United States v. Davis

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RANDY J. DAVIS

No. 2:13-CR-00046-8-JRG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT GREENEVILLE

March 4, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Randy J. Davis' Pro Se Motion for Compassionate Release under 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) [Doc. 735], the United States' Response in Opposition [Doc. 737], and the Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee's Reply [Doc. 742]. For the reasons herein, the Court will deny Mr. Davis' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2014, Mr. Davis entered into a plea agreement with the United States under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). [Plea Agreement, Doc. 253]. He pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to manufacture five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(B). [Id. at 1; Minute Entry, Doc. 277]. At sentencing, Mr. Davis was a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1(b), [PSR, Doc. 400, ¶¶ 27, 50], with a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, [Statement of Reasons at 1 (on file with the Court)]. His guidelines range was 262 to 327 months' imprisonment. [Id. at 1]. Accepting the parties' Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, [id. at 2], the Court sentenced him to a below-guidelines sentence of 228 months' imprisonment, [J., Doc. 483, at 2]. He is serving his term of imprisonment at FCI Butner Medium II and is scheduled for release in February 2029.

Acting pro se, Mr. Davis, who is forty-nine years old, now moves the Court for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) because of the COVID-19 pandemic, claiming that he suffers from underlying medical conditions that place him at a heightened risk of severe illness from COVID-19. [Def.'s Mot. at 4]. Specifically, he states he has hepatitis C, was a heavy drug user for many years, and was a heavy smoker for many years. [Id. at 2, 4]. In addition, Mr. Davis claims that his mother, whom he states is his minor son's only caregiver, is in poor health and no longer able to care for his son. [Id. at 5-6]. According to Mr. Davis, he is now the only available caregiver for his son and his need to care for his son and his mother constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. [Id.; Def.'s Reply at 3]. Also, Mr. Davis maintains that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)'s factors favor his release because he "has done remarkably well" during his incarceration and demonstrated "exemplary rehabilitation." [Def.'s Mot. at 7, 8].

In a reply brief, the Federal Defender Services of Eastern Tennessee ("FDS") reiterates Mr. Davis' arguments, noting that it "believes Mr. Davis has submitted a well-presented motion ripe for consideration," [Def.'s Reply Br. at 1]—an assertion with which the Court does not disagree. FDS, however, also raises a new argument on Mr. Davis' behalf: it contends that Mr. Davis, under the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019), would no longer be a career offender under § 4B1.1(b). [Id. at 3-4]. If Mr. Davis were to appear before the Court today for sentencing, FDS says, his "non-career offender guideline range" would be "a total offense level of 27, Criminal History Category VI, and an advisory guideline range of 130 to 162 months, instead of the 262 to 327 months." [Id. at 3]. FDS argues that Mr. Davis' "post-Havis" guidelines range is "an extraordinary and compelling reason to allow Mr. Davis to go home to his son and mother." [Id. at 4]. FDS also highlights his good behavior during his term of imprisonment, urging the Court "to seek Mr. Davis' inmate status report and the lack of disciplinary actions." [Id.].

The United States does not dispute that Mr. Davis has a commendable record while incarcerated, but it does, nevertheless, argue that § 3553(a)'s factors weigh against his release. [United States' Resp. at 8-12]. The United States also argues that Mr. Davis has not identified an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). [Id.]. Having carefully considered the parties' arguments, the Court is now prepared to rule on Mr. Davis' motion.

II. ANALYSIS

This Court begins with a word of clarity. FDS insists that Mr. Davis' motion is not a "typical" request for compassionate release and "should not be discarded out of hand without giving due consideration." [Def.'s Reply at 4]. The Court is not in the habit of rejecting any defendant's request for compassionate release out of hand or without appropriate consideration. Although the Court might well be within its rights to enter a form order when ruling on a defendant's motion for compassionate release, it does not do so. See United States v. Navarro, 986 F.3d 668, 669-73 (6th Cir. 2021) (affirming the district court's denial of a motion for compassionate release even though the district court's order consisted of only one sentence); cf. United States v. Boulding, 960 F.3d 774, 783 (6th Cir. 2020) ("[W]e held that a district court's completion of an AO Form Order was an adequate statement of reasons for the resentencing decision[.]" (citation omitted)).

Instead, as counsel is surely aware, the Court has regularly entered lengthy opinions in which it has taken considerable care to explain to all defendants why they do not qualify for compassionate release under § 3553(a)'s factors—even when, upfront, they are without an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. See United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021) (stating that "district courts may deny compassionate-releasemotions when any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not need to address the others" (citations omitted)). The Court will do the same for Mr. Davis, but the simple fact is that compassionate release presents defendants with a high bar to hurdle, and that high bar is too lofty for the vast majority of them, including Mr. Davis. See United States v. Dusenbery, No. 5:91-cr-291, 2019 WL 6111418, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 2019) (stating that "compassionate release due to a medical condition is an extraordinary and rare event" (quotation omitted)).

A. The First Requirement: Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances

"[O]nce a court has imposed a sentence, it does not have the authority to change or modify that sentence unless such authority is expressly granted by statute." United States v. Thompson, 714 F.3d 946, 948 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 2010)). Although § 3582(c)(1)(A) begins with the declaration that "[t]he court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed," Congress enacted the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-319, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), which amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) so that courts can consider motions for compassionate release once a defendant either exhausts her administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons or waits thirty days after submitting a request to the warden. Section § 3582(c)(1)(A) now states:

(c) Modification of an imposed term of imprisonment.—The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that—

(1) in any case—

(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed theunserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or

(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);

and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The United States concedes that "[t]he Court has authority to consider the motion because Davis submitted a request to the warden of his facility over 30 days ago, thereby satisfying the exhaustion requirement." [United States' Resp. at 1].

Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), compassionate release is "discretionary, not mandatory," United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted), and the statute contains three substantive requirements that the Court must address in sequential order before it can grant compassionate release, id.; United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1004 (6th Cir. 2020). First, the Court must determine that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant" a sentence reduction. Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1004 (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Second, the Court must determine that "such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." Id. (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)). And third, the Court must consider any applicable factors under § 3553(a) "and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by [steps one and two] is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case." Jones, 980 F.3d at 1108 (quoting Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010))).

1. Mr. Davis' Underlying Medical Conditions

When determining whether an inmate, in requesting compassionate release, has identified reasons that are extraordinary and compelling in nature, "courts have universally turned to USSG § 1B1.13 to provide...