United States v. Davila

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMON AVILA DAVILA, a/k/a Raymond, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-4338

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

May 23, 2023

UNPUBLISHED

Argued: May 4, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle District Judge. (5:19-cr-00112-BO-1)

ARGUED:

Sandra Barrett, Hendersonville, North Carolina, for Appellant.

John Gibbons, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

Todd A. Smith, SMITH GILES PLLC, Graham, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Joshua H. Rogers, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by per curiam opinion for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM.

Ramon Avila Davila challenges his conviction and sentence for crimes related to drug trafficking and distribution. He argues that the district court failed to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 while conducting his plea hearing, that his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction lacks a sufficient factual basis, and that his sentence must be vacated. Although the district court did err in failing to comply with many of the requirements of Rule 11, Davila has not demonstrated that the errors prejudiced him or that his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction lacks a factual basis. We thus affirm his conviction. But we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing because of the inconsistency between his pronounced and written sentences.

I.

In December 2017, federal agents first learned of Davila's involvement in a drug trafficking organization when they seized marijuana he had distributed to a confidential informant.^[1] Two months later, officers stopped Davila for speeding and, in searching his vehicle, found eight pounds of marijuana. Davila then gave the officers consent to search three properties.

The officers found drug trafficking paraphernalia in each of the properties. In the first they found 457 grams of methamphetamine and a kilogram press with cocaine residue.

During that search, Davila admitted that he had recently used the kilogram press to press five kilograms of cocaine. In the second, the officers found 43 pounds of marijuana. In the third, which Davila identified as his home, they found approximately $14,000 in U.S. currency, a small amount of marijuana, and a handgun located in the master bedroom of the property.

In a written plea agreement, Davila pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and a quantity of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (D), 846 (Count 1); aiding and abetting the distribution of 500 grams or more of cocaine and a quantity of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (D) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 3). The plea agreement contained no factual statement, but the Government offered facts at the Rule 11 plea hearing in support of the plea, without opposition from Davila.

At the Rule 11 plea hearing, the district court made more than a dozen errors or omissions. For example, the court did not inform Davila of his right to plead not guilty, ensure that Davila understood the elements of the charges to which he pled guilty, or accurately describe the potential penalties Davila faced. At sentencing, however, the court imposed the sentence upon which Davila and the Government had previously agreed: 160 months' imprisonment and five years of supervised release.

In imposing the conditions of supervised release, the court stated:

[Davila is] not to violate any federal, state or local law; use or associate with any controlled substance or dangerous weapon; remain gainfully employed; support his dependents; submit to any process from immigration regarding his stay in the United States and otherwise obey the conditions of supervised release that are in force in this district.

The district court then filed a written judgment containing the mandatory conditions of supervised release and 13 standard conditions corresponding to those recommended in the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The written judgment also contained additional conditions, including a condition that Davila "consent to a warrantless search [of his person and premises] . . . at the request of the probation officer, or any other law enforcement officer."

Davila's counsel filed an appellate brief in compliance with this court's process under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). After a thorough review of the record, we appointed new counsel for Davila and ordered the parties to brief three issues: (1) whether the district court's errors and omissions in the Rule 11 hearing undermined the validity of Davila's guilty plea; (2) whether a sufficient factual basis supports his guilty plea to the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offense; and (3) whether his sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable.

II.

We consider first Davila's challenges to his guilty plea and conviction.

A.

Rule 11 imposes a series of requirements on a district court when accepting a defendant's guilty plea. Through colloquy with the defendant, the district court "must ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty, and the various rights the defendant is relinquishing by pleading guilty." United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)). The district court must also confirm that the plea is knowing and voluntary and that a factual basis supports the plea. Id.

Where, as here, the defendant did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea before the district court, we review the sufficiency of the Rule 11 hearing only for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524-25 (4th Cir. 2002). In the context of Rule 11, this standard requires that even if a reviewing court identifies an error that is plain, in order to prevail on appeal a defendant must also "demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty." United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). The Government concedes that Davila's Rule 11 hearing contained several errors and omissions. See Oral Arg. at 38:40. And failure to comply with the explicit requirements of Rule 11(b) is plain error. See United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009). Therefore, the only question at issue with respect to the Rule 11 hearing is whether Davila can demonstrate that absent these errors, "the probability of a different result is 'sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding." United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)).

Davila cannot do so. Davila began cooperating with the Government immediately after officers apprehended him during a traffic stop. He waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and then volunteered information about his drug distribution activities. As his trial counsel stated during sentencing, Davila was "more honest than they were asking for." Davila gave the officers his consent to search three properties used in his drug distribution. He also provided information to the Government about other members of the organization during a debriefing interview after his full confession.

In response to Davila's forthrightness, the Government filed a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion on Davila's behalf, acknowledging his acceptance of responsibility and cooperation. The Government recommended, and Davila agreed to, a sentence (160 months) substantially shorter than the low end of Davila's sentencing guidelines range (248 months). And although the district court failed to properly inform Davila of the maximum penalties for his crimes, the court imposed a sentence shorter than the potential punishment the court stated at the Rule 11 hearing. See Martinez, 277 F.3d at 533 (holding that a misstatement of the maximum penalty did not affect a defendant's substantial rights when he would have been subject to a far greater potential penalty if he proceeded to trial); cf. Lockhart, 947 F.3d at 194, 197 (holding that a misstatement of the maximum penalty prejudiced a defendant when, among other things, he was in fact sentenced to a term of imprisonment longer than that described during the Rule 11 hearing).

While the cumulative effect of multiple individually harmless errors may prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error, to warrant reversal under the cumulative error doctrine these harmless errors must render the proceeding fundamentally unfair. United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 520 (4th Cir. 2013). Given the complete lack of evidence that Davila might have proceeded to trial absent the errors and the significant benefit at sentencing that Davila earned from his cooperation and acceptance of responsibility, we cannot conclude that the Rule 11 errors during Davila's plea hearing prejudiced him in such a manner.

We would be remiss not to note that the lack of compliance with Rule 11, and...