United States v. D'Ambrosio

105 F.4th 533

UNITED STATES of America v. Anthony F. D'AMBROSIO, Appellant in 23-1310

United States of America v. Armando Enrique Delgado, Appellant in 23-1319

No. 23-1310

No. 23-1319

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Argued on January 31, 2024

Filed: June 26, 2024

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (District Court Nos. 1-15-cr-00003-002; 1-15-cr-00003-004), District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner

Patrick J. Bannon [Argued], Office of the United States Attorney, Middle District of Pennsylvania, 235 North Washington Avenue, P.O. Box 309, Ste. 311, Scranton, PA 18503, Carlo D. Marchioli, Office of the United States Attorney, 1501 North 6^th Street, 2^nd Floor, P.O. Box 202, Harrisburg, PA 17102, Counsel for Appellee

Edward J. Rymsza, III [Argued], Miele & Rymsza, 125 East Third Street, Williamsport, PA 17701, Counsel for Appellant D'Ambrosio

Frederick W. Ulrich [Argued], Office of the Federal Public Defender, 100 Chestnut Street, Ste. 306, Harrisburg, PA 17101, Counsel for Appellant Delgado

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, RESTREPO and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

A sentencing judge bears the responsibility of depriving or limiting a person's liberty by ordering a period of incarceration or probation. To assist with reintegration into society after a custodial sentence, that judge can also impose conditions of supervised release. Because a sentencing judge imposes these conditions, a sentencing judge must also be permitted to amend them. Accordingly, and for the following reasons, we hold that a district court has the authority to modify an arguably unlawful condition of supervised release raised in a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) when properly challenged below.

I.

From 2012 through 2015, a man named Albert Martinez operated a sex trafficking ring out of the Middle District of Pennsylvania that spanned various states including Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, Georgia, and Florida. Appellants Anthony D'Ambrosio and Armando Delgado worked for Martinez in various roles: transporting women and girls across state lines, collecting money, providing security, and supplying drugs to the victims.

In March 2015, a federal grand jury indicted Delgado and D'Ambrosio, as well as others involved in the organization, for their involvement in the sex trafficking business.¹ A jury convicted both Delgado and D'Ambrosio in December 2017,² and the two subsequently filed post-trial motions.³ In May and July of 2019, respectively, United States Probation prepared Presentence Investigation Reports for D'Ambrosio and Delgado, which recommended both men comply with the requirements of 34 U.S.C. § 20901, the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), as a condition of supervised release. Sex offender registration is triggered by an individual's conviction for a sex offense.⁴ A district court must decide, as a matter of law, if that person's conviction qualifies as a sex offense for purposes of imposing SORNA. United States v. Icker, 13 F.4th 321, 330 (3d Cir. 2021) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) requires the court to first determine whether the person has been convicted of a sex offense as defined in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)).

A.

At his sentencing in July 2019, Delgado objected to the imposition of SORNA registration as a condition of his supervised release. He argued that his offenses of conviction did not require SORNA registration.⁵ The District Court acknowledged that neither the court, counsel, nor Probation knew whether the SORNA requirement applied to Delgado's offenses. As a result, the District Court delegated that determination to Probation, noting that

we need to further investigate whether your offenses of conviction are qualifying offenses, and frankly at this juncture we simply don't know, but that is a matter for probation to determine and you will obviously be apprised of any registration requirements when you begin to report to the probation office.

J.A. 81.

Delgado filed a direct appeal to this Court in August 2019, appealing his judgment of conviction and sentence. We affirmed. United States v. Delgado, 827 F. App'x 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2020). As to Delgado's claim that the District Court erroneously required him to register under SORNA, we concluded that the District Court did not impose any such requirement. Id. at 184 ("The Judgement and Commitment Order [did] not mandate that Delgado register as a sex offender under SORNA.").

Following his direct appeal, Probation required Delgado to register under SORNA. In April 2021, Delgado challenged that condition in a motion pursuant to § 3583(e)(2). The District Court stayed the proceedings pending this Court's ruling in United States v. Icker, which held that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) requires the court to determine, as a matter of law, whether a person has been convicted of a sex offense as defined in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A). 13 F.4th at 330.

