United States v. Delgado

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DEIVY JOSE RODRIGUEZ DELGADO, Defendant.

CRIMINAL ACTION No. 22-304 (JEB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

December 1, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

James E. Boasberg Chief Judge

In July 2022, Deivy Jose Rodriguez Delgado allegedly perpetrated three separate hostage takings in the Dominican Republic with the help of an accomplice. He is accused of using a dating application to lure the victims into meeting for a date and then getting into his car. In all three instances, Defendant allegedly stopped to let his accomplice into the backseat after a short drive, at which point they held each victim at knifepoint and demanded ransom for their release. In addition to three counts of hostage taking, Delgado is also charged with conspiracy to commit those acts. With trial beginning next week, he moves to suppress evidence obtained in a search of his residence and vehicle in the Dominican Republic. He also moves to sever the Indictment's four counts from each other and requests that the Court order separate trials on each of them. The Court will deny both Motions, but it will allow Defendant to renew the Motion to Sever during trial as the need arises.

I. Background

In May 2023, a grand jury returned a four-count Superseding Indictment against Delgado, charging him with Conspiracy to Commit Hostage Taking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (Count I), and three counts of Hostage Taking, also in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1203(a) (Counts II-IV). See ECF No. 14 (Superseding Indictment).

At the outset, the Court briefly recounts the relevant facts of the three incidents and the investigation thereof. The crimes took place in the Dominican Republic between July 5 and July 30, 2022, under highly similar circumstances. See ECF No. 31 (Opp. to Severance) at 2-4, 13. According to the Government, Defendant first made contact with all three victims on a dating application called Grindr; his profile name was “Sebastian.” Id. He picked each victim up in a vehicle on the pretense of going on a date. Id. Little did these victims know, an unwelcome third wheel was soon to join. After driving a short distance Delgado stopped to let an accomplice into the car. Id. Upon crashing the supposed dates, the accomplice put the victims in a headlock from behind and threatened them with a knife while Defendant brandished his own knife. Id. Delgado then demanded ransom in exchange for the victims' release, instructing that the money be sent to a CashApp account under the name Geneitha Nettles. Id.

While bearing quite a resemblance to one another, the crimes were not identical. For instance, Defendant moved his conversation from Grindr to WhatsApp with two of the victims. Id. He drove different cars to pick his victims up, although the Government claims that he leased all three vehicles from the same person. Id. Only one victim had his hands zip-tied. Id. at 2. In addition, the Government does not assert that the crimes occurred at the same location within the Dominican Republic.

Following victim reports and a request from the FBI to take action regarding the hostage takings, Dominican authorities began an investigation in August 2022. See ECF Nos. 32-1 (Search Warrant) at 1; 32-2 (Investigation Report) at 1, 7. On September 9, 2023, a magistrate judge of the Dominican Pretrial Criminal Proceedings Court found “reasonable cause” to issue a warrant for a search to take place at Delgado's residence in the Dominican Republic. See Warrant at 5-6. Although the scope of the authorized search is somewhat difficult to parse, it appears to define the residence as the “location in which [law enforcement] intend[s] to find and seize items related to the unlawful conduct,” including “electronic devices” and “vehicles.” Id. at 6. Dominican officials executed the Warrant on September 10, 2022, searching Defendant's apartment and a red Hyundai Elantra found in the apartment parking lot that had been linked to him by multiple witness reports. See ECF No. 32 (Opp. to Suppression) at 4-5; Investigative Report at 20-21. In the apartment, officials found, inter alia, an iPhone with a background picture that matched Delgado's Grindr profile picture, an insurance card for the Hyundai Elantra, and a key to - apparently - the same vehicle. See Opp. to Suppression at 4 & n.2; Investigative Report at 21. The search of the car yielded, among other pieces of evidence, two serrated knives. See Opp. to Suppression at 5; Investigative Report at 21. During the search, Dominican law enforcement arrested Delgado. See Investigative Report at 20-21.

