United States v. Enriquez

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ELPIDIO ENRIQUEZ, Defendant.

Case No.: 17-CR-3293-BEN-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

December 14, 2020

ORDER:

(1) SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE UNDER THE FIRST STEP ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO FILE DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL

[ECF No. 66, 67]

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant Elpidio Enriquez's ("Defendant") Motion to Reduced Sentence Under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), ECF No. 66, and Motion to File Documents Under Seal, ECF. No. 67. For the reasons discussed below, the Court (1) orders the Government to respond to Defendant's Motion, ECF No. 66, by January 9, 2021, ensuring it addresses the issues raised within this order, and (2) GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Seal, ECF No. 67.

II. BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2017, a United States Marine Patrol Aircraft identified several vessels approximately 125 nautical miles south of the Mexico/Guatemala border, traveling in the vicinity of the United States Coast Guard Cutter ("USCGC") James I. ECF No. 33 at 4. One of these vessels was told by the USCGC to stop, yet, continued at a high rate of speed. Id. The USCGC dispatched a small boat to board and inspect the vehicle and discovered 12 bales, amounting to 547 kilograms, which tested positive for cocaine. Id. at 4-5. Upon being interviewed, Defendant stated that he was recruited to transport 23 sacks of drugs from Colombia to Guatemala. Id. at 4.

On October 11, 2017, the grand jury issued an indictment, charging Defendant with two counts: Count 1, conspiracy to distribute cocaine on board a vessel, 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503 and 70506(b), and Count 2, knowingly and intentionally possessing, with intent to distribute, approximately 600 kilograms of cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance, 46 U.S.C. § 70503, and aiding and abetting while on board a vessel, 18 U.S.C. § 2. ECF No. 1.

On January 23, 2018, Defendant consented to entering a Rule 11 plea. ECF No. 25. That same day, Defendant signed a written plea agreement, pursuant to which Defendant agreed to plead guilty to Count 2 of the Indictment in exchange for the Government's agreement (1) "not to charge him with an enhanced penalty for the intant offense pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, which under the facts of this case, carries a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence" and (2) to "dismiss Count 1 of the underlying indictment without prejudice after Defendant is sentenced." ECF No. 26 at 2.

On January 29, 2018, Magistrate Judge William Gallo issued his Findings and Recommendation that the Court accept Defendant's guilty plea. ECF No. 29. On March 5, 2018, after no objections were received, this Court issued an order accepting the Findings and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, adopting Defendant's plea of guilty to County 2 of the Indictment. ECF No. 31. Prior to sentencing, the Government recommended a sentence of 120 months in custody, ECF No. 46, while Defendantrequested a sentence of 120 months in custody and three years of supervised release, ECF No. 47. According to the Presentence Investigation Report, based on Defendant's total offense level of 37 and Criminal History Category II, the guideline imprisonment range was 235 months to 293 months. ECF No. 33 at 13.

On July 31, 2018, this Court sentenced Defendant to 180 months in prison and 10 years of supervised release after he pled guilty to Count 2 of the indictment, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on board a vessel and aiding and abetting in violation of 46 U.S.C. 70503 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. ECF No. 57. During the sentencing hearing, the Court noted that had the Government filed an information pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 851, the mandatory minimum sentence would have been twenty years, or 240 months, in part, due to the fact that this was Defendant's second offense. ECF No. 60 at 5:10-17. However, in the absence of being able to apply a repeat offender enhancement, the Court calculated Defendant's adjusted offense level as 36, carrying a guideline sentence of 210 months to 260 months. Id. at 19:16-20:15. "After considering the 3553(a) factors," the Court "believe[d] that a sentence of 180 months [was] reasonable and sufficient but not greater than necessary." Id. at 20:20-24. During the sentencing, the Court noted that supervised release would "be waived upon deportation, exclusion, or voluntary departure."

On November 30, 2020, Defendant filed his Motion to Reduce Sentence Under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), seeking a reduction in his sentence to either (1) time served or (2) 120 months. ECF No. 66 at 4. Defendant seeks the reduction on the basis of his diagnosis with prostate cancer and a medical opinion that he likely has less than ten years to live, and as such, will not live to see his release. Id. Defendant also filed a Motion to File Documents Under Seal along with his motion, seeking to file his medical records in support of his aforementioned motion under seal. ECF No. 67.

According to the Bureau of Prisons, Defendant is sixty-four (64) years old, imprisoned at Forth Worth Federal Medical Center, and is scheduled for release on June 29, 2030. https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582

Generally, a "court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, an exception allows courts to do so in any case where a motion is filed by either the (1) Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or (2) a federal inmate, after the earlier of having (a) "fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf" or (b) the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility." 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Court, upon reviewing such a motion, may (1) consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)¹ to the extent they are applicable and (2) find that (a) "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction" or "the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison," (b) "the defendant is no a danger to the safety of any other person or community," and (c) "a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 28 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The United States Sentencing Commission, "in promulgating general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions . . . shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction." 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). In the Commentary to Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines, covering Reduction in Term of Imprisonment, the Sentencing Commission indicates that a defendant meets the requirements of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" where the medical condition of the defendant "substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of acorrectional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover." U.S. SENT'G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13, cmt. n. 1. The conditions listed include where the defendant suffers from a (1) "terminal illness (i.e., a serious and advanced illness with an end of life trajectory)," such as "metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, and advanced dementia" and/or (2) "a serious physical or medical condition," (3) "a serious functional or cognitive impairment," or (4) "deteriorating physical or mental health because of the aging process, that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover." Id.

In sum, a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 ("Section 3582") entails two primary inquiries: "first, whether Defendant has satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement, and second, whether Defendant has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction." United States v. Galaz, No. 15-CR-02559-GPC, 2020 WL 4569125, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2020). "A defendant bears the burden to show special circumstances meeting the bar set by Congress and the Sentencing Commission for compassionate release to be granted." United States v. Shabudin, 445 F. Supp. 3d 212, 214 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing United States v. Greenhut, No. 2:18-cr-00048-CAS-1, 2020 WL 509385, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020); United States v. Sprague, 135 F.3d 1301, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1998)).

B. Motion to File Documents Under Seal

Except for certain documents "traditionally kept secret," federal courts begin a sealing analysis with "a strong presumption in favor of access to court records." Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). A party seeking to seal a judicial record then must "articulate [] compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings," id., that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the "public interest in understanding the judicial process," Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court "conscientiously balance[s] . . . the competing interests" of the public and the party who seeks to keepcertain judicial records secret. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. After considering these interests, if the Court decides to seal certain judicial records, it "base[s] its decision on a compelling reason and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture." Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1434 (citing Valley Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 798 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying compelling reasons standard to dispositive motions).

A party must satisfy the compelling reasons...