United States v. Farkas

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MITCHELL LEON FARKAS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-6061

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

December 1, 2023

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

Before: COLE, GILMAN, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Mitchell Farkas of attempted murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, and associated racketeering offenses based on Farkas's role in a stabbing at a federal prison conducted by members of the Aryan Circle. The district court sentenced Farkas to thirty years' imprisonment. Farkas argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, that the jury should not have heard certain evidence, and that his sentence is in violation of double jeopardy and procedurally unreasonable. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I.

In 2018, Mitchell Farkas and Jonathan Gober were incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary Big Sandy, a high-security federal prison in Kentucky. Farkas and Gober were members of the Aryan Circle, a gang active in the federal prison system. The Aryan Circle required its members to carry out stabbings when ordered. The member would potentially become the target if he did not execute the order.

A.S was a prospective Aryan Circle member at USP Big Sandy. A.S. was "getting investigated" by the Aryan Circle to determine if he would be "validated" as a full member. (Trial Tr., R. 451, PageID 5058.) The Aryan Circle discovered that A.S. previously made a statement to law enforcement and was therefore "no good," "no longer Aryan Circle," and "had to go." (Id.)

Aryan Circle leadership assigned Farkas and Gober to attack A.S. While exercising at the USP Big Sandy gymnasium, Gober suddenly grabbed A.S.'s legs. While Gober held A.S. down, Farkas stabbed A.S. in the head repeatedly for approximately a minute. (Sentencing Hr'g Tr., R. 463, PageID 5286; Gov't Ex. 31, Dkt.. 37, Video.) When A.S. attempted to break free, Farkas yelled, "Get his legs." (Trial Tr., R. 447, PageID 4113.) The attack was captured by surveillance video. (Trial Tr., R. 451, PageID 4841; Gov't Ex. 31, Dkt. 37, Video.) A.S. permanently lost vision in his left eye as a result of the stabbing. After the attack, Gober gave a "rundown" of the stabbing to his Aryan Circle superior, who relayed the report up the chain of command. (Trial Tr., R. 447. PagelD 4155-56, 4158-59.)

At trial, A.S. identified Farkas as his assailant. Two prison officials identified Farkas based on the surveillance video footage. A prison investigator testified that Farkas was discovered with a "red unknown substance," apparently blood, on his hands and clothes after the incident. (Trial Tr., R. 447, PageID 4005-06.) A photograph of a "plastic homemade weapon" recovered near the scene was displayed for the jury. (Id. at PageID 4064; Gov't Ex. 29, Dkt. 37, p. 4.)

Robert Johnson, a lieutenant with the Bureau of Prisons, testified that he had investigated prior attacks by Aryan Circle members, including a stabbing at USP Lewisburg in 2014 and stabbings at USP Big Sandy in 2014, 2017, and 2019. (Trial Tr., R. 451, PageID 4834-35, 4837-38.)

Robert Bodin, an agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, testified that he had investigated an Aryan Circle related murder in Louisiana in 2016 and Aryan Circle stabbings at USP Talladega in 2010, USP Pollack in 2014, and USP Big Sandy in 2014. (Trial Tr., R. 450, PageID 4684, 4701-02, 4730-31.) Bodin clarified that Farkas was not involved in these incidents.

Johnson testified about how dangerous weapons can be made in prison. Over Farkas's objection, the district court admitted a photograph depicting weapons like the ones Johnson described. (Gov't Ex. 28, Dkt. 37, p. 3.) The court instructed the jury to consider the photograph "only for the purpose of visualizing the testimony" and emphasized that "there's no allegation that any of these items have any connection to Mr. Farkas, [nor] that Mr. Farkas was in any way associated with these particular weapons." (Trial Tr., R. 450, PageID 4759-60.)

