United States v. Edwards

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. RAYMOND EDWARDSandRENATA EDWARDS, Defendants.

Case No. 16-CR-20070--SRB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

July 6, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendants Raymond and Renata Edwards have been awaiting trial for four years. Defendants now argue that the delay and legal representation they have experienced since this case's July 2016 beginning has violated their statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial and their constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Because the delay in this case violates the Speedy Trial Act ("STA") but not Defendants' constitutional speedy-trial right, and because, under this case's facts, this violation warrants dismissal without prejudice, the Court grants Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Indictment Due to Violations of Speedy Trial Rights (Doc. 199) and denies as moot Defendants' Joint Motion For Relief Due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Doc. 202).

I. Background

Four years ago, the Government indicted Defendants Raymond and Renata Edwards for operating a business that allegedly sold counterfeit goods and defrauded the United States Postal Service ("USPS"). The Government charges that Defendants used counterfeit trademark labels and stickers to traffic "generic" computer batters and adapters as legitimate, while also allegedly manipulating the actual weight of packages shipped from the business to pay less-than-due postage. On July 26, 2016, the Court arraigned and conditionally released Defendants.

Since that time, a number of extensions and continuances have delayed trial.

Four extensions occurred before the Court had scheduled any date for trial. On September 12, October 11, and November 22, 2016, the parties jointly moved to extend pretrial deadlines. The September 12 and October 11 joint motions also requested that the Court continue a scheduled status hearing. When the Court later rescheduled that status hearing beyond the date covered by the parties' October 11 motion, Defendants' former retained counsel, on November 10, moved to extend the pretrial deadlines to the date of the rescheduled hearing. Generally, however, the September 12, October 11, and November 22 motions represented that, owing to "unexpected delays in compiling discovery," defense counsel needed additional time to review and discuss with Defendants voluminous discovery.¹ All four motions also represented that Defendants were "in agreement" with the requests' tolling their STA clock.² In rulings dated September 15, October 13, and November 15 and 29, 2016, the Court granted each of these motions under the STA's ends-of-justice provision. Combined these rulings excluded from Defendants' speedy trial calculation September 19, 2016, to September 11, 2017, the first trial date.

Defendants' former attorneys then made four continuance requests that resulted in another four trial dates. On August 7, 2017, defense counsel moved to continue the trial because the timing of certain pending motions, unfulfilled discovery requests, and the trial's start date would "not give the defense an adequate opportunity to put its case together."³ At a status conference on February 26, 2018, defense counsel orally moved to continue the trial to permit the parties' moretime to exchange expert reports, review discovery, and develop additional facts. A continuance motion filed on September 5, 2018, represented that the defense needed "substantial time to process and analyze" additional evidence that the government was "working to collect and produce . . . on a rolling basis."⁴ And on January 20, 2019, defense counsel represented that the defense needed time to seek an expert and to determine whether the parties could accomplish a diversion "resolution proposal . . . pending with the U.S. Attorneys Office."⁵ Each motion also assured that Defendants were again prepared to waive their STA rights because "their interest in being able to fully present their defense trump[ed] their desire to resolve this matter in a more expeditious fashion."⁶ Each time, again under the STA's ends-of-justice provision, the Court continued the trial date. The continuances issued on September 11, 2017; February 26, 2018; September 17, 2018; and January 23, 2019. Combined, these continuances tolled Defendants' STA clock from September 11, 2017, to April 8, 2019.

Another three continuances occurred thereafter. On March 29, 2019, a high volume of pretrial motions caused the Court to continue the trial's start date by one week, to April 15, 2019. A medical emergency involving the spouse of the Government's lead attorney then caused the Government to move for an ends-of-justice continuance on April 9. The continuance motion represented that the emergency would make lead counsel unavailable and, under the circumstances, irreplaceable by another prosecutor during key portions of the trial. At a hearing the next day, the Court granted the motion over Defendants' objection. Doing so, the Court tolled Defendants' STA clock from the date of that hearing, April 10, to the new trial date, September 30, 2019.

The events leading to the last continuance started at a pretrial hearing held on September 25, 2019. At that hearing, after hearing argument on several pretrial motions, the then-presiding judge announced that an "unavoidable" issue—termed "court-related obligations" in the minute entry⁷—would require the Court to continue the trial beyond September 30.⁸ The judge proposed a new trial date of November 4, 2019, and allowed the parties a two-day recess to review and coordinate their schedules. At the follow-up status hearing to determine the new trial date, defense counsel indicated that their earliest availability was not until late May 2020. Defense counsel maintained that Defendants, therefore, were "placed in a very difficult situation" where Defendants "object[ed] to the fact that this case is being continued at all" but neither "the two [attorneys] that they have put their trust and confidence in for really the last four years" nor "other counsel . . . could be available" and prepared to go to trial on the Court's proposed date.⁹ Addressing the Court directly, Mr. Edwards explained:

Your Honor, we are not happy about this extension, but we really have no choice. As [defense counsel] had mentioned, we have been working closely with our lawyers for over four years now and it would be impossible to retain new lawyers, not to mention the cost to start over again.

. . . . [W]e find ourselves having to compromise one constitutional right to the speedy trial in order to protect the right to counsel of choice.

So as [defense counsel] has articulated, we object to this but have no choice but to go along with this extension.¹⁰

Ultimately, the Court continued the trial to May 27, 2020, stating:

The court on its own did continue the trial setting . . . until November 4th. The court also has under advisement pending motions.

The court would find that by setting it on November 4, the court would still be able to have this trial within the speedy trial time. That was the court's decision and I apologize, again, for defendants feeling this is now a forced response. And . . I understand how it's going to be received . . . , but it appears that defendants' counselis not available on November 4th and the first availability of defendants' counsel would be in May of 2020.

So that is going to be the continuance of the now scheduled trial date, which was November 4th. It will now be continued. And I'm going to use this language and, again, not to upset you, but it's going to be based on the unavailability of defendants' counsel in November.

. . . .

The court is going to find that to not continue [the trial] to [May 27, 2020] would interfere with defendants' right to be adequately represented in their case and also in regards to the circumstances of this case, the length of time its been pending, the different matters the parties' attorneys have brought to the court's attention and have addressed, that it would be a miscarriage of justice to not have this continuance to allow defendants the right to have these attorneys represent them.

The court is also going to find those same reasons to be reasons to stop the running of the speedy trial time until that next court date there as well.¹¹

Following this continuance, the parties reconvened for a status hearing on February 5, 2020, to address an apparent disagreement that had developed between Defendants and their counsel. Sometime before that hearing, Defendants had emailed the then-presiding judge's chambers, indicating their desire that the Court take up a pro se motion raising speedy trial arguments and, possibly, allow them different counsel. At the hearing, Defendants requested to represent themselves on the speedy-trial and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel motions now before the Court. In turn, defense counsel orally moved to withdraw. The Court granted both the withdrawal and the self-representation requests. Defendants filed their pro se motions the next day, February 6. Later, when the originally assigned judge retired, the case was reassigned. A hearing on Defendants' motions occurred June 22.

II. Discussion

Defendants' pro se motions place three rights at issue: (1) the right to a speedy trial under the STA; (2) the right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, and (3) the right to effectiveassistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.¹² Of these rights, the Court infringed the first, finds no violation of the second, and, because it must dismiss this case, declines to address the third.

A. Speedy Trial Act Violation

Defendants first claim that various extensions and continuances granted in this case have violated their STA rights to a speedy trial. Defendants' scattershot criticisms seemingly call into question each extension and continuance. But specifically, Defendants attack the September 15 and October 13, 2016 extensions and the...