is earlier"); Wayda, 966 F.3d at 308 (explaining that an additional period of time is reasonable when the government "strive[s] to certify" a person in a way that "eliminates or at least minimizes" his wait for a § 4246 determination). So if the § 4246 certificate is filed after the period of lawful custody expires, then a person may move for, and the civil-commitment court must order, the dismissal of the certificate as untimely.

When the criminal court issued only one § 4241(d) custody order, the question for the civil-commitment court is straightforward: Is that order still in effect? But it gets more complicated when the criminal court issued multiple custody orders. In that case, may a person challenge the duration of any custody period, or only the most recent one (at least in the civil-commitment court)?

We have opted for the latter approach. See Curbow, 16 F.4th at 114-17. When a person challenges a § 4246 certificate's timeliness in the civil-commitment court, the only question before that court is whether he is presently committed to the Attorney General's custody under § 4241(d). So if there is a § 4241(d) order on the books, and that order is still in effect, then present custody is conclusively established. Any challenges to delays in prior periods of custody, or to the criminal court's authority to issue the operative custody order, must be raised in the criminal court itself. In effect, this means that the civil-commitment court may only hear challenges to the period of custody that immediately precedes the civil-commitment proceedings.

To illustrate how this works, consider our two recent cases: United States v. Wayda, 966 F.3d 294, and United States v. Curbow, 16 F.4th 92.

After Wayda was charged with federal sex offenses, the criminal court held a § 4241 competency hearing and found Wayda incompetent to stand trial. Wayda, 966 F.3d at 299. Over the next two years, the...