United States v. Esteras

88 F.4th 1163

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edgardo ESTERAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 23-3422

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

Decided and Filed: December 20, 2023^*

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown. No. 4:14-cr-00425-10—Benita Y. Pearson, District Judge.

ON BRIEF: Christian J. Grostic, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Matthew B. Kall, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; WHITE and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

SUTTON, C.J., delivered the order of the court in which THAPAR, J., joins in full. WHITE, J., joins in the result because she agrees that United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2007) is controlling.

AMENDED ORDER

SUTTON, Chief Judge.

Edgardo Esteras appeals the district court's order revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 24 months in prison. We affirm the district court's revocation order for the reasons that follow.

In 2018, Esteras pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Varying downward from a guidelines range of 15 to 21 months, the district court sentenced Esteras to 12 months of imprisonment, to be served consecutively with a 15-month prison term for violating his probation for a prior federal drug-trafficking conviction, followed by six years of supervised release.

Esteras's six-year term of supervised release began in January 2020. Three years later, in January 2023, the probation officer reported to the district court that Esteras had violated the conditions of his supervised release (1) by committing domestic violence, aggravated menacing, and criminal damaging, and (2) by possessing a firearm. The probation officer notified the district court that the new criminal charges against Esteras had been dismissed at the victim's request.

Judge Benita Y. Pearson conducted a hearing and found that Esteras possessed a firearm while under supervised release. She "worr[ied]" that her previous sentences for drug crimes and violating an earlier supervised release term failed "to deter [Esteras], to encourage [him] to be respectful of the law." R.439 at 83. Based on his "dangerous" and "disrespectful" behavior, she varied upward from an advisory range of six to twelve months to impose a 24-month jail sentence, "long enough to at least allow [Esteras] to reconsider [his] behavior." Id. at 85. She added three years of supervised release to the sentence, including an anger management class and six months of location monitoring. These conditions, Judge Pearson explained, would teach him to "do better" and "think before [he] act[s]." Id.

Esteras objected that the court should not have considered the three subfactors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when crafting its sentence: "to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense." Id. at 92. Judge Pearson agreed that "part of [her] contemplation certainly is the need for the sentence imposed, to promote respect for the law." Id. But she added that she also considered deterrence and community safety, which appear in other statutory provisions. She also referenced her decision to vary upward "to separate Mr. Esteras from the average, typical, mine run-type defendant." Id.

In closing the hearing, Judge Pearson expressed hope that Esteras would take advantage of this opportunity. She acknowledged that some of the conventional features of supervised release could be seen as partly "punitive," such as location monitoring and other measures that "restrict [his] freedom" of movement. Id. She then referred to other terms, such as anger management, as "there to bolster [him]" and "help [him] to do better going forward." Id. at 95-96.

On appeal, Esteras challenges his sentence on the ground that the district court relied on prohibited factors in sentencing him. We disagree.

Congress has authorized district courts to revoke supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). In some settings, district courts have discretion to revoke, modify, or decrease a term of supervised release. Id. In other settings, as when a parolee possesses a weapon as Esteras did here, the district court must revoke the individual's supervised release. Id. § 3583(g). Whether at the outset of sentencing an individual, in the context of a modified term of supervised release, or in the context of a required revocation of supervised release, Congress has directed courts to consider certain factors. In the words of Congress under the heading "Factors to be considered in including a term of supervised release": "The court . . . consider[s] the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)." Id. § 3583(c); see also id. § 3583(e) (similar for "modification of conditions or revocation" of supervised release).

To bring this provision into full view, here is a full recitation of § 3553(a) that italicizes the factors that district courts need not consider in supervised-release determinations:

The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available;

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines—

(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and

(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or

(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28);

(5) any pertinent policy statement—

(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 28); and

(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

Invoking the italicized language, Esteras claims that § 3583(c) and (e) create a divide between permitted and forbidden supervised-release considerations. As he sees it, a district court judge who considers the forbidden factors—"the seriousness of the offense," "respect for the law," "just punishment for the offense," or "the kinds of sentences available"—necessarily imposes a procedurally unreasonable sentence. Notably, this argument applies to original supervised-release decisions, which come immediately on the heels of any prison-sentence determination under all of the § 3553(a) factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c), as well as to any revocation, modification, or reduction determinations with respect to supervised release, see id. § 3583(e), (g).

United States v. Lewis rejected this argument. 498 F.3d 393, 399-400 (6th Cir. 2007). It provided two explanations: one textual, one contextual. Textually, Lewis observes that § 3583 generally gives courts considerable discretion over supervised-release decisions after considering the listed factors. Id. at 400. It never says that the court may consider "only" those factors. Id. Congress, as it happens, knew how to instruct courts not to consider certain sentencing factors, as shown in its express command to disregard the goal of rehabilitation when imposing prison time. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) ("recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction or rehabilitation").

In the context of supervised-release decisions, moreover, Lewis was concerned that this proposed bright-line rule was unworkable. Whether in the context of an initial or later supervised-release decision, the purportedly forbidden considerations mentioned in § 3553(a)(2)(A) tend to be "essentially redundant" with the permitted ones. Lewis, 498 F.3d at 400. Take § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s consideration about the "seriousness of the offense." It aligns with § 3553(a)(1) and its emphasis on "the nature and circumstances of the offense." To think about the one requires the judge to think about the other.

Or take § 3553(a)(2)(A)'s consideration of the need "to promote respect for the law." It meshes with the rationale that revoking supervised release will "hel...