The jury convicted Farkas on four counts: (1) attempted murder in aid of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), (2) assault in aid of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3), (3) attempted murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1113, and (4) assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3). The assault in aid of racketeering count was dismissed prior to sentencing. The district court calculated Farkas's offense level to be 39 under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, including a two-level enhancement for physical restraint of the victim under § 3A1.3. This calculation resulted in a Guidelines range of 30 years to life, with statutory maximums setting the upper bound at 40 years. An offense level of 37 would have led to the same Guidelines range. The court sentenced Farkas to a combined 30 years' imprisonment: 10 years for the attempted murder in aid of racketeering count, 20 years consecutive for attempted murder under § 1113, and 10 years concurrent for assault with a dangerous weapon under § 113(a)(3). (Judgment, R. 420, PageID 2353-54.) The court sentenced Farkas at the low end of the Guidelines range only to avoid disparity with co-defendants who pleaded guilty. (Sentencing Hr'g Tr., R. 463, PagelD 5322-23.)

II.

A.

Farkas argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. He contends that the state failed to prove that he was the person who stabbed A.S., which was necessary for all four counts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3, 5); 18 U.S.C. § 1113; 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3). He also argues that the state failed to prove that he acted with the purpose of maintaining his position in the Aryan Circle. Proof of this purpose is required for the racketeering convictions. United States v. Hackett, 762 F.3d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 2014). Evidence is insufficient to prove an element if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational juror would find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317-19 (1979).

There is sufficient evidence that Farkas stabbed A.S. First, A.S. identified Farkas at trial as the person who stabbed him. Although A.S. initially declined to identify Farkas to investigators, the jury was entitled to believe A.S.'s trial testimony despite his inconsistent statements. See United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2005). Second, based on the prison investigator's testimony, a rational juror could infer that Farkas had A.S.'s blood on his hands just after the stabbing. Finally, the stabbing was captured on video, and prison staff familiar with Farkas identified him as the attacker based on the footage.

There is also sufficient evidence that Farkas acted to maintain his position in the Aryan Circle. Farkas does not contest his membership in the organization. (Appellant Br. 17.) As discussed above, there is sufficient evidence to show that Farkas stabbed A.S. Testimony and other evidence indicated that the Aryan Circle required members to carry out stabbings when ordered to do so or potentially become targets themselves. Witnesses testified that Aryan Circle leadership selected Farkas and Gober to stab A.S. and that Gober's report of the completed stabbing was relayed back up the chain of command. Letters sent between prisons corroborated this testimony. (E.g., Trial Tr., R. 447, PagelD 4158-59.) Based on this evidence, a rational juror could infer that Farkas stabbed A.S. to maintain his position in the Aryan Circle. See Hackett, 762 F.3d at 500-01.

B.

Farkas next argues the district court improperly admitted evidence that should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial. Evidence is relevant when it "has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable" and "the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Fed.R.Evid. 401. But relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of "unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury[.]" Fed.R.Evid. 403. We generally review evidentiary rulings under the abuse-of-discretion standard.^[1] United States v. Gibbs, 506 F.3d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 2007).

Farkas first argues that the district court erred by admitting Johnson's and Bodin's testimony about stabbings and murders committed by other members of the Aryan Circle. According to Farkas, this testimony was unfairly prejudicial because he did not play a role in those crimes, and the testimony's "spillover effect" could lead a juror to convict him for stabbing A.S. (Appellant Br. 26.) Two charges against Farkas-attempted murder in aid of racketeering and assault in aid of racketeering-required the government to prove that the Aryan Circle was engaged in racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5); 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3). Racketeering activity includes "any act or threat involving murder." 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Testimony about these prior crimes is probative as to whether the Aryan Circle was engaged in racketeering activity. See United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403, 424 (6th Cir. 2016).

Further Bodin testified that he was not aware of Farkas's involvement in any of the stabbings or murders that Bodin investigated, thus limiting the danger of misleading the jury. The danger of unfair prejudice is further reduced because the testimony did not associate Farkas with acts more violent than those he was accused of committing. See id. Moreover, each officer's testimony consisted of unelaborated statements about his knowledge of the Aryan Circle's involvement in the prior stabbings. In contrast, the jury saw video footage and heard more graphic...