United States v. De La Cruz

674 F.Supp.3d 1

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Ángel DE LA CRUZ, Defendant.

Criminal No. 17-648 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

Signed May 26, 2023

Edwin Giovannie Mercado, AUSA, Juan C. Reyes-Ramos, AUSA, Sean R. Gajewski, United States Department of Justice United States Attorney's Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Defendant Ángel De la Cruz ("De la Cruz") moves the Court for a sentence reduction pursuant to the compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Docket No. 137.) For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES De la Cruz's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 11, 2017, the United States Coast Guard apprehended a vessel loaded with approximately 1,051 kilograms of cocaine and manned by a three-person crew, one of whom was De la Cruz. (Docket No. 107 at p. 17.) De la Cruz was indicted on two counts pursuant to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act ("MDLEA"), count one for conspiracy to possess a controlled substance on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States pursuant to 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503 and 70506; and count two for possession of a controlled substance on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and aiding and abetting, pursuant to 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503 and 70506, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Docket No. 12; Docket No. 137 at p. 3.) He was indicted in count three for conspiracy to import a controlled substance pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960, and 963. (Docket No. 12.) Each count carried a minimum term of imprisonment of ten years. (Docket No. 54 at p. 9.)

De la Cruz entered a straight guilty plea to all three counts on March 26, 2018. (Docket No. 108 at p. 14.) He argued at his change of plea hearing that he should be eligible for an exception from the mandatory minimum pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), commonly referred to as the 'statutory safety valve.' (Docket No. 107 at p. 15.) This statute allows a court to sentence defendants below the mandatory minimum if they meet certain requirements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The Court denied the motion, however, holding that MDLEA offenses are not covered by the text of the statute. (Docket No. 56.)

At sentencing, the government agreed to a two-level reduction pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") section 2D1.1(b)(17),¹ which has the same eligibility requirements as the statutory safety valve, but no restriction on what offenses to which it can apply. (Docket No. 108 at p. 4.) Section 2D1.1(b)(17) does not, however, provide an escape from the mandatory minimum. See Docket No. 108 at p. 3. De la Cruz also argued that he merited an additional two-level reduction pursuant to guideline section 3B1.2(b) because his role in the crime was minor, which would carry another four-level additional downward adjustment pursuant to section 2D1.1(a)(5). (Docket No. 108 at p. 4.) He argued that he was merely a drug courier and did not plan the trip, and that compared with the other two defendants he played a lesser role in the venture. Id. at pp. 5-6. The government opposed, arguing that pursuant to First Circuit Court of Appeals caselaw, being a courier does not entitle a defendant to an automatic minor role reduction, and that the quantity of cocaine on the boat which, by the government's estimate, would have had a street value of approximately $26 million in Puerto Rico, cut against finding that De la Cruz performed a minor role. Id. at pp. 11-12. The Court denied the minor role adjustment, finding that the amount of cocaine and its value demonstrated a level of entrustment that was not commensurate with a minor role. Id. at p. 13. With no prior criminal history and therefore criminal history category I, the Court determined De la Cruz's guideline range was 135 to 168 months. Id. at pp. 15-16.

Considering the sentencing factors pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ("section 3553(a)"), the Court noted that De la Cruz had no prior criminal history, was a 27-year-old Dominican national who had been a self-employed fisherman his whole life, had no history of using controlled substances or alcohol to excess, nor any history of mental health issues, and imposed a variant sentence of 120 months, the mandatory minimum. Id. at p. 16. The Court stated that 120 months would be "sufficient but not greater than necessary." Id. at pp. 16-17.

De la Cruz appealed his sentence, arguing that MDLEA offenses were eligible for the statutory safety valve, and that he had been improperly denied a minor role reduction. (Docket No. 137 at p. 4.) In the meantime, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018 ("First Step Act") which, among other changes to sentencing law, amended the statutory safety valve to explicitly include MDLEA offenses. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221 (2018). In 2021, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on De la Cruz's appeal and held that the statutory safety valve, although now amended to include MDLEA offenses, did not include MDLEA offenses at the time De la Cruz was sentenced, and thus affirmed his sentence. United States v. De la Cruz, 998 F.3d 508, 513 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Cruz v. United States, — U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 633, 211 L.Ed.2d 385 (2021). Because that question was determinative of the outcome, the court did not reach the question of whether De la Cruz's role was minor. Id. at 510.

De la Cruz moved for compassionate release on March 15, 2023, arguing that the sentencing disparities created by the change in the law pursuant to the First Step Act, as well as disparities in how the statutory safety valve was applied before the law was amended, created an extraordinary and compelling reason to warrant a reduction in his sentence. (Docket No. 137.) The government opposed the application, arguing that the change in the law alone was not sufficient to grant a reduction. (Docket No. 142.) De la Cruz replied. (Docket No. 147.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The First Step Act amended the compassionate release statute, allowing applicants themselves to make requests for sentence reductions to the court once they have exhausted administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons. See Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A court may not modify a term of imprisonment, however, unless "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). If the Court finds that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, it must still consider the sentencing factors set forth in section 3553(a), and the reduction must be consistent with "applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id. at § 3582(c)(1)(A).

III. DISCUSSION

The parties agree that De la Cruz has exhausted his administrative remedies, and that the issue is whether he meets the "extraordinary and compelling" standard for compassionate release. (Docket No. 142 at p. 2.)

De la Cruz argues that his circumstances are extraordinary and compelling because, had he been sentenced about five months later, the First Step Act would have allowed this Court a 'safety valve' from imposing the mandatory minimum of ten years in prison. (Docket No. 137 at p. 1.) De la Cruz also notes that data shows a wide disparity in the application of the safety valve for MDLEA offenses before the passage of the First Step Act, with 54% of cases in the First Circuit sentenced to less than the mandatory minimum. Id. at pp. 2, 7-8; Docket No. 137-1 at p. 4. He argues that had the Court had the discretion it now enjoys, it could have varied downward even further than it did, considering he was a low-level underling and not the type of kingpin the mandatory minimum was meant for. (Docket No. 137 at pp. 11-12.) He argues that the sentencing factors should not bar his compassionate release as he had no prior criminal record, accepted responsibility, his offense was nonviolent, and he has a young family he will rejoin in the Dominican Republic. (Docket No. 137 at pp. 15-17.)

The government argues that De la Cruz's application is based only on a change in the law that would not automatically have lowered his sentence were it in effect at the time, and that he alleges no other fact to make his circumstances extraordinary and compelling. (Docket No. 142 at p. 6.) The government also argues that the section 3553(a) sentencing factors cut against early release for De la Cruz, because he does not allege any serious medical condition, he participated in a drug-trafficking conspiracy, and if and when he is released, his deportation will mean he will not be supervised. Id. at pp. 7-9.

Extraordinary and Compelling

Congress did not define what makes a compassionate release application "extraordinary and compelling," instead delegating to the Sentencing Commission the task of issuing guidance through policy statements. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). The Sentencing Commission, however, has not issued a new policy statement following the passage of the First Step Act, and thus the First Circuit Court of Appeals has directed that the existing policy statement is not applicable to prisoner-initiated applications, but only to applications initiated by the Bureau of Prisons. See United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2022). "[U]ntil the Sentencing Commission speaks, the only limitation on what can be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant a prisoner-initiated motion is rehabilitation." United States v. Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 25, 26). Thus, "section 3582(c)(1)(A) must encompass an individualized review of a defendant's circumstances and permit a sentence reduction — in the district court's sound discretion — based on any combination of factors (including unanticipated post-sentencing developments in the law)." Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 26. A district court may therefore consider even non-retroactive changes in the...