United States v. Cueto-Sanchez

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. YOUANNY CUETO-SANCHEZ, REINALDO BARBOSA GUEBARA, and CARLOS GUZMAN-JAVIER, Defendants.

No. 22-cr-20282-BLOOM

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

August 29, 2022

OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

BETH BLOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants Jose Yovanny Cueto-Sanchez's (“Cueto”) Motion to Dismiss Indictment, ECF No. [14], Carlos Guzman-Javier's (“Guzman”) Motion to Dismiss Indictment, ECF No [16], Reinaldo Barbosa Guebara's (“Guebara”) (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss Indictment, ECF No. [17] (collectively “Motions”). The Government filed a Response to Defendants' Motions, ECF No. [20] (“Response”), to which Cueto filed a Reply, ECF No. [22] (“Reply”). To date, Guzman and Barbosa have not replied. The Court has considered the Motions, the record, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions are denied.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the Criminal Complaint, on or about June 2, 2022, a Maritime Patrol Aircraft (“MPA”) located a go-fast vessel (“GFV”) operating approximately 108 nautical miles northwest of Oranjestad, Aruba in international waters upon the high seas. See ECF No. [1] (“Complaint”). The HNLMS GRONINGEN, manned by United States Coast Guard (“USCG”) Law Enforcement Detached Team (“LEDET”) 109, investigated the GFV. Defendants were on the GFV. During the right of visit questioning, Cueto, who was the master of the vessel, claimed Dominican nationality for the vessel. Upon being contacted by U.S. authorities, the Government of the Dominican Republic could neither confirm nor deny registry of the vessel. See id. Accordingly, the vessel was treated as a stateless vessel under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”). A full law enforcement boarding ensued, and law enforcement officials found 630 kilograms of cocaine.

On June 28, 2022, Defendants were charged by Indictment with conspiracy to possess a controlled substance onboard a vessel in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70506(b) of the MDLEA and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance onboard a vessel in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1) of the MDLEA and 18 U.S.C. § 2. ECF No. [6] (“Indictment”).

Defendants now seek dismissal of the Indictment asserting that: (1) the MDLEA's definition of a “stateless” vessel in § 70502(d)(1)(C) is facially unconstitutional because it applies to vessels that are not “stateless” under customary international law and therefore exceeds Congress's authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 (“Felonies Clause”); (2) the United States' authority pursuant to the MDLEA is limited to offenses occurring on the “high Seas,” and the alleged offenses did not take place on the “high Seas” because the offenses took place within the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”) of Venezuela; and (3) Congress's power under the Felonies Clause is limited to offenses bearing a nexus to the United States and the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendants violates Due Process. See ECF Nos. [14], [16], [17]. With regard to Defendants' first argument, Defendants rely on United States v. Davila-Reyes, 23 F. 4th 153 (1st Cir. 2022). There, the First Circuit held that 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) is facially unconstitutional because the provision applies to vessels that are not “stateless” under customary international law and therefore exceeds Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause.^[1]

The Government responds that Defendants' arguments are foreclosed by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent. See ECF No. [20] (citing United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2017); United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2014)). That precedent expressly upholds MDLEA prosecutions in cases where the vessel's claimed nation of registry could not corroborate the registry claim and cases where vessels were deemed to be on the high seas because they were outside territorial waters.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

a. Motion to Dismiss Indictment

A motion to dismiss an indictment is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b). A defendant may challenge an indictment on various grounds, including failure to state an offense, lack of jurisdiction, or constitutional reasons. See United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012). “Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) an indictment may be dismissed where there is an infirmity of law in the prosecution; a court may not dismiss an indictment, however, on a determination of facts that should have developed at trial.” United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 1987). Further, “[t]he sufficiency of a criminal indictment is determined from its face.” United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 307 (11th Cir. 1992). “The indictment is sufficient if it charges in the language of the statute.” Id. “Constitutional requirements are fulfilled ‘by an indictment that tracks the wording of the statute, as long as the language sets forth the essential elements of the crime.'” Id. at 308; see also United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 760 (11th Cir. 1985). The indictment's allegations are assumed to be true and are viewed in the light most favorable to the government. See Torkington, 812 F.2d at 1354.

