United States v. Davis

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSHUA EARL DEVON DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 23-4202

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

November 28, 2023

UNPUBLISHED

Submitted: November 21, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III District Judge. (5:21-cr-00244-D-1)

ON BRIEF:

Damon J. Chetson, CHETSON FIRM, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM.

Joshua Earl Devon Davis pled guilty, without a written plea agreement, to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).^[*] The district court sentenced Davis to 71 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Davis challenges the district court's denial of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence that law enforcement officers obtained during a traffic stop. Davis also argues that the district court erred in calculating his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by applying a four-level enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6) (2021) for using or possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense. We dismiss in part and affirm in part.

With respect to Davis' appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress, "when a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior to entry of the plea and has no non-jurisdictional ground upon which to attack that judgment except the inadequacy of the plea under [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11." United States v. Glover, 8 F.4th 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Because Davis does not dispute that he entered a valid and unconditional guilty plea, his challenge to the district court's denial of his motion to suppress "is not properly before us." United States v. Fitzgerald, 820 F.3d 107, 113 (4th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of the appeal.

Next, rather than evaluating the merits of Davis' challenge to the calculation of his Guidelines range, "we may proceed directly to an assumed error harmlessness inquiry." United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, we may assume the alleged Guidelines "error occurred and proceed to examine whether the error affected the sentence imposed." United States v. McDonald, 850 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 2017). "[W]e can find any error harmless if we have (1) knowledge that the district court would have reached the same result even if it had decided the [G]uidelines issue the other way, and (2) a determination that the sentence would be reasonable even if the [G]uidelines issue had been decided in the defendant's favor." United States v. Gondres-Medrano, 3 F.4th 708, 721 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). The claimed error will be deemed harmless only when we are "certain" that these requirements are met. United States v. Gomez, 690 F.3d 194, 203 (4th Cir. 2012).

Here the first part of the inquiry is satisfied "because the district court has expressly stated in a separate and particular explanation that it would have reached the same result" even if it had erred in calculating the Guidelines. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d at 383. With respect to the second step of the analysis, we review a sentence for substantive reasonableness by "tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)." United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court appropriately balanced Davis' offense conduct and significant, violent criminal history with the mitigating factors he presented. The court further explained that the 71-month sentence was necessary to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, and afford adequate deterrence. In light of the district court's thorough discussion of the relevant § 3553(a) factors, we conclude that Davis' sentence is...