United States v. Davis

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KEITH DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-2114

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

May 16, 2022

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

Argued March 1, 2022

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 16 CR 00570 Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

BEFORE MICHAEL S. KANNE, CIRCUIT JUDGE DIANE P. WOOD, CIRCUIT JUDGE THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, CIRCUIT JUDGE

ORDER

Keith Davis was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment and five years' supervised release after pleading guilty to kidnapping three separate women upon whom he inflicted extraordinary suffering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a). On appeal Davis argues-and the government concedes-that the district court plainly erred when it calculated the applicable range of supervised release. Davis requests plenary resentencing, while the government argues that a limited remand is enough. We think that the government has the better of this point. The court made it clear that it would impose "certainly nothing less" than the 30-year prison term it chose. All that is needed is a fresh look at the supervised release component of the sentence. We thus remand the case for that limited purpose.

I

Davis was a serial violent sex abuser. Over the span of about six weeks, on three separate occasions, he kidnapped and held a woman for his sexual gratification. He contacted each victim-K.B., N.A., and J.C.-over the internet and lured her to a secluded location by offering to pay for sex work. When each woman arrived, he refused to pay and restrained her from leaving. Davis cruelly beat, sexually assaulted, and threatened to kill K.B and N.A. He also viciously beat J.C who escaped half-naked before Davis managed to rape her, too.

On May 19, 2019, Davis pleaded guilty to three counts of kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). Before sentencing, the Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report ("PSR") that calculated Davis's total offense level at 42, and a criminal history category of III, for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. That led to a range of 360 months to life imprisonment as well as two to five years of supervised release per count. The Probation Office recommended 45 years' imprisonment and five years' supervised release.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court first heard from the government, which requested a 45-year prison sentence based on the horrific and strategic nature of Davis's crimes. The government then read a statement by K.B., one of Davis's victims, who was present by videoconference. K.B described in haunting, excruciating detail how Davis's attack affected her and her family.

The court then discussed Davis's objections to the PSR with the attorneys. The court first confirmed that the guidelines range was 360 months to life imprisonment under either Davis's or the government's calculation and then addressed supervised release:

The Court: And supervised release of, I believe, five to life.

[Davis's Attorney]: The government just said they recommended five years, Judge -

The Court: Yes, but the range is five to life. Is that correct? I believe -

[The Prosecutor]: The guidelines ... for the supervised release is two years to five years per count.

The Court: Okay. So that would be three counts, it would be six to 15, is that right, for supervised release?

[The Prosecutor]: Pursuant to the guidelines provisions, that's correct.

The Court: All right.

Neither Davis nor his attorney objected to that characterization of the supervised-release range. The court then heard Davis's remaining objections and agreed not to figure into the sentence Davis's pending sexual assault charge or the evidence that his DNA was linked to four other possible crimes.

Davis's attorney requested a maximum of 20 years' imprisonment, arguing that a 45-year prison term was a de facto life sentence. He emphasized that Davis had faced significant challenges in his life, such as exposure to violence at a young age and depression after his grandfather's death. Counsel also highlighted a mitigation specialist's report that Davis's difficult upbringing likely stunted his normative development. Finally, he pointed out that Davis was taking steps to better himself in jail.

Davis then spoke on his own behalf. He briefly apologized to the judge, his victims, and his family, then lamented the conditions he faced in jail and described how he was using his time productively in spite of those conditions. The court then asked if Davis could provide any explanation for his "almost inhuman conduct towards" his victims. He said no.

The court then considered the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). With respect to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the court found that they were "almost unspeakable in their brutality" and that nothing in Davis's background "explained] the nature of these particular crimes." The court emphasized a need for specific deterrence given the "almost unspeakable nature of the crime" so that "no woman ... will be in such a situation again." But, the court explained, "I do not believe in putting somebody away for their entire lifetime." Thus, a 45-year sentence was too lengthy because Davis would not get out until "late middle-age, late age." Still, the court stated, "certainly nothing less than 360" months was warranted. It settled on a 30-year term (i.e. 360 months) followed by 5 years' supervised release.

Finally, the court considered Davis's objections to the conditions of release and resolved each objection favorably to Davis.

II

The only issue on appeal is whether we should order a limited remand or plenary resentencing. Davis argues, and the government concedes, that the standard of review is plain error. We agree with that assessment: Davis did not object to the district court's calculation despite an opportunity to do so, but he did not affirmatively agree to it either. Because there was no obvious strategic justification for remaining quiet, the omission is best viewed as a forfeiture, not a waiver. United States v. Wylie, 991 F.3d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2021). Plain-error review requires Davis to show a clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights. Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1897, 1904 (2018). If he makes that showing, then we should reverse if not doing so "seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at 1905 (citations omitted).

We start with the question of error. As the parties recognize the district court plainly erred when it determined that Davis's three supervised release terms could run consecutively. Each count of conviction carried a statutory maximum of five years' supervised release and a recommended guidelines term of two to five years' supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(a)(1). By statute, those terms cannot run consecutively. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e); United States v. Danser, 270 F.3d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, the district court calculated, and the government erroneously confirmed the...