United States v. Eccleston

480 F.Supp.3d 1232

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff/Respondent

v.Sebastian Leigh ECCLESTON, Defendant/Petitioner.

No. CIV 19-1201 JB\CG

No. CR 95-0014 JB

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Filed July 28, 2020

Todd Coberly, Coberly Law Office, Santa Fe, New Mexico and Carter B. Harrison, IV, Harrison & Hart, LLC, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorneys for the Petitioner/Defendant.

John C. Anderson, United States Attorney, David M. Walsh, Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorneys for the Respondent/Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

James O. Browning, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Motion to Vacate Conviction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed December 20, 2019 (Civ. Doc. 1)("Motion"). The primary issue is whether Defendant and Petitioner Sebastian Leigh Eccleston's 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction, in 1996, for using a firearm during a crime of violence is properly predicated on a crime of violence in light of United States v. Davis, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019), in which the Supreme Court of the United States of America held that § 924(c) ’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The Court concludes that Eccleston was convicted of a crime which necessarily has an element of violence such that his § 924(c) conviction is based on a proper predicate. Accordingly, the Court denies the Motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court takes its facts from the Presentence Report. On December 15, 1994, Eccleston and his codefendant, Ronald Marvin Martinez, were in a Motel 6 Parking lot in Albuquerque, New Mexico, when they confronted Robert Boyle as he was exiting his car. See PSR ¶ 9, at 3. Martinez approached Boyle, "racked the action of a shotgun, pointed the weapon at the victim's head and ordered him out of the vehicle." PSR ¶ 9, at 3. Boyle heard another sound towards the car's rear that he "associated with a firearm being chambered" and, when Boyle turned, he saw Eccleston pointing a second firearm at him. PSR ¶ 9, at 3. After Boyle fled, Eccleston and Martinez both got into Boyle's car and drove away. See PSR ¶ 9, at 3.

Shortly thereafter, Albuquerque Police Department ("APD") officers responded to an armed-robbery call at another Albuquerque motel. See PSR ¶ 10, at 3. The victims, David Henkemeyer and Karen Kuepers, told police that they were in the motel's parking lot when a white car with two passengers approached them and demanded their money. See PSR ¶ 10, at 3. Henkemeyer later identified Eccleston and said that Eccleston held and pointed a firearm at Kuepers as Eccleston took her purse, and at Henkemeyer as Eccleston took his wallet. See PSR ¶ 10, at 4.

While APD officers were taking the armed robbery report, Bernalillo County Sheriff's Office ("BCSO") deputies attempted to stop a vehicle that matched Henkemeyer's description of Martinez and Eccleston's vehicle. See PSR ¶ 11, at 4. After a "high speed pursuit," the vehicle crashed, and the occupants fled. PSR ¶ 11, at 4. BCSO deputies apprehended Martinez, but Eccleston escaped. See PSR ¶ 11, at 4. APD officers took all three robbery victims to the crash site, where the victims "positively identified the vehicle" and found some of their property in the vehicle. PSR ¶ 11, at 4. BCSO deputies found a shotgun and eight twelve-gauge shotgun rounds in the crashed vehicle. See PSR ¶ 12, at 4. Boyle also positively identified Martinez. See PSR ¶ 12, at 4. Federal agents later interviewed the sales manager for the dealership that sold the car that Martinez and Eccleston stole, and the sales manager confirmed that the vehicle was not manufactured in the State of New Mexico. See PSR ¶ 15, at 5.

A federal Grand Jury issued a ten-count Second Superseding Indictment on July 6, 1995. See Second Superseding Indictment at 1, filed July 7, 1995 (Cr. Doc. 34)("Indictment"). The Indictment charges Eccleston with: (i) carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1), and aiding and abetting carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 ; (ii) three counts of using and carrying a firearm during the carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) ; (iii) five counts of interference with commerce by threats of violence against Boyle in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and aiding and abetting the interference in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 ; and (iv) against Martinez only, possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5485(a)(2). See PSR ¶ 3, at 2.