b. MDLEA

The Felonies Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations[.]” U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. Pursuant to the Felonies Clause, Congress enacted the MDLEA, which makes drug trafficking on certain vessels in the high seas subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501 et seq. The MDLEA applies to all cases where the alleged trafficking occurs on a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States[.]” 46 U.S.C. § 70503(e)(1). The MDLEA further defines a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to include “(C) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and for which the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality.” 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C).

III. DISCUSSION

a. MDLEA's Definition of a Stateless Vessel

Defendants first argue that the Indictment must be dismissed because 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C) of the MDLEA is facially unconstitutional. See ECF Nos. [14] at 4-12, [16] at 5-14, [17] at 4-12. According to Defendants, Congress's authority under the Felonies Clause to “define and punish . . . Felonies committed on the high Seas” is limited by customary international law. See ECF Nos. [14] at 5, [16] at 6, [17] at 5. International law only allows jurisdiction over stateless vessels. See ECF Nos. [14] at 8, [16] at 9, [17] at 8 (citing Davila-Reyes, 23 F.4th at 180). When a master or individual in charge of a vessel makes a claim of nationality, international law considers the vessel to have established a prima facie showing of nationality that does not render the vessel stateless, even if the claimed nation of registry does not confirm or deny the nationality of the vessel. See ECF Nos. [14] at 8, [16] at 10, [17] at 9. In contrast, § 70502(d)(1)(C) of the MDLEA confers jurisdiction over a vessel if the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality. As such, Defendants submit that § 70502(d)(1)(C) of the MDLEA is facially unconstitutional because it extends beyond Congress's constitutional authority under the Felonies Clause.

Defendants further argue that the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the issue and the Court should consider the First Circuit's holding in Davila-Reyes. See ECF Nos. [14] at 9-12, [16] at 1114, [17] at 10-12. According to Defendants, Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292, involved a statutory challenge pursuant to the MDLEA rather than a constitutional challenge of the MDLEA. See ECF Nos. [14] at 9-10, [16] at 11, [17] at 10. Defendants claim that the defendants in Hernandez argued unavailingly that the Government failed to establish jurisdiction pursuant to § 70502(d)(1)(C) because the vessel was not actually stateless. See ECF Nos. [14] at 10, [16] at 11, [17] at 10. The defendants in Hernandez did not challenge the constitutionality of § 70502(d)(1)(C).

The Government responds that Defendants misinterpret binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, namely Hernandez, 864 F.3d at 1303, where Guatemala “had not ‘affirmatively and unequivocally' asserted that [the vessel] was of Guatemalan nationality,” and Campbell, 743 F.3d at 809-810, where Haiti “could neither confirm nor deny the registry” claim. See ECF No. [20] at 2. According to the Government, the two cases presented the identical criminal offense and factual circumstances as the instant case, and the Eleventh Circuit held that the MDLEA conferred jurisdiction over the defendants. See id. at 15-16. Further, in Hernandez, the Eleventh Circuit specifically held that “the MDLEA was a constitutional exercise of Congressional authority under the Felonies Clause.” See id. at 16 (citing 864 F.3d at 1303). In Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the defendant's “argu[ment] that Congress lacked the power under the Felonies Clause to define his conduct as a criminal offense,” thereby upholding the constitutionality of the MDLEA under the Felonies Clause. See id. at 5 (citing 743 F.3d at 806). Given binding Eleventh Circuit precedent, the Government argues that Defendants' reliance on the First Circuit's decision in Davila-Reyes is misplaced. See id. at 6-7.

In addition, the Government submits that, as a necessary...