United States v. Easter

975 F.3d 318

UNITED STATES

v.Jamel E. EASTER, Appellant

No. 19-2587

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued: January 15, 2020

Filed: September 15, 2020

Heidi R. Freese, Frederick W. Ulrich [ARGUED], Office of Federal Public Defender, 100 Chestnut Street, Suite 306, Harrisburg, PA 17101, Attorneys for Appellant

David J. Freed, U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Michael A. Consiglio [ARGUED], Office of the United States Attorney, Middle District of Pennsylvania, 228 Walnut Street, P.O. Box 11754, 220 Federal Building and Courthouse, Harrisburg, PA 17108, Attorneys for Appellee

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Appellant Jamel E. Easter challenges the District Court's order denying his motion for a resentencing hearing or a reduction of his sentence under § 404 of the First Step Act of 2018 ("First Step Act"). Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Following the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ("Fair Sentencing Act") and Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced by two levels some of the base offense levels in the Sentencing Guidelines, the District Court granted Easter's unopposed motion to reduce his initial sentence. Following the enactment of § 404 of the First Step Act, however, Easter sought resentencing again, and this time the District Court declined to resentence Easter on the grounds that the First Step Act did not alter the guideline range applicable to Easter's offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). In reaching that decision, the District Court did not indicate whether it had considered the other factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

The question presented here is whether, when considering a motion for sentence reduction under the First Step Act, a court must consider anew all of the § 3553(a) factors. Nothing in the First Step Act directs district courts to deviate from § 3553(a) ’s mandate that "[t]he court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider" the § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Our answer is therefore a resounding yes. We will vacate the denial of Easter's motion and remand for reconsideration of the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 8, 2008, Easter was convicted of various drug offenses involving crack cocaine and one firearms offense. At the time of his conviction, the drug counts each carried a mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment, a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, and a minimum term of supervised release of 5 years. The gun charge carried a mandatory minimum of 5 years’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to the sentence on the drug counts.

The District Court determined that the applicable guideline range for the drug offenses was 168 to 210 months. The District Court based that determination on a finding that Easter was responsible for possessing 343.55 grams of crack cocaine, which consisted of the crack cocaine seized at the time of arrest and the amount Easter and his co-defendant Carlton Easter attempted to buy from an FBI informant. This finding yielded a base offense level of 32 under § 2D1.1 of the 2007 Sentencing Guidelines, which the District Court increased by two levels to 34 because Easter obstructed justice by driving aggressively in his attempt to evade arrest. The District Court finally determined his criminal history category to be II. Taken together, these findings yielded a guidelines range of 168 to 210 months. His firearm offense carried a term of 60 months’ imprisonment. On March 31, 2009, the District Court sentenced Easter to 228 months’ imprisonment. That sentence consisted of 168 months on the drug offenses to run consecutively to 60 months for the firearms offense followed by a term of 5 years’ supervised release.

In November 2014, Amendment 782 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines became effective. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 782 (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2014). Amendment 782 reduced by 2 levels the base offense levels of various drug quantities. Id. On October 7, 2015, the District Court granted Easter's unopposed motion for a retroactive sentence reduction pursuant to Amendment 782.¹ Under Amendment 782, Easter's base offense level decreased from 34 to 32, which corresponded to a guideline range of 135 months to 168 months’ imprisonment for the drug offenses. The District Court imposed a sentence at the bottom of this range—135 months for the drug offenses and 60 months for the gun possession charge to run consecutively to the drug counts. The District Court therefore reduced his sentence on the drug charges from 168 months to 135 months and the 60-month consecutive term on the gun charge remained the same.

On December 21, 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act, which made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively applicable.² At the time of Easter's initial sentencing, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) carried a mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment if the offense involved more than 50 grams of crack cocaine. If the offense involved 5 grams or more of crack cocaine, then the violation carried a mandatory minimum of 5 years’ imprisonment and a maximum sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment. Under the Fair Sentencing Act, the offense must involve 280 grams or more of crack cocaine to trigger the 10-years-to-life range and 28 grams or more to trigger the 5-to-40-year range.

On April 26, 2019, Easter filed a motion requesting a resentencing hearing because he was convicted of a covered offense for which the statutory penalties were reduced by Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act. The Government opposed that motion and argued that Easter was not eligible for First Step Act relief, contending that eligibility turns not on the drug weight for which Easter was convicted (i.e., 50 grams) but on the drug weight for which he was held responsible at sentencing (i.e., 343.55 grams). The District Court disagreed and found Easter eligible under § 404(a) of the First Step Act.³

On June 25, 2019, the District Court denied Easter's motion in the order that is the basis for this appeal. Despite finding Easter eligible for First Step Act relief, the District Court explained that for sentencing purposes, Easter was held responsible for 343.55 grams of crack cocaine. His offense level was therefore 30 before adding the 2-level enhancement for use or possession of a firearm. A total offense level of 32 with a criminal history category of II, which is unchanged, yielded a guideline range of 135 to 168 months. That range is identical to the guideline range he had following Amendment 782. Because the guideline range did not change and the guideline range was the only basis for his sentence, the District Court declined to exercise its discretion to resentence Easter. See J.A. at 7 ("The applicable mandatory minimum here ... has no effect on Easter's sentence since his guideline range is greater than the 5-year mandatory minimum so resentencing him as if the [First Step Act] had been in effect at the time of the offense would change nothing."). In reaching this holding, the District Court failed to address Easter's request that it consider his post-sentence rehabilitation when determining whether to reduce his sentence. The District Court did not mention any other § 3553(a) factor in making this determination nor did it acknowledge that it had to consider the § 3353(a) factors in exercising its discretion.

Easter timely filed this appeal.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3582(c)(1)(B), and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Where the District Court finds that a movant is eligible for a sentence modification under § 3582(c) but declines to reduce the sentence, we review the denial for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Pawlowski , 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020) (motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A) ); United States v. Weatherspoon , 696 F.3d 416, 420 (3d Cir. 2012) (motions under § 3582(c)(2) ).

We review a criminal sentence for a "violation of the law," 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1), which includes both "(i) matters of statutory interpretation over which we have plenary review, as well as (ii) questions about reasonableness," United States v. Manzella , 475 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted), which we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Diaz , 639 F.3d 616, 619 (3d Cir. 2011).

The parties dispute whether we review the District Court's decision de novo or for abuse of discretion. Although district courts have considerable discretion in determining an appropriate sentence, that discretion is subject to certain constraints. The question presented by this case pertains to what constraints the First Step Act puts on district courts when determining whether to grant a motion for sentence reduction. In essence, the issue to be resolved is one of statutory interpretation (i.e., the scope of the district court's legal authority); therefore, we will review the District Court's sentencing decision de novo.⁴ See United States v. Jackson , 964 F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 2020).

III. DISCUSSION

The question whether a sentencing court must consider the § 3553(a) factors when exercising its discretion to reduce the sentence of a defendant pursuant to a motion under § 404 of the First Step Act is a matter of first impression in our circuit. Although our sister circuits are divided over the precise nature of the proceedings that sentencing judges must conduct in this context, the emerging consensus is that, at a minimum, a district court may consider the § 3553(a) factors. For the following reasons, we hold that district courts must consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to the extent they are applicable.

In its order denying Easter's motion for resentencing, the District Court did not analyze this issue in any depth. Although it did consider the...