United States v. Class

930 F.3d 460

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

v.Rodney CLASS, Appellant

No. 15-3015

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued March 13, 2019

Decided July 19, 2019

Leonard R. Powell, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Jessica Ring Amunson, Washington, DC.

Lauren R. Bates, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the briefs were Jesse K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Chrisellen R. Kolb, Jeffrey Pearlman, and Valinda Jones, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Griffith and Srinivasan, Circuit Judges, and Sentelle, Senior Circuit Judge.

Griffith, Circuit Judge:

Federal law prohibits the possession of firearms on the grounds of the United States Capitol. 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e). Rodney Class pleaded guilty to violating this law after parking a car containing three guns on a street near the Capitol. He now argues that, as applied to his case, the law violates the Second Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. These claims lack merit, and we affirm his conviction.

I

In May 2013, Rodney Class drove to the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. He parked his car in one of the many angled parking spots that line the 200 block of Maryland Avenue SW (the "Maryland Avenue lot"). That parking spot sits just north of the United States Botanic Gardens and approximately 1,000 feet from the entrance to the Capitol itself. The street is accessible to the general public, but the parking spot Class used is reserved on weekdays (like the Thursday he parked there) for employees of the House of Representatives. The parking lot is marked by a sign indicating a permit is required. Class locked his car and walked inside the Capitol. Upon his return, several police officers were peering into his car. One asked Class if he had any weapons inside, and he answered that he did. The officer told Class that it was illegal to have weapons on Capitol Grounds and took Class to Capitol Police headquarters. When the car was searched, three firearms were found.

Class was indicted for possession of a firearm while on the grounds of the Capitol, in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1) (the "Capitol Grounds ban"). He filed several motions seeking to dismiss the indictment, arguing, inter alia , that the Capitol Grounds ban violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms. The district court denied these motions from the bench, holding that the Capitol Grounds ban "does not burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment," because "laws prohibiting individuals from carrying firearms in sensitive places, such as government buildings, are presumptively lawful." Tr. of Mot. Hr’g at 18, United States v. Class , No. 1:13-cr-0253-1 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 2014), Dkt. No. 193. Class subsequently entered an unconditional guilty plea.

Class appealed his conviction on both constitutional and statutory grounds. United States v. Class , No. 15-3015, 2016 WL 10950032, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 5, 2016). We affirmed his conviction, holding that his unconditional guilty plea waived his right to appeal on those grounds. Id. at *2. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Class did not waive his constitutional claims because they challenged the government’s very power to make his conduct criminal. Class v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 798, 805, 200 L.Ed.2d 37 (2018).

On remand, we now consider the merits of those claims: first, that the ban as applied to Class’s conduct violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms, and second, that the ban violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because the law defining the Capitol Grounds is complicated enough that Class lacked notice that he was on them. Because these claims present questions of law, we review them de novo. United States v. Yakou , 428 F.3d 241, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2005).¹ The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II

To evaluate the constitutionality of firearms regulations, we first determine "whether a particular provision impinges upon a right protected by the Second Amendment." Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II ), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011). If it does, we ask "whether the provision passes muster under the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny." Id. Because we conclude that the Capitol Grounds ban does not "impinge[ ] upon a right protected by the Second Amendment," we do not reach the second question.

The Second Amendment protects the right to own and carry a firearm outside the home. Wrenn v. District of Columbia , 864 F.3d 650, 657-58 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ; see District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I ), 554 U.S. 570, 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). But the right is not unlimited. The Supreme Court has been careful to note that "longstanding prohibitions" like "laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings" remain "presumptively lawful." Heller I , 554 U.S. at 626, 627 n.26, 128 S.Ct. 2783. A challenger may rebut this presumption only by "showing the regulation [has] more than a de minimis effect upon his right" to bear arms. Heller II , 670 F.3d at 1253.

With respect to the Capitol itself, there are few, if any, government buildings more "sensitive" than the "national legislature at the very seat of its operations." Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of the Capitol Police , 421 F.2d 1090, 1093 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1969). And tragically, gunmen have targeted the Capitol before. Francis Clines, Capitol Hill Slayings: The Overview; Gunman Invades Capitol, Killing 2 Guards , N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 1998), https://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/25/us/capitol-hill-slayings-the-overview-gunman-invades-capitol-killing-2-guards.html.

Class, however, was found with a firearm in the Maryland Avenue parking lot, not the Capitol itself. He argues that Heller I refers only to bans on possession "in sensitive places like government buildings," and the "Maryland Avenue outdoor parking lot, like most of the Capitol Grounds, is certainly not ‘in a government building.’ " Suppl. Class Br. 22. As a result, he claims, the ban is "outside of any presumption of constitutionality that applies only ‘in’ sensitive places." Id . This argument slices Heller I too thin. The Supreme Court was careful to note that Heller I ’s list of "presumptively lawful" regulations was not exhaustive, see 554 U.S. at 627 n.26, 128 S.Ct. 2783, and we have little trouble concluding that the same security interests which permit regulation of firearms "in" government buildings permit regulation of firearms on the property surrounding those buildings as well. Indeed, Class appears to concede this point elsewhere in his brief, agreeing with the government that the White House lawn, for instance, is "sensitive" for purposes of the Second Amendment. See Suppl. Class Br. 25 n.7.

As for the Maryland Avenue parking lot, although it is not a government building, we conclude that it is sufficiently integrated with the Capitol for Heller I ’s sensitive places exception to apply. Accordingly, we conclude that the Second Amendment does not give Class the right to bear arms in the Maryland Avenue lot. Several facts lead us to this determination.

First, though it is open to the public, the Maryland Avenue parking lot may be used during working hours only by Capitol employees with a permit. This makes the area a potential stalking ground for anyone wishing to attack congressional staff and disrupt the operations of Congress. The operation of the national legislature depends not only on the ability of members of Congress and their staff to conduct business inside the Capitol, but also on their ability to freely and safely travel to and from work. The same special security concerns that apply to the employees while in the Capitol apply when they walk to and from their cars on Capitol property.

Second, the lot is close to the Capitol and legislative office buildings. Class possessed a firearm less than 1,000 feet away from the entrance to the Capitol, and a block away from the Rayburn House Office Building. Although there is surely some outer bound on the distance Congress could extend the area of protection around the Capitol without raising Second Amendment concerns, Congress has not exceeded it here.

Finally, as the owner of the Maryland Avenue lot, the government—like private property owners—has the power to regulate conduct on its property. See Adderley v. Florida , 385 U.S. 39, 47, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966) (observing in the free-speech context that the government, "no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated"); cf. Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv. , 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015) (observing that when the U.S. Postal Service acts "as a proprietor rather than as a sovereign, [it] has broad discretion to govern its business operations according to the rules it deems appropriate").

In sum, because the Maryland Avenue lot has been set aside for the use of government employees, is in close proximity to the Capitol building, and is on land owned by the government, we consider the lot as a single unit with the Capitol building, and conclude that the lot is a "sensitive" place where firearms prohibitions are presumptively lawful. Accord id. at 1125-28 (finding that a post office parking lot is "sensitive" for Second Amendment purposes); United States v. Dorosan , 350 F. App'x 874, 875 (5th Cir. 2009) (same).

Class raises two counterarguments. First, he tries to distinguish the Maryland Avenue lot from other outdoor government property that is protected by security or not accessible to the public. In support, he points to language from Wrenn , where we concluded that the Second Amendment "enables self-defense at least against the level of threat generally faced by those covered by the...