United States v. Dean, 3:17-CR-15

UNITED STATES, v. DAHVEED DEAN, Defendant

3:17-CR-15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 8, 2021

(JUDGE MANNION)

MEMORANDUM

I. BACKGROUND¹

On January 31, 2017, defendant Dahveed Dean, formerly an inmate at USP Canaan in Waymart, Pennsylvania, was charged in a one-count indictment with assault of a corrections officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §111(a)(1) and (b). (Doc. 1). On February 10, 2017, Dean was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. Because Dean was serving a prior federal sentence, he was detained at the Lackawanna County Prison pending trial in this case, and he is currently confined there. (Docs. 12 & 13).

The court set a deadline of March 7, 2017 to file pre-trial motions and set a trial date of April 10, 2017. (Doc. 14).

Subsequently, Dean filed several motions for extensions of time to file pre-trial motions, namely, 15 requests, and they were all granted by the court. Specifically, Dean's requests for extensions were granted and the deadline was repeatedly extended from March 7, 2017 through July 12, 2018.²

On July 12-14, 2018, Dean filed numerous pre-trial motions. (Docs. 64, 66, 76, 82, 70, 73, 78, 80 & 84). After being granted extensions of time, the government filed its opposition briefs to all of Dean's motions.

On June 12, 2019, the court issued a Memorandum and Order denying all of Dean's motions without prejudice, except for his motions in limine, (Docs. 80, 84 & 86), which the court deferred until the time of trial since the government indicated that it did not intend to introduce the challenged documents at trial but reserved the right to do so. (Docs. 98 & 99).

No action occurred on this case from June 12, 2019 through March 17, 2020, when this case was reassigned to the undersigned due to Judge Caputo's passing.

On June 22, 2020, the court conducted a status conference and discussed pending matters in the case, including the likelihood that Dean would be filing a motion to dismiss as a result of a Speedy Trial violation. (Doc. 100).

On August 4, 2020, the court issued a scheduling order stating that no motion to dismiss has been filed since the status conference as it was anticipated, and directing that if Dean intended to file a motion to dismiss for a Speedy Trial violation, he must file it by August 14, 2020. (Doc. 101).

On August 14, 2020, Dean filed, through his counsel, a motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act ("STA"), 18 U.S.C. §3161. (Doc. 102).

After being granted extensions of time, Dean filed his brief in support of his motion on September 18, 2020. (Doc. 110).

The government also requested, and received, an extension of time, and filed its brief in opposition to Dean's motion to dismiss on November 25, 2020. (Doc. 114).

On December 9, 2020, Dean filed his reply brief. (Doc. 115).

II. DISCUSSION

Since the complete factual background of defendant Dean's criminal case is detailed in the briefs of the parties and are not contested, they are not fully repeated herein. (Doc. 110 at 5 & Doc. 114 at 1-2). Suffice to say that Dean was serving a prison sentence at USP Canaan after he wasconvicted of bank robberies. He allegedly punched a correction officer at this prison on July 15, 2016, resulting in the instant charge of assault and impeding federal employees being filed against him on January 31, 2017. (Doc. 1). The indictment also alleged that Dean inflicted bodily injury on the correction officer.

Dean essentially argues that all of the time from the court's July 12, 2019 ruling on his pre-trial motions until, at least, June 22, 2020, when this court conducted the status conference, or until August 14, 2020, when he filed his instant motion, is not excludable time under the STA. Dean argues that his rights under the STA have been violated and, that his 6^th Amendment rights have been violated by this undue delay. As such, Dean points out that his trial was not commenced within the requisite 70-day period and seeks the dismissal of the indictment with prejudice.

The government concedes that more than 70 days of non-excludable time have passed in this case without a trial being held. As indicated, it is clear that all of the time from June 12, 2019 through August 14, 2020, is not excludable time under the STA, which the government calculates to be "441 days of non-excludable delay."

The STA, 18 U.S.C. §3161(c)(1), provides as follows:

In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, which ever date last occurs.

The time periods that are excludable from the speedy trial calculation are contained in §3161(h), which provides in pertinent part:

h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence:

(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to—

(A) delay resulting from any proceeding, including any examinations, to determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant;

(B) delay resulting from trial with respect to other charges against the defendant;

(D) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.

18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(1)(A), (B) and (D).

The time given for the filing of pre-trial motions is also excludable under 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(1). See United States v. Erby, 419 Fed. Appx. 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2011) ("the amount of time set aside by a district court for the preparation and submission of pretrial motions is excludable 'delay resulting from other proceedings' under 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(1), regardless of whether the time is granted sua sponte or pursuant to the defendant's request.") (citation omitted). Further, time is excludable under §3161(h)(7)(A) if thecourt grants a motion filed by either party and finds "that the ends of justice served by granting this extension and continuance outweigh the interests of the public and the defendant to a speedy trial." Id.

Here, there is no dispute that a Speedy Trial Act violation has occurred. Thus, pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, the charges against Dean must be dismissed due to the expiration of more than 70 non-excludable days. However, the issue is whether this case should be dismissed with or without prejudice.

If the 70-day deadline is not met, the STA provides that the indictment "shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. §3162(a)(2). No doubt that "the defendant has the burden of proof supporting a motion claiming a Speedy Trial Act violation." United States v. Green, 471 F.Supp.3d 577, 587 (M.D. Pa. July 9, 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. §3162(a)(2). Indeed, "[]the Speedy Trial Act admits no ambiguity in its requirement that when such a violation has been demonstrated, the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant." United States v. Curet, 2020 WL 6290509, *3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2020) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Additionally, §3162(a)(2), provides that if the STA is violated,

[i]n determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice [to the government's right to re-charge the defendant], the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.

Dean contends that since 441 days are not excludable under §3161(h), the court should dismiss the indictment with prejudice. The government counters stating that any dismissal should be without prejudice to its right to immediately re-indict Dean. Both parties support their respective arguments by relying upon the factors contained in §3162(a)(2), but they arrive at different conclusions upon weighing the applicable factors.

As the court in U.S. v. Williams, 2021 WL 278306, *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2021, recently explained:

"The Speedy Trial Act does not specify whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice, nor does it contain a default presumption one way or the other." United States v. Robinson, 389 F.3d 582, 586 (6^th Cir. 2004). To determine whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice, the court must consider, among other factors, "the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice." 18 U.S.C. §3162(a)(2). "Where, as [in section 3162(a)(2)], Congress has declared that a decision will be governed by consideration of particular factors, a district court must carefully consider those factors as applied to the particular case and, whatever its decision, clearly articulate their effect in order to permit meaningful appellate review." United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336 (1988); United States v. Stevenson, 832 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Taylor, 487 U.S. at 336).

Moreover, the Third Circuit analyzes the presence or absence of prejudice to the defendant "as a component of the third statutory factor." Id. at *5.

First, the court considers the seriousness of the charge against Dean, namely, assaulting a corrections officer while Dean was an inmate confinedat USP Canaan. This factor "centers primarily on society's interest in bringing the particular accused to trial", and "[t]he logic behind this factor is intuitive: '[t]he graver the crimes, the greater the insult to societal interests if the...