United States v. Crespin

680 F.Supp.3d 1227

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Michael CRESPIN, Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cr-1759-WJ

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

Filed July 5, 2023

Jackson Tavo Hall, DOJ-USAO, Albuquerque, NM, David M. Walsh, Norman Cairns, U.S. Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

WILLIAM P. JOHNSON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Michael Crespin's Motion for Compassionate Release Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Doc. 188. The Defendant argues that he was incorrectly classified as a career offender resulting in a Guidelines calculation that was improperly high. Id. 6-8. He argues that had the career offender enhancement not applied, he may have already completed his term of imprisonment. Id. at 7. The Defendant further argues that his family circumstances and personal health concerns support compassionate release. Id. at 11-13. The Defendant contends that both arguments, taken together, constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances justifying compassionate release. Upon review of the parties' briefing and the applicable law, the Court concludes the circumstances presented by the Defendant do not rise to the extraordinary and compelling level required to grant compassionate release. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

In September 2015, the Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of Armed Bank Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d). Doc. 115 at 2. The Defendant was sentenced to 156 months of imprisonment in May 2016. Doc. 143 at 1. The Defendant is currently incarcerated at FCI Hazelton and has served 107 months of his sentence. Doc. 188 at 12.

The Defendant exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing the instant motion. On June 16, 2022, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") denied the Defendant's request to file a motion for compassionate release, concluding the Defendant's circumstances are not extraordinary and compelling as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Id. at 3. The Defendant filed the instant motion with the assistance of counsel on April 7, 2023.

The Defendant cites four reasons in support of compassionate release. First, the Defendant argues that, had he been sentenced three months later, he would not have been designated a career offender in light of the August 2016 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which removed burglary as a predicate crime of violence for the career offender enhancement. Doc. 188 at 7. Second, he cites the need to care for ailing family members. Id. at 12. Third, he cites personal health concerns that he claims are exacerbated by the ongoing threat of COVID-19. Id. at 2. Fourth, he cites his efforts at rehabilitation while imprisoned. Id. 9. Whether considered individually or cumulatively, the Court concludes that the circumstances cited by the Defendant are not extraordinary and compelling as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and therefore do not justify compassionate release.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

Defendant moves for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Doc. 188 at 1. Generally, a federal court is prohibited from modifying a term of imprisonment once imposed. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011); United States v. Wilson, 493 F. App'x 919, 921 (10th Cir. 2012). However, Congress has provided a limited exception to this rule and allowed for compassionate release for "extraordinary and compelling reasons." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Before the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. Law 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (Dec. 21, 2018), only the BOP could seek compassionate release, making the defendant "wholly dependent upon the Director of the BOP [to do] so on his or her behalf." United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir. 2021).

The First Step Act modified Section 3582(c)(1)(A) with the intent of "increasing the use and transparency of compassionate release." 132 Stat. at 5239. The provision now reads, in relevant part:

[T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—

. . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A federal prisoner now may file a motion for compassionate release after he has fully exhausted all of his administrative rights to appeal the BOP's failure to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or after the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility. Id. It is undisputed that the Defendant requested that the BOP file a petition for his release and that said request was denied. Doc. 192-2, 1-3. As such, Defendant has satisfied the exhaustion requirement.

Where the exhaustion requirement is met, the Tenth Circuit has held that § 3582(c)(1)(A) creates a "three-step test." United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1043 (10th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 831 (10th Cir. 2021). Under the first step, the Court must find whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction. McGee, 992 F.3d at 1042. The second step requires the Court to find whether such a sentence reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Id. For the third step, the Court is to consider any applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and make a discretionary determination whether the reduction authorized by steps one and two is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case. Id.; see also Maumau, 993 F.3d at 831. The Court may deny a compassionate release motion based on lack of any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) and does not need to address the others. McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043; Maumau, 993 F.3d at 831 n.4.

Because the United States Sentencing Commission has not issued an applicable policy statement for motions for compassionate release filed by a defendant, the second step does not apply.¹ See Maumau, 993 F.3d at 836-37; McGee, 992 F.3d at 1049-50. Further, the Court need not engage in the third-step analysis of the § 3553(a) factors if it determines there is no extraordinary and compelling reason justifying release. United States v. Hald, 8 F.4th 932, 942-43 (10th Cir. 2021). In this case, the Court need only reach the first step because the Defendant has not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons in support of compassionate release.

DISCUSSION

The Defendant asserts two categories of arguments in support of compassionate release. First, he makes a legal argument that he would not be classified as a career offender in light of the 2016 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. Second, the Defendant asserts his factual circumstances—his need to provide care for family members, his personal health ailments, and his rehabilitative efforts—amount to extraordinary and compelling circumstances. The Court addresses each argument in turn.

I. Defendant failed to present an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.

A. The 2016 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 does not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for release.

The Defendant argues that his sentence would have been more lenient had it been imposed after August 2016, when the U.S.S.C. amended § 4B1.2 to remove burglary from the list of offenses that constitute a predicate crime of violence for the purposes of the career offender enhancement. Doc. 188 at 7. The Defendant contends that post-amendment, he would not be classified as a career offender because one of the offenses supporting his career offender designation was his 2001 residential burglary conviction. Id. He argues that but-for his classification as a career offender, his Guidelines sentencing range would have been 120 to 150 months of imprisonment, rather than 188 to 235. Id. The Defendant further argues that he would have been able to negotiate a more advantageous plea deal without the career offender enhancement. Id. The Defendant's argument fails because, even without his residential burglary conviction, his 1992 and 2002 armed robbery convictions are sufficient to qualify him as a career offender under § 4B1.1(a). Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") ¶¶ 44, 49.²

Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), defendant is a career offender if

"(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense."

It is undisputed that the Defendant meets the first two requirements. The parties' dispute is confined to whether the Defendant has two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence that qualify him as a career offender. The term "crime of violence" includes robbery offenses punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). The Defendant served nine years in custody for a 1992 armed robbery conviction and more than four years in custody for a 2002 armed robbery...