In February 2023, the District Court denied Delgado's § 3583(e)(2) motion. Despite "acknowledging the facial unconstitutionality of the challenged condition" in light of Icker, J.A. 8, the District Court held it "lack[ed] jurisdiction to consider [Delgado's] legal challenge to his obligation to comply with SORNA," id. at 9. It reasoned that "challenges to the legality of a condition of supervised release may not be raised in a Section 3583(e)(2) motion." Id.

Delgado timely appealed.

B.

Unlike Delgado, D'Ambrosio failed to object to the SORNA registration requirement at his February 2020 sentencing. The only question that arose regarding SORNA pertained to the length of D'Ambrosio's registration. See J.A. 94 ("The only question that I have [ ] about [ ] SORNA . . . is it a Tier 1? Is it a Tier 2? Or is it a Tier 3 requirement?"). His counsel confirmed on the record that "as a result of that conviction [ ] there would most likely be as part of [ ] supervised release some SORNA requirements.". J.A. 94. Although D'Ambrosio now asserts that "questions arose by the parties and the [D]istrict [C]ourt regarding the applicability of SORNA at all," D'Ambrosio Br. at 5, the record reflects no such questioning. Instead, his counsel affirmed its applicability, noting that "[he] certainly recognize[d] that this [was] a SORNA offense." Id. As a result, the District Court required D'Ambrosio to comply with SORNA as a condition of supervised release.

D'Ambrosio did not file a direct appeal. He first challenged the SORNA requirement in October 2021 via a pro se motion, followed by a June 2022 counseled § 3583(e)(2) motion to modify. In February 2023, the District Court denied D'Ambrosio's § 3583(e)(2) motion on the same grounds as Delgado's denial. D'Ambrosio timely appealed and we review both cases together.

II.

As a threshold matter, we must address our jurisdiction to review the District Court's denial of a motion filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction of these underlying criminal cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. United States v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009). Section 1291 grants appellate jurisdiction "from all final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court's § 3583(e)(2) denials in these cases constituted final decisions, closing the criminal cases below. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 855 F.3d 526, 530-31 (3d Cir. 2017) (determining appellate jurisdiction in the context of Section 3582(c)(2) because "[f]inal judgment in a criminal case means sentence" and "[l]ike sentencing judgments, rulings on Section 3582(c)(2) motions are 'unquestionably final decisions of [a] district[ ] court because they close the criminal cases once again.' " (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted)).

Nevertheless, our Court has yet to address whether we possess jurisdiction over appeals concerning a district court's denial of an individual's § 3583(e)(2) motion to modify conditions of supervised release. We have, however, held that we exercise jurisdiction over the imposition of additional conditions of supervised release raised in a § 3583(e)(2) motion. See United States v. Wilson, 707 F.3d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that appellate jurisdiction exists when appealing an order modifying conditions of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2)); United States v. Murray, 692 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to grant jurisdiction over appeals taken from a district court order adding a condition of supervised release).

Given that we possess jurisdiction to review the imposition of additional conditions of supervised release, it would be prejudicial to defendants to decline jurisdiction when reviewing the removal of such conditions. We thus exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to § 1291 to review a district court's denial of a § 3583(e) motion.

III.

Before reaching the merits of the appeals—the District Court's finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify conditions of supervised release—we must review the District Court's delegation of the SORNA registration condition to Probation. We review for abuse of discretion. See Wilson, 707 F.3d at 414; see also United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted).

"A condition [of supervised release] is within the court's discretion if two criteria are met. First, the condition must be reasonably related to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (2)(B)-(D) . . . . Second, a condition must involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the deterrence, public protection and/or correctional treatment for which it is imposed." United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). Thus, "[a]n abuse of discretion can occur if a district court fails to apply the proper legal standard." Melvin, 978 F.3d at 52 (...