United States v. Donelson

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. MARLON DONELSON, Defendant.

No. 2:22-cr-20133-JTF-tmp

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Western Division

February 21, 2023

ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JOHN T. FOWLKES, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on Defendant's Motion to Suppress (“R & R”), submitted December 16, 2022. (ECF No. 40.) Defendant Marlon Donelson filed a Motion to Suppress on September 27, 2022. (ECF No. 21.) The motion was referred to the Magistrate Judge on September 28, 2022. (ECF No. 25.) The Government responded to the motion on October 12, 2022. (ECF No. 26.) The Magistrate Judge held a hearing on the motion on November 3, 2022. (ECF No. 36.) After this hearing the Magistrate Judge submitted the present R & R recommending that the Motion to Suppress be denied. Donelson filed objections to the R & R on January 9, 2023. (ECF No. 45.) For the following reasons, the R & R is ADOPTED, and the Motion to Suppress is DENIED.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) “to relieve some of the burden on the federal courts by permitting the assignment of certain district court duties to magistrates.” United States v. Curtis 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to the provision, magistrate judges may hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the Court, except various dispositive motions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Upon hearing a pending matter, “the magistrate judge must enter a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(1); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App'x. 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003). Any party who disagrees with a magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendation may file written objections to the report and recommendation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). A failure to file specific objections to a Magistrate Judge's report does not meet the requirement of filing an objection at all. Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991); McCready v. Kamminga, 113 Fed. App'x. 47, 49 (6th Cir. 2004). However, “[w]hen no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) advisory committee notes. The district court is not required to review, and indeed “should adopt[,] the findings and rulings of the Magistrate Judge to which no specific objection is filed.” Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Shelby Cty. Sch., 47 F.Supp.3d 665, 674 (W.D. Tenn. 2014) (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985)).

The standard of review that is applied by a district court when considering a magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations depends on the nature of the matter(s) considered by the magistrate judge. See Baker, 67 Fed. App'x at 310 (citations omitted) (“A district court normally applies a ‘clearly erroneous or contrary to law' standard of review for non-dispositive preliminary measures. A district court must review dispositive motions under the de novo standard.”). Where timely, specific objections are filed, the parts objected to are reviewed under a de novo standard. Rugiero v. United States, 330 F.Supp.2d 900, 904 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Upon a review of the evidence, the district court may accept, reject, or modify the proposed findings or recommendations of the magistrate judge. Brown v. Board of Educ., 47 F.Supp.3d 665, 674 (W.D. Tenn. 2014); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court “may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the [m]agistrate [j]udge with instructions.” Moses v. Gardner, No. 2:14-cv-2706-SHL-dkv, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29701, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 11, 2015). Again, a district judge should adopt the findings and rulings of the magistrate judge to which no specific objection under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) is filed. Brown, 47 F.Supp.3d at 674. An objection to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation that does nothing more than state a disagreement with the magistrate judge's suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an objection, as required to preserve the right to appeal a subsequent order of the district court adopting the report. J.A. v. Smith County School District, 364 F.Supp.3d 803, 81112 (M.D. Tenn. 2019).

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The R & R's Proposed Findings of Fact are an accurate representation of the facts and are hereby ADOPTED and are summarized in relevant part below. Donelson offers only two objections to the Findings of Fact, which seek to clarify rather than dispute. (ECF No. 45, 2-3.)

On May 11, 2022, at around 8:00 p.m., Memphis Police Department (“MPD”) officers were “notified of a vehicle of interest via a Flock alert.” (ECF No. 40, 2.) Flock alerts are part of an automated system designed to alert officers if a vehicle of interest passes by one of many licenseplate scanning cameras arranged around the city. (Id.) This alert was specifically for a gray Nissan Maxima with Tennessee license plate number 29AR07, “traveling southbound through the intersection of Sycamore View and I-40.” (Id.) The car was associated with Donald Moore, who had several outstanding felony warrants. (Id.) The Flock alert provided officers with Moore's drivers license photo. (Id.)

After receiving the alert, Officer J. Thompson noticed a Nissan of “the same make, model, color, and body style as the wanted vehicle” parked at the FairBridge Inn. (ECF No. 40, 3.) The FairBridge Inn is located at 6015 Macon Cove, which intersects Sycamore View immediately south of I-40 and is along the path of the vehicle that caused the Flock alert. (Id.) The Nissan Officer Thompson noticed was backed into a parking spot outside the Inn with four people in and around the car, including a man who Thompson believed was Moore in the driver's seat.^[1](Id.) Officers Bulak, Tremmel, and Franklin responded to Thompson's notice. (Id.)

Bulak blocked in the Nissan with his vehicle. (ECF No. 40, 4.) Tremmel noticed Marlon Donelson along with two other men and a woman standing outside the Nissan. Tremmel believed “Donelson resembled Moore in complexion, appearance, height, and weight.” (Id.) Bulak and Tremmel exited their vehicle and approached, asking Donelson if he was Donald Moore. Donelson responded that he was not and provided his real name, but Tremmel told Donelson to stand beside the police car while they verified his identity before placing him in handcuffs. (Id.) At this point, Bulak and Tremmel separated slightly. Bulak went to the back of the Nissan to check its license plate, while Tremmel verified Donelson's identity and questioned Donelson about where he had gotten the car. (Id. at 5.) Once Tremmel had verified Donelson's identity, he took off Donelson's handcuffs. (Id.) Quickly following the removal of the handcuffs, Bulak approached Donelson, asking him if he was a convicted felon.^[2](Id. at 6.) This question was seemingly prompted by the presence of a gun that Bulak observed in the passenger seat of the Nissan as he made his way back from checking the car's plates. (Id. at 5-6.) Bulak had previously yelled out that the car was a drive-out after checking the tags, but had received no response, and he also verbally identified that there was a gun in the passenger seat seven seconds before he asked Donelson about his prior convictions. (Id.)

Donelson responded to Bulak's question by stating that he had been convicted of a felony. (ECF No. 40, 6.) Tremmel then asked to see the title to the car, which Donelson provided. (Id.) After this, Bulak asked Donelson to sit in the back of the police car, at which point he was detained on suspicion of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Id.) Ten minutes later, Donelson was told that he was being held due to the gun in the car. (Id. at 7.) Donelson said that the gun was not his but rather belonged to one of the men that had been around the car with him when the officers first approached. (Id.) Ultimately, Donelson was handcuffed again, searched, patted down, and placed back in the car for almost two hours. (Id.) Donelson was never given Miranda warnings during the interaction. (Id.)

Donelson was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (ECF No. 40, 8.) In the underlying Motion to Suppress, Donelson argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him and obtained incriminating statements in violation of Miranda. (Id.)

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

As stated above, a district judge should adopt the findings and rulings of the magistrate judge to which no specific objection under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) is filed. Brown, 47 F.Supp.3d at 674.

Donelson filed objections to essentially all of the Magistrate Judge's central findings. Each relevant finding and corresponding objection will be addressed in turn.

1. The Constitutionality of the Terry Stop

The Magistrate Judge found that the encounter between Donelson and MPD officers was a valid “investigative detention,” or Terry stop. A Terry stop is constitutional if there is a proper basis for the stop and if the degree of intrusion caused by the stop is reasonably related in scope to the situation at hand. United States v. Mays, 643 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir. 2011). The proper basis for a Terry stop is “reasonable suspicion,” or a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). The Magistrate Judge found that the MPD officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Donelson based on three main facts. First, the Magistrate Judge noted that “Donelson's Nissan was the same...