On May 3, 1996, Eccleston pled guilty to four counts: (i) carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1), and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 ; (ii) "us[ing] and carry[ing] a firearm ... during and in relation to a crime of violence," carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2119(1), and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 ; (iii) "obstruct[ing], delay[ing] and affect[ing], and attempt[ing] and conspir[ing] to obstruct, delay and affect commerce ... by robbery ... in that [Eccleston] did unlawfully take and obtain personal property" from Karen Kuepers "by means of actual and threatened violence, and fear of injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2"; and (iv) "us[ing] and carry[ing] a firearm ... during and in relation to a crime of violence," in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 924(c) and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. Plea Agreement ¶ 7, at 4-5, filed May 3, 1996 (Cr. Doc. 70). See PSR ¶ 3, at 2.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After sentencing, Eccleston extensively litigated this case in both direct and collateral appeals.¹ The Court summarizes those aspects of this case's procedural history that are relevant to Eccleston's Motion. The PSR, his sentencing, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's review of Eccleston's sentence all bear on the issue at hand: whether, in light of Davis v. United States, Eccleston's Count V Hobbs Act conviction is a crime a violence such that Eccleston's conviction and sentence for Count VI is constitutional.

1. The Plea Hearing.

On May 3, 1996, the Honorable LeRoy Hansen, then-United States District Judge for the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, accepted Eccleston's Plea Agreement. See Transcript of Proceedings at 1:1 (taken May 3, 1996), filed September 29, 1996 (Cr. Doc. 279)("Plea Tr."). After ensuring that Eccleston reviewed and understood the Plea Agreement, Judge Hansen stated:

[T]he government has an obligation to prove ... that on or about December 15th, 1994, in Albuquerque, ... New Mexico, that you ... did unlawfully, in Count V, obstruct, delay, and affect and attempt and conspire to delay, and affect commerce as that term is defined in 18 U.S. Code, Section 1951, and the movement of articles and commodities in such commerce by robbery, as that term is defined therein that you did unlawfully take and obtain personal property consisting of jewelry, personal checks, a purse, a wallet, a camera, and credit cards from the person and in the presence of Karen Kuepers against her will by means of actual and threatened force, violence, and fear of injury, immediate and future, to her person and a person in her company, that is, the threat that if Karen Kuepers did not give defendant property, you were going to injure or kill her and David Henkemeyer, and in Count VI that you did use and carry a firearm made from a Remington Shotgun ..., which weapon as modified has a barrel of less than 18 inches in length, during and in relation to a crime of violence for which you may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, namely, the charge in Count V that I have reviewed with you.

Plea Tr. at 10:10-11:20 (Hansen, J.). Eccleston responded that, after the carjacking, the car did not have any gas, so he

went to another motel, and that's where I got out with a pistol and held up a lady and a guy and asked them for the guy's wallet and the lady's purse and -- but I didn't have a Remington shotgun in my possession as it says here. I had a pistol, an automatic pistol. And that's what happened. That's what I'm pleading to.

Plea Tr. at 12:10-15 (Eccleston). Judge Hansen then asked Eccleston if he "did take, then, the personal property from the two people at the second motel?" Plea Tr. at 13:19-20 (Hansen, J.). Eccleston responded affirmatively. See Plea Tr. at 13:22 (Eccleston).

Judge Hansen then asked the United States what it would prove at trial. See Plea Tr. at 14:3 (Hansen, J.). The United States responded that it could prove at trial that, about a half-hour after the carjacking,

two Oregon residents, ... Kuepers and ... Henkemeyer, were robbed at gun point in the parking lot of another motel. Ms. Kuepers had an individual identified as Mr. Martinez, Mr. Eccleston's co-defendant, come up to her, point a sawed-off shotgun at her, chamber a[ ]round once again and take her purse, telling her to give him her purse. The second individual, who, in this case, was positively identified as Mr. Eccleston, went up to Ms. Kuepers’ companion, Mr. Henkemeyer, took his wallet at gunpoint at the same time that his companion and co-defendant, Mr. Martinez, got back into the white rental car and drove off.

Plea Tr. at 14:24-15:11 (Kimball). The United States continued: "For all of these reasons, the United States contends that we could prove that Mr. Eccleston either committed or aided and abetted in the commission of these crimes within the meaning of Section 2 of Title 18, United States Code." Plea Tr. at 16:15-19 (Kimball). Eccleston agreed with the United States’ characterization of the offenses. See Plea Tr. at 16:20-22 (Hansen, J; Eccleston). Eccleston then pled guilty to Counts I, II, V, and VI. See Plea Tr. at 16:23-25 (Hansen, J.; Eccleston). Judge Hansen accepted Eccleston's guilty plea. See Plea Tr. at 17:9 (Hansen, J.).

2. The PSR.

The United States Probation Office ("USPO") calculated Eccleston's base offense level...