United States v. Charles

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. MILES CHARLES, Defendant.

20 CR 419(VM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

June 16, 2021

DECISION & ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, U.S.D.J.:

Defendant Miles Charles ("Charles" or "Defendant") was charged with participating in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). (See "Indictment," Dkt. No. 5.) Now before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the Indictment on the grounds that the grand jury did not reflect a fair cross section of the community, in violation of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 ("JSSA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq., and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution. (See Dkt. No. 25.)

In support of his motion, Charles has filed a memorandum of law ("Defense Br.," Dkt. No. 26), which attaches an expert Declaration from Jeffrey Martin ("Martin Decl.," Dkt. No. 26-1). The Court also received the Government's opposition ("Government Br.," Dkt. No. 33), attaching an expert Affidavit from Bernard R. Siskin ("Siskin Aff.," Dkt. No. 33-1). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A complaint was filed against Charles on August 12, 2020, alleging that Charles had attempted to purchase large quantities of cocaine in Manhattan. A grand jury seated in White Plains returned the Indictment on August 18, 2020.

The Government explains that it sought the Indictment in White Plains because at the time, "only one grand jury was sitting in the Manhattan courthouse and that grand jury was available only one day each week" because of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Government Br. at 1-2.) As a result of these pandemic-related constraints, "the Manhattan grand jury could not hear all the cases handled by the Manhattan division of the U.S. Attorney's Office," and ultimately "a number of cases" assigned to the Manhattan courthouse were heard by the grand jury sitting in White Plains. (Id. at 2.)

The jury-selection procedures in this District are governed by the 2009 Amended Plan for the Random Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (the "SDNY Jury Plan").¹ The SDNY Jury Plan contemplates the creation of Master Jury Wheels and Qualified Jury Wheels. See SDNY Jury Plan art.III.A, IV.A. Consistent with their naming, the Master Jury Wheels include "master" lists of prospective jurors derived from voter-registration logs, while the Qualified Jury Wheels include "all persons who have been found qualified to serve as jurors." Id. Under the SDNY Jury Plan, the Master Jury Wheels "shall be emptied and refilled by not later than September 1 following the date of each Presidential Election." Id. art. III.B.

From among the Master Jury Wheels, qualified jurors are identified using "jury qualification questionnaires" sent to prospective jurors² once or twice a year, "or more frequently, if necessary." Id. art. III.D. Once returned, the questionnaires are "reviewed by the Clerk and finally evaluated by a district judge as necessary" to determine eligibility and inclusion in the Qualified Jury Wheels.³ Id. Once a month, jurors from the Qualified Jury Wheels are summoned based on anticipated requirements for the coming month and then randomly assigned to grand or petit juries asneeded. Id. art. III.F, IV.C.

Two courthouses comprise this district: Manhattan and White Plains. Master Jury Wheels and the Qualified Jury Wheels are created separately for each respective courthouse. The Manhattan courthouse draws from residents of New York, Bronx, Westchester, Putnam, and Rockland counties, and the White Plains courthouse draws from residents of Westchester, Putnam, Rockland, Orange, Sullivan, and Dutchess counties.⁴ Id. art. III.C, IV.B. The proportion of jurors drawn from each county for the master wheels is the same as the proportion of registered voters in that county. See id. art. III.A, III.B.

The SDNY Jury Plan does not contain any rules regarding which courthouse should return a particular indictment or where cases should ultimately be assigned. Nor do the Rules for the Division of Business Among District Judges (the "SDNY Business Division Rules"), which provide that "[i]ndictments designated for Manhattan may be returned by the grand jury in open court to the magistrate judge presiding in the criminal part" and "[i]ndictments designated for White Plains may bereturned by the grand jury to the magistrate judge presiding in the White Plains Courthouse." SDNY Business Division Rule 6 (emphasis added).⁵ The SDNY Business Division Rules suggest, but nowhere require, that crimes committed in the northern counties be assigned to the White Plains courthouse. See SDNY Business Division Rule 18(b) ("The U.S. attorney designates on the criminal cover sheet that the case is to be assigned to White Plains if the crime was allegedly committed in whole or predominant part in the Northern Counties.") There is no parallel provision regarding the assignment of cases involving crimes allegedly committed in the southern counties.

