United States v. Dick

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. RONALD DICK

Nos. 3:96-cr-00145, 2:95-cr-00010

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

December 9, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELI RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release (Doc. No. 11, “Motion”).^[1] Via the Motion Defendant seeks a reduction of his 55-year sentence and immediate release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Defendant claims “extraordinary and compelling” reasons exist for his release because: (1) his wife's health is failing, and he desires to care for his thirteen-year-old granddaughter; and (2) his age (67) and health conditions (COPD and obesity) combined with the COVID-19 pandemic. The Government has filed a response in opposition (Doc. No. 16, “Response”), arguing that the Motion should be denied because Defendant has not established “extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release” and consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors counsels strongly against granting compassionate release.

BACKGROUND

On June 21, 1995, in case no. 2:95-cr-00010, Defendant was charged in an indictment with one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count One); one count of carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Two); and one count of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (Count Three). (No. 2:95-cr-00010, Doc No. 1, PSR1 at 1).^[2] On October 26, 1995, Defendant pled guilty to all counts of the indictment. (No. 2:95-cr-00010, Doc. No 5). On January 18, 1996, Defendant received a sentence of 295 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. (No. 2:95-cr-00010, Doc. No. 9).

On November 21, 1996, in case no. 3:96-cr-00145, Defendant was charged in an indictment with one count of conspiracy to commit murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1117 (Count One); one count of solicitation of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373 (Count Two); one count of attempted murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1114 (Count Three); one count of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 924(c) (Count Four); and one count of causing another to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to commit murder for hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (Count Five). (No. 3:96-cr-00145, Doc. No. 19, PSR2 at 1). The charges were based upon a murder-for-hire plot that Defendant planned while incarcerated, whereby he planned the murder of a Federal Bureau of Investigations agent. (PSR2 at 5-7). On May 14, 1997, after a twelve-day jury trial, the jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. (No. 3:96-cr-00145, Doc. No. 149). On August 25, 1997, Defendant received a sentence of 420 months of imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. (No. 3:96-cr-00145, Doc. No. 180). The sentence was to run consecutively to Defendant's state sentence, and consecutively to the sentence imposed in case no. 2:95-cr-00010. (Id.).

Defendant has been serving his sentence at Florence USP. According to BOP, Defendant's release date is December 23, 2050. See Federal Inmate Locator, Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last accessed Dec. 7, 2021).

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR “COMPASSIONATE RELEASE”

Prior to 2018, only the Director of the Bureau of Prisons could move for compassionate release. The First Step Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) to allow prisoners to move for compassionate release on their own behalf. See First Step Act of 2018, § 603, Pub. L. No. 115391, 132 Stat. 5239. Now, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as modified by the Section 603(b)(1) First Step Act, ^[3] a district court may under certain circumstances grant a defendant's motion for compassionate release (hereinafter, “defendant-filed motion”). See United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Congress's use of ‘may' in § 3582(c)(1)(A) dictates that the compassionate release decision is discretionary, not mandatory.”). In order to grant such a defendant-filed motion, however, a court must find that the so-called “exhaustion requirements” have been satisfied-i.e., “[either] the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of [BOP] to bring a motion [for compassionate release] on the defendant's behalf or [there has been a] lapse of 30 days since the receipt of such a request [for BOP to file such a motion] by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier.” See also United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that a district court may not disregard the exhaustion requirements of Section 3582(c)(1)(A)).

Once it properly can act on a defendant-filed motion brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court next determines whether, in its discretion, to grant compassionate release to a defendant. In its recently issued opinion in Jones, the Sixth Circuit discussed the steps of the compassionate release analysis:

The three-step § 3582(c)(1)(A) test is as follows. At step one, a court must “find[ ]” whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” a sentence reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).12 At step two, a court must “find[ ]” whether “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). The Commission's policy statement on compassionate release resides in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (U.S. Sent'g Comm'n 2018). Thus, if § 1B1.13 is still “applicable, ” courts must “follow the Commission's instructions in [§ 1B1.13] to determine the prisoner's eligibility for a sentence modification and the extent of the reduction authorized.” Dillon [v. United States], 560 U.S. [817, ] 827 [(2010)]. At step three, “§ 3582(c)[ (1)(A) ] instructs a court to consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized by [steps one and two] is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” Id.

Jones, 980 F.3d at 1108. The court then went on to resolve the following question with respect to defendant-filed motions (as opposed to compassionate-release motions filed BOP) in particular: “given the First Step Act's procedural reforms to compassionate release, is § 1B1.13 still an applicable-‘that is, “relevant” or “appropriate, ”' [United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 100708 (6th Cir. 2020)]-policy statement for the purposes of the second § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry?” Id. The court noted that this is a question that has “sharply divided the courts, ” id. (citation omitted), as many district courts, including this Court, previously considered the Section 1B1.13 policy statements applicable when determining whether compassionate release was warranted. The court then chose a side, holding that “the passage of the First Step Act rendered § 1B1.13 ‘inapplicable' to cases where an imprisoned person files a motion for compassionate release.” Id. (citing United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020)).^[4] Therefore, “[u]ntil the Sentencing Commission updates § 1B1.13 to reflect the First Step Act, district courts have full discretion in the interim to determine whether an ‘extraordinary and compelling' reason justifies compassionate release when an imprisoned person files a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion.” Id.

In other words, because § 1B1.13 is inapplicable to defendant-filed motions, a district court adjudicating such a motion is not bound by anything § 1B1.13 has to say about-including any limitations or requirements § 1B1.13 would impose upon-the finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons. But this rule is not the only consequence of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Jones. Another is that the district court, in adjudicating a defendant-filed motion, may disregard the requirement of § 1B1.13(2) that the court find the defendant not pose a danger (to any other person or to the community) in order to grant compassionate release.

If, in adjudicating a defendant-filed motion, a district court determines that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release exist, the court then determines whether compassionate release is warranted in light of the Section 3553(a) sentencing factors. See Jones, 980 F.3d at 1112.^[5] The sentencing factors set forth in Section 3553(a) include:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed-

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner (3) the kinds of sentences available;

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for-

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the . . .

i) [United States Sentencing Guidelines, (“U.S.S.G.”)]-

ii) [in effect at the time of sentencing]

(5) any pertinent policy statement-

A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code; and

B) [and in effect at the time of sentencing]

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any

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