United States v. Carter

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JESSE CARTER, Defendant.

No. 1:20-cr-62

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division

June 24, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

DOUGLAS R. COLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This cause is before the Court on Defendant Jesse Carter's Motion to Suppress (Doc. 19) and Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 24). The former seeks to exclude, on Fourth Amendment grounds evidence that law enforcement officers obtained when searching a vehicle that Carter was driving-a vehicle that had been reported stolen. The latter motion argues that the government cannot establish that Carter possessed the firearm described in Count One of the Indictment “in or affecting commerce, ” which is a necessary element under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). For reasons described below, the Court DENIES both of Carter's Motions.

BACKGROUND

On March 6, 2020, Cincinnati Police Department (“CPD”) officers stopped a black Nissan after witnessing it run a red light. (Tr., Doc. 25, #211). When the officers ran the vehicle's tags, they learned that the vehicle had been reported stolen. (Id. at #217). In response, the officers ordered Carter and his passenger to exit the vehicle, handcuffed them both, and then detained them in a police cruiser. (Id. at #221-22). When securing Carter, Officer Fehrman, one of the arresting CPD officers, performed a pat down on him. (Id. at #221). During the pat down, the officer discovered two concealed knives on Carter's person, both hidden in his boot. The officer also observed insignia on Carter's clothing that suggested affiliation with the Iron Horseman motorcycle gang.

Once detained, Carter discussed the vehicle's ownership status with Officer Fehrman, who asked if Carter knew the car was stolen or reported stolen. (Id.). Carter said no and claimed that he purchased the car from a former girlfriend had the title at his house, and was in the process of transferring the title to his name (the title, according to Carter, was still in his ex-girlfriend's deceased husband's name). (Id.). In addition, Carter stated that he was aware that his ex-girlfriend was “reneging on the deal.” (Id.). Even so Carter told the officers that he had paperwork at his house that would attest to his ownership. (Id. at #242). Despite Carter's statement and request to be allowed to go to his residence to get that paperwork, the CPD officers did not permit Carter the opportunity to obtain that paperwork or to phone a friend who would bring those documents to the scene. (Id.).

While Carter and Officer Fehrman had that discussion, other CPD officers, including Officer Myers, arrived and searched the vehicle's interior without a warrant. (Id. at #252). When officers approached the car, its doors were open, making much of the interior visible. The officers observed five knives in plain sight inside the car, three in the back of the car and two in the driver's-side door. (Id. at #253-54). These knives “were more of a pocket knife type, ” were kept in sheaths, and appeared “dangerous” to Officer Myers. (Id. at #254-56). Because it is unusual to see numerous knives scattered in a car, Officer Myers became suspicious that the car would contain contraband. (Id. at #256).

After observing the knives, Officer Myers began the search by opening the trunk of the car, which contained a zipped backpack. (Id. at #272). Before opening the backpack, Myers opined that he thought the backpack would contain a firearm. (Id. at #273). That backpack only contained an “AR15 tool, ” and not a firearm, but CPD officers continued to search the car. For example, they located a “crack pipe, ” stored in a case, in an open compartment on the interior of the driver's-side door. (Id. at #263). In total, the officers “located assorted narcotics, U.S. currency, a digital scale, ammunition, knives, and a 9mm Taurus pistol, Model PT809C, bearing serial number TEU 02959.” (Mot. to Suppress, Doc. 19, #37). Having made that discovery, the officers arrested Carter. They brought state-law charges against him, which resulted in Carter's detention at the Hamilton County Justice Center.

While detained, Carter made a recorded jail-cell call to another member of the Iron Horseman gang. (Tr., Doc. 25, #284). From this recording, the government learned that an item, which Carter referred to as “the big one, ” remained hidden in the car “behind the sub.” (Id. at #285). In response, ATF agents tracked down the car Carter drove on the night of his arrest and performed a second search of the car on March 26, 2020. (Id. at #286). Carter's ex-girlfriend, who then possessed the car, granted permission for the search. (Id. at #287). The ATF agents found a “short barreled AR-style rifle” inside the car's subwoofer. (Id. at #289). A federal grand jury indicted Carter on two charges: (1) unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and (2) illegal possession of a machine gun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o).

Carter now moves to exclude the evidence from both searches. As to the first, Carter argues that the government's warrantless search on March 6, 2020, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. And, as to the second, he claims that the March 26, 2020, search would not have happened but-for the earlier unconstitutional search, and thus the evidence found during that search constitutes inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree.

The government responds by arguing that (1) Carter had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the car during the March 6, 2020, stop because he did not own the vehicle, meaning he lacks standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge, and (2) multiple exceptions for warrantless searches, namely the automobile exception, the search incident to arrest exception, and the inventory search exception, all apply on the facts here.

The Court held a hearing on Carter's Motion to Suppress on April 12, 2021. At that hearing, CPD Officers Fehrman, Myers, and Del Raso testified regarding the March 6, 2020, automobile search, and ATF Agent Remick-Cook testified regarding the March 26, 2020, search during which officers found a machine gun in the same automobile. Carter filed a Supplementary Memorandum in support of his Motion to Suppress on May 5, 2021. (Doc. 26). The government filed its Response in Opposition on May 18, 2021. (Doc. 28). Carter submitted his Reply on May 25, 2021. (Doc. 29). That issue is now fully briefed and ripe for resolution.

Apart from his Motion to Suppress, Carter also asks the Court to dismiss Count One of the Indictment on the grounds that the government cannot show a necessary element under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), namely that Carter possessed the Taurus pistol “in or affecting commerce.” (See Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. 24). In short, he argues that merely possessing a firearm manufactured in another state does not satisfy the statute's interstate commerce requirement. The government disagrees. (See Resp. in Opp'n, Doc. 27). It claims that so long as a gun is manufactured outside a given state, and later discovered in the possession of a person inside that state, that suffices, in and of itself, to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)'s “in or affecting commerce” requirement. This issue is also fully briefed and ripe for resolution.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Carter Had An Expectation Of Privacy In The Car Sufficient To Create Standing For A Fourth Amendment Claim.

As a preliminary matter, the government contends that Carter lacks standing to assert the Fourth Amendment here because he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the car or its contents. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.'”) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, (1967)). The government bases this argument on its assertion that Carter was driving a car owned by someone else, coupled with the well-settled proposition that drivers of stolen cars typically lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in those cars (and the items inside). Byrd v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1518, 1529 (2018) (“No matter the degree of possession and control, the car thief would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a stolen car.”); cf. United States v. Taylor, 496 F.Supp.2d 852, 855 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (“[C]ourts have generally held that the owner of a vehicle has a reasonable expectation of privacy therein.”). So the Court begins by asking whether Carter fits the bill as a car thief for Fourth Amendment standing purposes.

First, a few words on the burden of proof. Carter bears the overall burden of showing that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130 n.1 (1978) (“The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.”). And in that regard, he also “has the burden of establishing his standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation.” United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that defendant had the burden to show his expectation of privacy in a rental car). See also United States v. Mastromatteo, 538 F.3d 535, 544 (finding that defendant “failed to carry his burden” concerning the Fourth Amendment “standing question”). “The defendant has the burden of establishing the standing necessary to assert a Fourth Amendment violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Shelton, 384 F.Supp.3d 916, 922 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).

Here the government claims that Carter failed to meet that burden, citing Carter's admissions that he (1) had not paid for the car in full, (2) did not possess its title in his name, and (3) knew about his...