United States v. Edwards

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER ALLEN EDWARDS, Defendant.

No. 21-CR-255-1 (NEB/ECW)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

August 18, 2022

ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

NANCY E. BRASEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Christopher Allen Edwards was indicted on one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and one count of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846. (ECF No. 1.) Edwards moved to suppress evidence seized from five warrants and for a Franks^[1] hearing. (ECF Nos. 38, 51.) In an Order and Report and Recommendation, United States Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright denied Edwards's motion for a Franks hearing and recommended denying Edwards's motion to suppress. (ECF No. 64 (“R&R”) at 4445.) Edwards objects to the R&R, including the denial of the Franks hearing. (ECF No. 68 (“Obj.”).)

The Court has reviewed the R&R de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3); D Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3). Based on that de novo review the Court overrules Edwards's objection and accepts the R&R. The Court also affirms Judge Wright's denial of the Franks hearing.

BACKGROUND

Neither party objects to the R&R's description of the factual background, so the Court incorporates those facts by reference. (R&R at 1-5.) Edwards seeks to suppress evidence obtained by five warrants: (1) a tracker warrant for a Dodge Charger (which was never installed); (2) a tracker warrant for an Audi Q5 (which was never installed); (3) a second tracker warrant for the Audi Q5; (4) a tracker warrant for a rented Jeep Compass; and (5) a search warrant for Edwards and his co-defendant Chloe Johnson, the Audi Q5, the rented Jeep, Edwards's residence in Stewartville, and Johnson's residence in Rochester (“Search Warrant”). (ECF Nos. 39-2-39-6 (“Exs 1-5”).) The applications for the warrants build on each other by including much of the same information, with additional information provided in later applications. The relevant portions of the applications at issue are discussed below.

ANALYSIS

The Court first addresses Edwards's objections to the denial of the motion to suppress, then his objections to the denial of his motion for a Franks hearing.

I. Legal Standard for Probable Cause and Leon Good-Faith Exception

The R&R denied Edwards's motion to suppress because probable cause supported the issuance of the five warrants. The R&R also found that even without probable cause, the evidence is admissible under the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

Probable cause. The Fourth Amendment requires law enforcement to show probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, before a search warrant is authorized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Installing a GPS tracker on a car is a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause and a warrant. United States v. Petruk, 929 F.3d 952, 959 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Faulkner, 826 F.3d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 2016)). Probable cause “exists when, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. (cleaned up, citation omitted). A reviewing court is to give the issuing judge's probable-cause determination great deference, confirming only that the judge “had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)). Courts consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the affidavit supporting a warrant is enough to establish probable cause. United States v. Keele, 589 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 2009).

Leon good-faith exception. The typical sanction for a Fourth Amendment violation is suppression of the evidentiary fruits of the violation. United States v. Houston, 665 F.3d 991, 994 (8th Cir. 2012). But this rule does not apply “when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.” Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984)). Under the good-faith exception, disputed evidence is not suppressed if the officer acted “in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Relevant here, an officer's reliance is not objectively reasonable when the affidavit supporting the warrant was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. at 923 (citation omitted).

II. Edwards's Objections to the R&R

Edwards raises fifteen objections to the R&R. His first objection-that the R&R incorrectly concluded that the appropriate standards were satisfied and the warrants were properly issued-is addressed with more specificity in his other objections, and thus is subsumed by them. (Objection #1.) For the reasons below, the Court concludes that the appropriate standards were satisfied and all five warrants were properly issued.

A. Objections #2, #5, #6, and #15: Reliability of Informants

Edwards objects to the R&R's conclusions about the reliability of the government's informants. “The statements of a reliable confidential informant are themselves sufficient to support probable cause for a search warrant.” Petruk, 929 F.3d at 959 (alteration and citation omitted). “When an informant has provided reliable information in the past or where his tip was independently corroborated, a court may deem the informant's tip sufficiently reliable to support a probable cause determination.” Id. (emphasis in original, alteration and citation omitted). “Where some information is independently corroborated, it is permissible for the issuing judge to conclude the informant and the remaining information provided are reliable, even if uncorroborated.” United States v. Evans, 4 F.4th 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2021). And while an “informant's ‘reliability, veracity, and basis of knowledge are relevant considerations,'” “they are not ‘independent, essential elements' to finding probable cause.” Petruk, 929 F.3d at 960 (citations omitted).

Objection #2. Edwards objects to the R&R's conclusion about the reliability of the confidential reliable informant (“CRI”) in several of the warrant applications. (E.g., Ex. 1 at 124, Ex. 2 at 128.) The CRI had provided information about a male known as “Pablo” who he saw supplying another narcotics dealer, and gave Detective Z. Wagner photographs of “Pablo.” (Ex. 1 at 124.) Wagner determined that “Pablo” was Edwards. (Id.) The CRI also advised that Edwards was using a reddish 4-door car to deliver controlled substances. (Id.) Edwards objects to the R&R's reliance on the application's statement that information from this CRI had led to three previous arrests. (Id.; Obj. at 4.) Even if this information had been omitted from the application (as it was in subsequent warrant applications, (e.g., Ex. 3 at 139)), the CRI's information was independently corroborated. A maroon Dodge Charger with license plate number 680XXX was registered to Edwards. (Ex. 1 at 123.) The warrant applications include numerous law enforcement calls connecting that Dodge Charger to Edward and narcotics activity, and information “from multiple sources” that Edwards was linked to the use and sales of heroin and methamphetamine. (Id. at 124.) Thus, the CRI's information was reliable enough to support a probable cause determination.

Objection #5. As for the application for the first Audi tracker warrant, Edwards objects to the conclusion that the CRI's statement (that Edwards was seen at a Rochester, Minnesota hotel) was sufficiently corroborated by an officer's surveillance at the hotel and observation that Edwards was driving of a grey Audi with license plate GRAXXX, which was registered to Edwards and A.W. (Ex. 2 at 128; R&R at 16.) The Court has reviewed the warrant application and finds that this information sufficiently corroborated the CRI's statement. See United States v. Reed, 25 F.4th 567, 570 (8th Cir. 2022) (“While it is true that some independent verification is required when a known informant is without a track record of reliability, corroboration of even minor or innocent details may be sufficient to establish probable cause.” (internal citations omitted)).

Objection #6. As for the application for the second Audi tracker warrant, Edwards objects to the warrant application's reliance on a jail inmate's statement that Edwards was continuing to sell large quantities of heroine, methamphetamine, and cocaine. (Ex. 3 at 134.) Although the application does not reference the inmate's reliability, the inmate gave his statement in person, which bolsters his reliability. See Faulkner, 826 F.3d at 1145; United States v. Gabrio, 295 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that an officer “had an opportunity to assess the informant's credibility because he gave his tip in person”). And officers corroborated some of the inmate's statements. The inmate stated that Edwards was still driving a grey Audi and was living at The Gates of Rochester with a “female accomplice.” (Ex. 3 at 134.) The officers confirmed that co-defendant Johnson had recently begun utility services at The Gates of Rochester, and had observed Johnson, Edwards, and Edwards's Audi outside the building at various times. (Id.) Given this corroborating information, the issuing judge could conclude that the other information provided by the inmate was reliable, even though it was not corroborated. See Evans, 4 F.4th at 637.

As noted above, the inmate claimed that Edwards was selling large quantities of heroine, methamphetamine, and cocaine. Edwards contends that there was no probable cause to believe that he was selling cocaine. B...