United States v. Davenport

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DEREK DAVENPORT, Defendant.

Case No. 2:19-CR-20229-JTF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION

December 28, 2020

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Before the Court is Defendant Derek Davenport's Motion to Suppress, filed on June 29, 2020. (ECF No. 47.) The United States of America filed its Response to Defendant's Motion to Suppress on July 27, 2020. (ECF No. 56.) The United States of America also filed a Supplemental Response to Defendant's Motion on September 16, 2020. (ECF No. 61.) The Motion was referred to the Magistrate Judge on July 14, 2020, who held a hearing on the matter on September 16, 2020. (ECF Nos. 52 & 62.) On October 29, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation denying Defendant's Motion. (ECF No. 67.) Defendant did not file any Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.

For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation and DENIES Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

FINDINGS OF FACT

In his Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Pham sets forth proposed findings of fact based on evidence presented during the September 16, 2020 suppression hearing. (ECF Nos. 62 & 67, 1.) The Court adopts and incorporates those proposed findings of fact.

LEGAL STANDARD

Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) "to relieve some of the burden on the federal courts by permitting the assignment of certain district court duties to magistrates." United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to the provision, magistrate judges may hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the Court, except various dispositive motions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Regarding those excepted dispositive motions, magistrate judges may still hear and submit to the district court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Upon hearing a pending matter, "[T]he magistrate judge must enter a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App'x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). Any party who disagrees with a magistrate's proposed findings and recommendation may file written objections to the report and recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).

The standard of review that is applied by the district court depends on the nature of the matter considered by the magistrate judge. See Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App'x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) ("A district court normally applies a 'clearly erroneous or contrary to law' standard of review for nondispositive preliminary measures. A district court must review dispositive motions under the de novo standard."). Motions to suppress evidence are among the motions in criminal cases that are subject to de novo review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A); U.S. Fid. & Guarantee Co. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 955 F.2d 1085, 1088 (6th Cir. 1992). Upon review of the evidence, the district court may accept, reject, or modify the proposed findings or recommendations of the magistrate judge. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 3d 665, 674 (W.D. Tenn. 2014); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court "may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the [m]agistrate [j]udge with instructions." Moses v. Gardner, No. 2:14-cv-2706-SHL-dkv, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29701, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2015). A district judge should adopt the findings and rulings of the magistrate judge to which no specific objection is filed. Brown, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 674. "Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). "When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee notes.

ANALYSIS

Because Defendant has not filed Objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the Motion to Suppress be denied, the Court reviews the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation for clear error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee notes. The issue presented by Defendant's Motion is whether the police search of 587 Leacrest Avenue ("the Leacrest residence") on April 10, 2019 violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. (ECF No. 47, 1-2.) Defendant contends that all evidence obtained during the search should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 1.) Defendant first argues that he has the right to challenge the consent of Antionette Tennial, who resides at the Leacrest residence and is Defendant's ex-girlfriend. (Id. at 4.) Defendant then argues that Tennial's consent to the search was invalid for two primary reasons. First, Defendant posits, Tennial's consent was the product of police coercion. (Id. at 5.) Second, the search consent form that Tennial signed was presented only after the search of the Leacrest residence had begun. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge recommends the denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress because "Davenport did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Leacrest home and thus cannot challenge the search on Fourth Amendment grounds." (ECF No.67, 9.) The Magistrate Judge also found that even if Defendant had established the right to challenge the search, "the search was otherwise valid because the officers obtained Tennial's consent to conduct their search." (Id.) This Court agrees.

Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in the Leacrest Residence

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As the Magistrate Judge noted, "[b]ecause Fourth Amendment rights are 'personal,' the central inquiry in any suppression hearing is whether the defendant challenging the admission of evidence has shown a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the thing seized." United States v. Adams, 583 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 743 (6th Cir. 2000)) (citation omitted). Determining whether Defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Leacrest residence requires a two-part inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether Defendant had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy. See King, 227 F.3d at 743. Second, Defendant's expectation of privacy must be "one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting King, 227 F.3d at 743). Overall, in order to challenge Tennial's consent, Defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Leacrest residence. See United States v. Shelton, 384 F. Supp. 3d 916, 923-24 (M.D. Tenn. 2019) (citing United States v. Ponder, 240 F. App'x 17, 19 (6th Cir. 2007)).

Defendant's Actual, Subjective Expectation of Privacy

The first prong in determining whether Defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy requires that this Court "ask whether the individual, by conduct, has exhibited an actualexpectation of privacy; that is, whether he has shown that he sought to preserve something as private." King, 227 F.3d at 743-44 (citing Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000)). The Magistrate Judge did not expressly address whether Defendant had a subjective, actual expectation of privacy. (ECF No. 67, 8-9.)

Based on the narrative provided in the Memphis Police Incident Report, the police officers in this case found cash, drugs, and related paraphernalia scattered across the Leacrest residence, with some items being found in the kitchen, closets, a pair of pants in the bedroom, and under a mattress. (ECF No. 47-1, 9.) Because some of the items were found in closets, pants pockets, and under a mattress, the Court will assume for purposes of this analysis that Defendant evinced an actual expectation of privacy by seeking to preserve some things as private. King, 227 F.3d at 743-44.

Objective Reasonableness of Defendant's Expectation of Privacy

Assuming Defendant exhibited a subjective, actual expectation of privacy in the Leacrest residence, it would not be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The Magistrate Judge determined that Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy at the Leacrest residence. (ECF No. 67, 8-9.) The Magistrate Judge noted that Defendant did not reside at the home, had not slept there the previous night, and did not appear to keep personal items or clothes there. (Id.) Further, Tennial's testimony indicated that Defendant was not a regular visitor to the home and did not have any authority or permission to enter or exit the home at his leisure. (Id. at 9.)

Being an overnight guest is sufficient to establish a person's Fourth Amendment protections in a place. See United States v. Allen, 720 F. App'x 254, 257 (6th Cir. 2018) ("[T]his court has broadly interpreted the Fourth Amendment to protect nearly all overnight guests,clarifying that these Fourth Amendment protections extend to those who occupy common areas in an apartment that are freely accessible to others.") (citing United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 647-48 (6th Cir. 2000)). Defendant contends, without evidence, that he was an overnight guest at the Leacrest residence the night prior to the search. (ECF No. 47, 4.) However, the Magistrate Judge found, after a hearing, that Defendant "had not slept at the house the night before the search" and instead "had arrived at the house earlier that morning to pick up his daughter...