United States v. Daskal

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. JACOB DASKAL, Defendant.

No. 21-CR-110 (NGG)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

June 7, 2023

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the court are Defendant Jacob Daskal's omnibus pretrial motions seeking to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to various search warrants and to compel the Government to file a bill of particulars. (See Defs Mot. for Bill of Particulars (Dkt. 47); Memorandum in Support (“Defs. Mot.”) (Dkt. 50).) The Government opposes Daskal's motions in full. (See generally Gov't Opp. (Dkt. 55).) For the reasons discussed below Daskal's motion are DENIED in all regards.

I. BACKGROUND

This case stems from Defendant Jacob Daskal's alleged sexual abuse of a 15-year-old girl (the “Victim”) from approximately August 2017 through November 2017. (Gov't Opp. at 3.)^[1] Daskal is the founder and chief of the Boro Park Shomrim Society, a private, Orthodox Jewish crime-patrol group. (Id.) He was 59 years old at the time of the alleged abuse. (Id.) The Government alleges that the Victim's family contacted Daskal in June 2017 to ask for help finding her a place to live after she ran away from home. (Gov't Opp. at 3-4.) Daskal offered to have the Victim stay with his family at his summer home in South Fallsburg New York; the Victim moved in shortly thereafter. (Id.) There, on a Saturday in August 2017, the Government alleges that Daskal began to sexually abuse the Victim. (Id.) The abuse continued on several other occasions over the summer, including two instances where Daskal drove the Victim to a location near where she went to camp to engage in sexual activity. (Id.) Daskal also told the Victim that “no one should see what we do” and that she should not tell anyone about the abuse because “it's just going to ruin your life.” (Id.) Daskal and the Victim later returned to Brooklyn, where he continued to engage in sexual activity with the Victim and sent her text messages describing his sexual fantasies. (Id. at 5.)

In October 2017, the Victim, with the assistance of Daskal, enrolled in Bais Yaakov High School in Chicago, Illinois. (Id.) The Government alleges that Daskal and the Victim shared sexually explicit text messages and Skype video chats while apart. (Id.) Daskal also traveled to meet the Victim in Chicago in November 2017, when they again engaged in sexual activity. (Id.) After disclosing her relationship with Daskal to a classmate and then recanting, the Victim was expelled from school in Chicago and sent back to Brooklyn. (Id.) The Victim's parents then sent her to live in Israel, where she continued to communicate with Daskal over social media. (Id.) Daskal then asked the Victim to write a letter stating that they engaged in sex as part of “therapy” and that she loved him, hoping that this letter would exonerate him if his abuse was discovered. (Id. at 5-6.) Daskal also repeatedly told the Victim about his connections to police, stature in the Jewish community, and that he would deny any allegations that she made against him. (Id. at 6.)

On May 10, 2018, a grand jury in the Kings County Supreme Court returned an indictment charging Daskal with two counts of Rape in the Third Degree, four counts of Criminal Sexual Act in the Third Degree, six counts of Sexual Misconduct, six Counts of Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree, and two counts of Endangering the Welfare of a Child. (Id. at 2-3.) The same day, the NYPD arrested Daskal at his home at 1220 46th Street, Brooklyn, New York and recovered two cell phones from his person. (Id. at 2-3, 13.) The NYPD also executed a search warrant on Daskal's home, (the “New York Residence Warrant”), recovering approximately 30 computers in the process. (Id. at 16.) On October 10, 2018, the King's County District Attorney's Office (“Brooklyn DA”) received a second warrant, this time authorizing search of the two cell phones confiscated from Daskal's person (the “New York Phones Warrant”). (Id. at 13.) On September 21, 2020, the Honorable Dineen Ann Riviezzo, Justice on the New York Supreme Court invalidated the New York Phones Warrant for unconstitutional overbreadth. (Id. at 13.)

Federal investigators opened an investigation into Daskal in November 2018 and obtained new warrants to search his phones and computers. (Id. at 13-14.) The first warrant, obtained on February 19, 2019, authorized federal search of Daskal's phones (the “Federal Phones Warrant”). The second, obtained on September 26, 2019, authorized federal search of two computers previously seized from Daskal's home (the “Federal Computers Warrant”). (Id. at 16.) The two warrants were supported by affidavits with nearly identical underlying factual support and relied heavily on an FBI interview with the Victim in January 2019. (See generally Ex. L to Daskal Defs. Mot. (Dkt. 50-8); Ex. N to Daskal Defs. Mot. (Dkt. 50-8).)

The Government brought the instant prosecution against Daskal on February 26, 2021, charging him with: (1) Travel with Intent to Engage in Illicit Sexual Conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(b) and 3551; (2) Transportation of a Minor with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(a) and 3551; and (3) Travel with Intent to Engage in Illicit Sexual Activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(b) and 3551.

(Indictment (Dkt. 1).) Daskal now moves the court to suppress the fruits of the searches of his cell phones, computers, and home. (Defs. Mot. (Dkt. 50) at 1.) In the alternative, he asks for a suppression hearing regarding search of his devices and home. (Id.) Finally, he moves for a bill of particulars. (Id.) The Government opposes Daskal's motion in all respects. (See generally Gov't Opp.)

IL LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment protects persons against “unreasonable searches and seizures” by requiring that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. This requirement is motivated chiefly by the “‘indiscriminate searches and seizures' conducted by the British ‘under the authority of general warrants.'” United States v. Galpm, 720 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980)).^[2] To protect against this, the Fourth Amendment provides that “a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity.” Id. (quoting Kentucky v King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011)). The warrant requirement is also intended to ensure that “those searches deemed necessary should be as limited as possible.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). Evidence that is seized pursuant to an unreasonable search or derived from such a search must be suppressed. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1990).

“An evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress ordinarily is required if the moving papers are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in question.” United States v. Pena, 961 F.2d 333, 339 (2d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Watson, 404 F.3d 163, 167 (2d Cir. 2005). “General and conclusoty factual allegations which are based upon mere suspicion or conjecture, however, will not suffice to necessitate a hearing.” Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142,148 (2d Cir. 1991). “If facts urged in support of a hearing would not entitle the moving party to relief as a matter of law, no evidentiary hearing is required.” United States v. Chandler, 164 F.Supp.3d 368, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).

III. MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The court will begin by discussing the constitutional requirements for a valid warrant. It will then assess the constitutional sufficiency of the four warrants at issue before addressing the need for a bill of particulars.

A. Warrant Requirements

“[T]he Fourth Amendment provides that a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity.” Gal-pin, 720 F.3d at 445. “[P]robable cause to search is demonstrated where the totality of circumstances indicates a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 156 (2d Cir. 2007). “This required nexus between the items sought and the ‘particular place' to be searched protects against the issuance of general warrants.” United States v. Clark, 638 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2011). “When examining a warrant, [a] magistrate's determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.” United States v. Nelson, 828 Fed.Appx. 804, 806 (2d Cir. 2020) (Summary Order). The court need only ensure that the magistrate judge had a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983).

“A failure to describe the items to be seized with as much particularity as the circumstances reasonably allow offends the Fourth Amendment because there is no assurance that the permitted invasion of a suspect's privacy and property are no more than absolutely necessary.” United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1992). To satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement a warrant must: (1) “identify the specific offense for which the police have established probable cause”; (2) “describe the place to be searched”; and (3) “specify the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes.” United States v. Purcell, 967 F.3d 159, 178 (2d Cir. 2020). However, “broadly worded categories of items available for...