United States v. Clayton

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. NICHOLAS JARROD CLAYTON

CRIMINAL No. 2:18-cr-52-TBM-MTP

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division

August 2, 2023

ORDER

TAYLOR B. MCNEEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Nicholas Jarrod Clayton filed a Motion [44] for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Clayton asks the Court to grant him compassionate release because of the extreme hardship his incarceration places on his family and because he is non-violent. The Court finds that Clayton's Motion [44] should be denied, as his claims do not constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a reduction in sentence. United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2021). But even if they did, the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) weigh against a sentence reduction.

As discussed in more detail below, the Court has found no legal basis for the proposition that the placement of Clayton's daughter in foster care is an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. Regardless, based on Clayton's criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the underlying charges in this case, Clayton has not proven that he could assume the responsibilities as his daughter's caretaker if released. Not only did Clayton engage in several drug transactions selling marijuana, ecstasy, Xanax, and methamphetamine-during which a young child was present-but he also sold six firearms during the same six-month period.

Additionally Clayton provides no legal authority to support his contention that he is nonviolent and should receive a reduction in sentence. Instead, he offers only conclusory assertions which are insufficient to demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting his release.

Finally reducing Clayton's 68 month term of imprisonment would be inconsistent with the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In making this determination, the Court considered a number of factors, including the nature and circumstances of his offense and his prior criminal history. The presentence investigation report indicates that Clayton has prior convictions for domestic violence, possession of marijuana, a DUI, and multiple traffic violations including no child restraint.

For all of the reasons discussed fully below, Clayton has not shown extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying a reduction in sentence but even if he did, the Section 3553(a) factors weigh against reducing Clayton's sentence. Clayton's Motion [44] is therefore denied.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Beginning in January 2018 and continuing through June 2018, Clayton engaged in multiple drug transactions selling a variety of drugs in various quantities. Specifically, Clayton sold multiple grams of marijuana, 28 units of ecstasy, Xanax, and one fourth of an ounce of methamphetamine. [39], ¶¶ 54, 59, 61, 66, 74. According to the presentence investigation report, which was unobjected to, a young child was also present during one of the drug transactions. [39], ¶ 54. The presentence investigation report further provides that Clayton sold six firearms during that same six-month period. [39], ¶¶ 54, 56, 61.

Ultimately, Clayton was named in a five-count indictment on December 12, 2018, and was charged with one count of distributing marijuana, three counts of selling firearms, and one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. With assistance of counsel, Clayton entered into a plea agreement with the Government. Clayton agreed to plead guilty to Count 1, distribution of marijuana, and Count 3, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in exchange for the Government moving to dismiss the remaining counts.

Clayton was sentenced by this Court on July 7, 2021. In calculating the advisory guideline range, the Court considered his offense level of 10 and his criminal history category of II, which includes Clayton's prior convictions of domestic violence, possession of marijuana, driving with a suspended license, and a DUI. [39], ¶¶ 99, 100. As outlined in the presentence investigation report, Clayton also has a history of traffic violations such as no child restraint. Id. at ¶ 103. Upon consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors, this Court sentenced Clayton to a guideline range of 68 months imprisonment for distribution of marijuana and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.

Now before the Court is Clayton's Motion [44] for reduction in sentence. Clayton cites two reasons he is entitled to such relief: (1) his family has suffered hardship due to his incarceration and (2) he is non-violent. The Government opposes Clayton's Motion arguing that his claims do not justify a reduction in sentence or release.

II. EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT

Before the Court may consider Clayton's Motion, Clayton must have first “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on [his] behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of [his] facility, whichever is earlier.” United States v. Powell, 834 Fed.Appx. 940 (5th Cir. 2021). The Fifth Circuit has determined that while “the requirement is not jurisdictional,” it is a “mandatory claim-processing rule.” United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467-68 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (citing Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 692 (5th Cir. 2019) (overruled in part on other grounds)).

“A claim-processing rule is a rule that ‘seek[s] to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.'” Pierre-Paul, 930 F.3d at 692 (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011)). “A claim-processing rule is mandatory to the extent a court must enforce the rule if a party properly raises it.” Id. (citing Fort Bend Cty. v. Davis, ---U.S., 139 S.Ct. 1843, 1849, 204 L.Ed.2d 116 (2019)). “But an objection based on a mandatory claim-processing rule may be forfeited ‘if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.'” Id. Stated differently, exhaustion is mandatory if properly raised, but may be waived or forfeited by an opposing party. Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, --- U.S. ----, 139 S.Ct. 710, 714, 203 L.Ed.2d 43 (2019); United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1179 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding that the government failed to invoke Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement, and therefore forfeited its benefit because “[f]ailure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense . . . not a jurisdictional issue that the courts must reach even if the litigants elect not to raise it.”).

Here, the Government does not argue that Clayton has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Instead, the Government addresses his Motion on the merits. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Government has not properly raised any applicable exhaustion requirement. The Court will therefore proceed to the merits of Clayton's Motion. United States v. Rodney, No. CR 10-102, 2021 WL 1267795, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 6, 2021); United States v. Morrison, No. CR-16-36-MVL, 2022 WL 4365879, at *2 (E.D. La. Sep. 21, 2022); See Franco, 973 F.3d at 468 (explaining “because the government properly raised the rule in the district court, this ‘court must enforce the rule.'”) (emphasis added).

III. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

“As a general rule, federal courts ‘may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.'” United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). But that general rule is subject to a few exceptions, including a motion for reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Prior to the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, such motions could only be presented to a court upon a request by the warden of the defendant's facility. But now a prisoner may move for reduction in sentence “on their own accord.” United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2021).

Congress has dictated that a prisoner seeking a reduction in sentence must prove that (1) an “extraordinary and compelling reason” justifies the sentence reduction; (2) the relief sought is consistent with the Sentencing Commission's applicable policy statements; and (3) the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors weigh in favor of the requested relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Before the First Step Act, the relief sought had to be consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. However, the Sentencing Commission has not issued a policy statement since the First Step Act amended Section 3582 to allow prisoners, not just the BOP, to file motions for reduction in sentence. Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 392. Since no applicable policy statement currently exists for prisoner-filed motions, a prisoner who files a motion for reduction in sentence must show only that (1) an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief exists and (2) a sentence reduction would be consistent with the Section 3553(a) sentencing factors. Id. at 392-93. The Court will consider each in turn.

A. Extraordinary and compelling reasons

To begin, Congress has not “defined or provided examples of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons' that might warrant a reduction.” United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 2021).

And while the Sentencing Commission's policy statement U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, is no longer binding on courts when a Section 3582(c)(1)(A) motion is filed by a prisoner himself, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 “may inform the district court's analysis” on the merits of a request for reduction in sentence. Shkambi, 993 F.3d at 393 (holding that a district court “is...