Following Defendant's arrest, Dominican immigration officials ordered his deportation to Venezuela, his country of origin, in accordance with Dominican law. See ECF No. 28 (Mot. to Suppress) 3-4. Id. Instead of relocating him to Venezuela, however, and without informing him of his true destination, Dominican immigration agents brought him to Miami at the direction of the FBI. Id. Once Delgado was on American soil, FBI agents arrested him. Id. at 4.

II. Analysis

In advance of trial, Delgado has filed a Motion to Suppress evidence obtained in the above-described search of his residence and vehicle. See Mot. to Suppress. In a separate Motion, he seeks to sever the Indictment's four counts such that they must be tried separately. See ECF No. 29 (Mot. to Sever). The Court addresses the Motions in that order.

A. Motion to Suppress

In moving to suppress seemingly all the evidence obtained during the search of his residence and vehicle in September 2022, Defendant relies on both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Court will consider each in turn.

1. Fourth Amendment

Delgado's first attempt at suppression invokes the Fourth Amendment. While defendants are typically entitled to the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of that Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961), constitutional protections do not invariably extend to aliens, particularly those subjected to state action when outside of the United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (collecting cases indicating that noncitizens “receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country”); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“It is well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders.”). Relevant here, it is clearly established that “the Fourth Amendment has no application” to “a citizen and resident of [another country] with no voluntary attachment to the United States, [where] the place searched was located in [another country].” Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274-75.

In addition, “the [Fourth Amendment's] exclusionary rule does not normally apply to foreign searches conducted by foreign officials,” even of U.S. persons. United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Although the joint-venture doctrine creates an exception to that rule for situations in which “American officials or officers participated in some significant way” in the search, id. at 1318, defendants “not protected by the Fourth Amendment at the time of their arrests . . . are not entitled to suppression . . . under [that] doctrine.” United States v. Bourdet, 477 F.Supp.2d 164, 177 (D.D.C. 2007).

As the foregoing suggests and as the Government correctly argues, the Fourth Amendment has no application to the search of Delgado's residence or vehicle. See Opp. to Suppression at 5-6. The search took place in the Dominican Republic, and Delgado was, at the time, a citizen of Venezuela residing in the Dominican Republic. Simply put, not only did he lack a “substantial connection with our country,” he had no domestic connections to speak of, either voluntary or involuntary. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271-72; see id. at 274-75 (holding Fourth Amendment inapplicable to “a citizen and resident of Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States, [where] the place searched was located in Mexico”). Defendant, then, cannot argue that the search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Because the joint-venture doctrine offers no help to a defendant without Fourth Amendment rights at the time of search - even if American officials played a significant role, which is at least arguable here - that path to relief is similarly blocked. See Bourdet, 477 F.Supp.2d at 177.

Delgado does not contend that Verdugo-Urquidez holds otherwise. In fact, he acknowledges that the case “appears to foreclose” any Fourth Amendment challenge to this search. See Mot. to Suppress at 5. Still, he raises two arguments for applying the Fourth Amendment in order to “preserve” the issue. Id. First, he suggests that Verdugo-Urquidez was wrongly decided. Id. (citing dissenting opinion). The Court will not entertain that frontal attack on binding precedent.

Second, Defendant argues that Verdugo-Urquidez has been undermined by a more recent Supreme Court decision, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), which held that the Suspension Clause applies to individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay. See Mot. to Suppress at 5-7.

He asserts that Boumediene cast aside Verdugo-Urquidez's “substantial connections” test in favor of one looking to the “particular circumstances, the practical necessities,” and “whether judicial enforcement of the [constitutional] provision would be ‘impracticable and anomalous.'” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759; Mot. to Suppress at 5-6. This is consequential, he says, because applying the Fourth Amendment to foreign searches like the one in this case would not be “anomalous” in light of “extensive evidence indicating...