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, "the majority of in-person proceedings throughout the Southern District of New York were suspended." United States v. Schulte, No. 17 CR. 548, 2021 WL 1146094, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2021); see also Standing Order, M-10-468, Dkt. No. 20-mc-622 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2020). The Government contends, and defense counsel does not dispute, that grand jury operations were also significantly limited. (See Government Br. at 1-2; Defense Br. at 3.) Thus, the Government obtained from the White Plainsgrand jury certain indictments, like the one at issue here, for cases ultimately assigned to the Manhattan courthouse.

Like Charles, a number of criminal defendants throughout the district have challenged this practice on the grounds that it violates their right to juries comprised of a fair cross section of the community. These motions have been denied on grounds similar to those set forth below. See, e.g., United States v. Middlebrooks, No. 21 CR 89, 2021 WL 2402162 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2021) (citing recent cases); United States v. Segovia-Landa, No. 20 CR 287, 2021 WL 1966117 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021); United States v. Tagliaferro, No. 19 CR 472, 2021 WL 1172502 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021); Schulte, 2021 WL 1146094.

B. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Charles argues that "Black or African-American" and "Hispanic of Latino" jurors were significantly underrepresented on the White Plains grand jury that indicted him. He argues that his Sixth Amendment right to a jury comprised of a fair cross section of the community was violated because (1) Blacks and Latinos are a "distinct group," (2) they were significantly underrepresented on the White Plains grand jury regardless of the method and groups of comparison utilized, and (3) the underrepresentation was "systematic" insofar as it was part of a practice of pursuingindictments from White Plains for cases assigned to Manhattan. Charles further contends that the underrepresentation was systematic because the SDNY Jury Plan is defective in that: (1) it gets refilled only every four years, (2) voter registration lists are its only source of prospective jurors, (3) inactive voters are excluded, and (4) errors in proration resulted in the exclusion of thousands of people from certain counties. Next, Charles argues that for the same reasons his Sixth Amendment rights were violated, his Fifth Amendment rights were also violated. Regarding the animus component of his Fifth Amendment claim, Charles contends that the degree of underrepresentation here is enough to support a prima facie case of discrimination and shift the burden to the Government to justify its jury selection methods. Charles lastly argues that the Government violated the JSSA by obtaining his indictment in White Plains instead of Manhattan, and that the exclusion of inactive voters and the alleged proration errors also violated the JSSA.

The Government counters that Black and Latino jurors were not underrepresented on Charles's jury when using the correct jury pool, the correct comparison group, and the "absolute disparity" model. The Government argues that for this reason, and because any alleged underrepresentation isnot "systematic," Charles's Sixth Amendment claim fails. According to the Government, the alleged underrepresentation is not systematic because each component of the jury-selection process that Charles challenges is not itself defective but only problematic when affected by "external forces." The Government further argues that Charles has not shown that each challenged component is responsible for the alleged disparities. On Charles's Fifth Amendment claim, the Government contends that Charles has neither established intentional discrimination, nor alleged sufficient underrepresentation to shift the burden to the Government. Even if the burden were shifted, however, the Government insists that the challenged jury-selection methods are all justifiable and have minimal impact. The Government lastly argues that Charles's JSSA claim fails because Charles has not established that any of the alleged violations have a significant impact on the jury pool, none violate the JSSA's requirements, and technical errors are not considered violations.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

A. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a jury panel "drawn from a source representing a 'fair cross section' of the community." United States v.Jackman, 46 F.3d 1240, 1244 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 536 (1975)). To establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair-cross-section guarantee, a defendant must show:

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to

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