United States v. Edwards

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTOPHER ALLEN EDWARDS (1), Defendant.

No. 21-cr-255 (NEB/ECW)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota

June 21, 2022

ORDER AND REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

ELIZABETH COWAN WRIGHT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Christopher Allen Edwards' Motion to Suppress Evidence from Searches and Seizure (Dkt. 38) and Motion for Franks Hearing (Dkt. 51). This case has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1. The parties have agreed to have the motions decided on the papers without a hearing. (Dkt. 47.)

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant Christopher Allen Edwards is charged by Indictment with Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled Substances and Possession with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 846.^[1] (Dkt. 1.) Edwards seeks to suppress evidence seized as the result of following search warrants:

(1) GPS tracker warrant for a Dodge Charger issued on February 9, 2021 (Gov't Ex. 1); (2) GPS tracker warrant for an Audi Q5 issued on July 1, 2021 (Gov't Ex. 2);

(3) A second GPS tracker warrant for the Audi Q5 issued on August 26, 2021 (Gov't Ex. 3);

(4) GPS tracker warrant for a Jeep Compass rental vehicle issued on October 13, 2021 (Gov't Ex. 4); and

(5) An October 15, 2021 search warrant authorizing the search of Edwards' person, the person of Chloe Michelle Edwards, a residence in Stewartville, Minnesota, an apartment residence in Rochester, Minnesota, the Audi Q5, and the Jeep Compass rental vehicle. (Gov't Ex. 5).^[2]

Edwards asserts that the applications for the GPS search warrants (Exhibits 1-4), which seek evidence of “possible violations of Minnesota Statutes relating to Controlled Substance Crimes-trafficking and sales of Heroin and Methamphetamine,” are in “large measure. . . identical.” (Dkt. 39 at 4.) According to Edwards, these search warrants lacked sufficient probable cause because the only reference to cocaine was attributed to an inmate at the Olmsted County Adult Detention Center, who told police in August 2021 that Edwards was continuing to sell large quantities of heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine. (Id.) Edwards argues logic suggests that this inmate was talking to police in the hopes of lenient treatment, and that the inmate does not rise to the level of a confidential reliable informant (“CRI”). (Id.) In addition, Edwards argues that although the search warrant applications contain mentions of CRIs, they have little to say about what makes them “reliable,” with the possible exception of the first two search warrants, where there is a statement that a CRI has provided information that has led to the arrest of at least three people, and other statements that have been corroborated by surveillance. (Id. at 5.) Edwards also complains of stale tips from 2019. (Id.)

As to the search warrant at Exhibit 5, Edwards argues that authorization of a search warrant for his person and Chloe Johnson's person, vehicles, and premises had “the effect of diluting the necessary probable cause.” (Id. at 6.) Moreover, other than a mention of an inmate's assertion that Edwards was dealing with cocaine, Edwards argues that there is nothing linking him to cocaine. (Id.) Edwards contends that there is only speculation of trafficking based on surveillance, and that the stops of his person mention the recovery of a “small amount of marijuana,” but no mention of the recovery of methamphetamine, heroin, or cocaine. (Id. at 6-7.)

In sum, Edwards argues that the Government failed to establish a nexus between his home, person, and cars and criminal activity, and that the evidence in support of the warrant at Exhibit 5 is stale given that the police learned that Edwards was associated with the use and sale of heroin and methamphetamine in December 2020, yet the first tracking warrant at Exhibit 1 was not issued until February 2021. (Id. at 8-10.)

With respect to the Franks Motion, it is Edwards' contention that he has made a substantial preliminary showing required by Franks. According to Edwards, while the search warrant applications make references to CRIs, only two applications attempt to establish the CRI's reliability based upon prior activity, and references to the CRI's reliability are absent. (Dkt. 51 at 2-4.) In his reply in support of a Franks hearing, Edwards also made a number of arguments, including the following reproduced below:

1. The police improperly determined Mr. Edwards' identity through picture trades and an overly suggestive single photo spread.

2. The police distorted the public record of Mr. Edwards' interactions with the police by inflating minor marijuana cases into “narcotics related law enforcement calls.”

3. Recitals of past reliability, i.e., the provision of leads resulting in arrests, occur only in the first two applications for tracking orders, and are omitted entirely from the remaining applications when a CRI is mentioned. This omission is particularly telling in connection with application 5 (Altman Affidavit Exhibit 5), which was a compilation of the previous four applications and presumably the only one reviewed by the State court judge on October 15, 2021.

4. There was no indication of how many CRIs were involved. If there was more than one CRI, that fact severely undercuts an assertion of past reliability.

5. The police talked to a jail inmate who “advised Christopher Edwards is continuing to sell large quantities of heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine.” This reference to cocaine is the only reference in all the applications connecting Mr. Edwards with cocaine, an allegation that was apparently not corroborated and certainly not highlighted for the reviewing court.

6. Additionally, the applicant advises of a controlled buy between Chloe Johnson and a CRI. There is no mention of Mr. Edwards not being present at this transaction or otherwise knowledgeable about this transaction.

(Dkt. 61 at 8-9.)

The Government counters that the search warrants are supported by sufficient probable cause and that even if probable cause supporting a search warrant is found lacking on subsequent review, the evidence seized is still not subject to suppression because the officers' reliance on the search warrant was reasonable under the exception set forth by United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). (Dkt. 49.) With respect to the Franks Motion, the Government counters that Defendant has conflated arguments that are relevant to probable cause showings with Franks issues; Defendant cites no evidence that any information was withheld deliberately or recklessly; and he fails to explain how the applications would not support probable cause if supplemented with this information. (Dkt. 57.)

The Court will proceed with addressing each of the search warrants as to both motions.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Ordinarily, searches pursuant to a warrant are reviewed to determine if there was probable cause for the search in the search warrant application and affidavit. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). “Probable cause exists when, given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person could believe there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in a particular place.” United States v. Fladten, 230 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). The task of a court issuing a search warrant is “simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . including the ‘veracity' and ‘basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. “Placement of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle is a ‘search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, requiring probable cause and a warrant.” United States v. Faulkner, 826 F.3d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

Probable cause is a fluid concept that focuses on ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'” United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 576 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 231). In reviewing the decision of the issuing court, the duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the court had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (citation omitted); see also LaMorie, 100 F.3d at 552 (citation omitted) (“Our duty as a reviewing court is to ensure that the issuing judge had a ‘substantial basis' for concluding that probable cause existed, and we owe substantial deference to the determination of probable cause by the issuing judge.”). As to what this Court should consider when reviewing a search warrant for probable cause, “[w]hen the [issuing judge] relied solely on the affidavit presented to him, ‘only that information which is found within the four corners of the affidavit may be considered in determining the existence of probable cause.'” United States v. Solomon, 432 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Etheridge, 165 F.3d 655, 656 (8th Cir. 1999), quoting United States v. Gladney, 48 F.3d 309, 312 (8th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Smith, 581 F.3d 692, 694 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1986)).

The proponent of a suppression motion on the basis of a Fourth Amendment violation bears “the burden of establishing that his . . . Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure.” Rakas v Illinois, 439 U.S....