United States v. Cottrell

636 F.Supp.3d 797

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Keith COTTRELL, Defendant.

Criminal Case No. 21-20676

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

Signed October 21, 2022

Jihan M. Williams, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.

Federal Community Defender, Public Defender, Detroit, MI, Celeste Kinney, Public Defender, Federal Community Defender Detroit, MI, Nancy L. McGunn, Public Defender, Federal Defender Office, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS (ECF NO. 17)

LINDA V. PARKER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendant Keith Cottrell ("Defendant") has been charged with Possession with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(vi). The charge arises from a stop of Defendant by two Michigan State Police officers outside of a Greyhound bus station in Detroit, MI on October 18, 2021. Defendant now moves to suppress the fentanyl the officers uncovered during the stop, claiming he was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

I. Factual Background

On October 18, 2021, Officers Chadwick Bloom and Matt Kiser (the "Officers") "performed interdiction" at the Greyhound bus station, which included "observing the queue line for the outbound bus to observe any overt reactions" due to the bus being "utilized regularly by narcotics traffickers moving drugs from Detroit to out of state destinations." (ECF No. 21 at Pg ID 76-77; ECF No. 21-1 at Pg ID 89.) Officers surveilled both the inside and outside of the bus station with a focus on arriving passengers. (ECF No. 21 at Pg ID 77.) According to the Government, Officer Bloom has been in law enforcement for approximately eight years. (Id.) Officer Kiser has been in law enforcement for approximately twenty-six years. (Id.) Both officers claim to have experience and familiarity with tactics used by drug traffickers to engage in drug trafficking. (Id.)

As the bus began boarding for its 12:50 p.m. departure, Defendant was dropped off outside of the station in a car, which departed immediately. Defendant entered the station carrying a black backpack, a red backpack, and a drawstring bag. Once Defendant was a few steps inside of the station, he "suddenly stopped, looked down at something in his hand, and then turned and exited the bus station." (ECF No. 17 ¶ 3, Pg ID 47.) According to the officers, Defendant's behavior of arriving late to the bus station, getting dropped off in a car, seeing marked police presence upon entry into the station, and immediately exiting and getting into a different car other than the one he arrived in, made officers believe that Defendant was attempting to "leave the station due to police presence." (ECF No. 21 at Pg ID 78; ECF No. 21-1 at Pg ID 90.)

At approximately 12:48 p.m., Defendant entered a taxicab as it waited in front of the station. Within a few seconds after Defendant closed the door, officers exited the station and headed towards the taxicab where Defendant was located. Upon arriving at the taxicab, one officer placed his laptop on the hood of the car and then both approached the car door, while one officer knocked on the backseat passenger window. Once the car door opened, the officers approached Defendant and questioned him, which included a request to see his driver's license. According to the Government, Defendant "appeared startled, kept looking past officers, and appeared to fabricate a comment about forgetting his keys." (ECF No. 21 at Pg ID 78.)

The officers then asked Defendant to step out of the car and requested permission to search his bags, at which point Defendant declined. The officers then ran Defendant's driver's license and discovered that he had an active arrest warrant for cocaine possession. Defendant was then arrested. Following the arrest and the K9 sniff of Defendant's bags, officers searched the bags and found over 200 grams of a substance containing heroin and fentanyl.

II. Parties' Arguments

Defendant moves to suppress the drugs, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize and search him. Defendant maintains that the officers had nothing more than a hunch that Defendant was involved in criminal activity, which does not support reasonable suspicion to stop or search him.

The Government maintains that the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to stop Defendant when (1) he arrived late for the bus, (2) arrived in a car, entered the bus station and immediately left upon seeing marked officers, (3) got into a taxicab, which was different then the vehicle he arrived in, and (4) immediately attempted to leave the station. According to the Government, these factors, combined with the fact that Defendant "arrived to board a bus known to law enforcement to be used by drug traffickers to distribute drugs out of state," demonstrates evidence of reasonable suspicion to satisfy the requirements for a Terry stop. (ECF No. 21 at Pg ID 83.) After reviewing the record, the Court is granting Defendant's motion to suppress due to the officers lacking reasonable suspicion to seize Defendant.

III. Applicable Law

The Fourth Amendment safeguards "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A law enforcement officer's stop of a suspect—though potentially brief in duration—demonstrably infringes upon the suspect's liberty and thus constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ("[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person.").

An investigatory stop must be lawful at its inception—i.e., justified by the requisite level of suspicion. Id. "[P]ursuant to Terry, a warrantless encounter may be countenanced under the Fourth Amendment if an officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot." United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2008). "Reasonable suspicion 'requires more than a mere hunch, but is satisfied by a likelihood of criminal activity less than probable cause, and falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.' " Id. at 370-71 (quoting Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 395 (6th Cir. 2008)) (additional quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 354 (6th Cir. 2005) (reasonable suspicion must be "supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur."). Moreover, "officers [may] draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person." Id. at 371 (quoting United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374, 380 (6th Cir. 2008)); United States v. Calvetti, 836 F.3d 654, 666 (6th Cir. 2016).

When conducting a Terry stop, the "stop and inquiry must be 'reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.' " United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868). "Typically, this means that an officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509, 519 (6th Cir. 2014).

For Fourth Amendment purposes, an officer seizes an individual "when the officer restrains the person's freedom of movement 'by means of physical force or a show of authority.' " United States v. Lewis, 843 F. App'x 683, 688 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). Stated differently, a seizure occurs "when a reasonable person would not believe he or she was free to leave or disregard the officer's requests." Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2004)).

To constitute a seizure, the individual must actually surrender to the officer's show of authority. Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 2010)). "The question of when a seizure occurs is relevant because 'once a consensual encounter escalates to the point where the individual is 'seized,' the police officer must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a Terry stop, or probable cause to justify an arrest, in order for the seizure to comply with the Fourth Amendment.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949, 954 (6th Cir. 2007)). "Examples of circumstances that indicate a seizure include 'the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled.' " Id. at 689 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870). "Simple police questioning is insufficient to constitute a seizure." Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)).

IV. Analysis

As an initial matter, the parties agree that Defendant was seized when the two marked officers approached the taxicab and placed a laptop on the hood of the taxi, which prevented it from moving. (See ECF No. 17 at Pg ID 58; ECF No. 21 at Pg ID 79.) Additionally, the officers also stood at the open door while questioning the Defendant, followed by additional officers approaching the vehicle, including an officer accompanied by a drug sniffing dog. See United States v. Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 398-99 (6th Cir. 2011) ("Although [l]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures by approaching individuals in public places and asking questions, a consensual ...