United States v. Farnsworth

OPINION & ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE (DKTS. 114, 127)

MARK A. GOLDSMITH, United States District Judge.

On February 11, 2015, Defendant Michael Paul Farnsworth was detained following an investigation that uncovered evidence that Farnsworth had knowingly received, possessed, and distributed child pornography. See Compl. (Dkt. 1); Order of Detention (Dkt. 4). Farnsworth subsequently pled guilty to distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). Judgment (Dkt. 81). On February 16, 2018, the Court sentenced Farnsworth to 120 months' imprisonment. Id. Farnsworth is incarcerated at FCI Milan and his anticipated release date- accounting for good conduct time-is August 19, 2023. Inmate Data (Dkt. 127-2).

On May 15, 2020, Farnsworth filed a motion for compassionate release based on his fear that his underlying health conditions-including asthma and a body mass index (BMI) of 31-increased his risk of contracting COVID-19 (Dkt. 91). The Court denied the motion because Farnsworth failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for release and because the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) did not support releasing him (Dkts. 102, 109).

On February 22, 2021, Farnsworth, proceeding pro se, filed a new motion for compassionate release, again arguing that he has an increased risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19 due to

his underlying health conditions-including asthma, obesity, and gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD)-and adding that he is also entitled to release to care for his sick mother (Dkt. 114). After the Government filed a response (Dkt. 117), Farnsworth filed a request for appointment of counsel to assist him in connection with his motion for compassionate release (Dkt. 120). The Court granted the request and ordered Farnsworth to file, through his newly appointed attorney, a supplemental brief in support of his motion for compassionate release (Dkt. 121). Instead of filing a supplemental brief, Farnsworth filed, through counsel, a second motion for compassionate release (Dkt. 127). In his second motion, Farnsworth argues that in addition to the reasons he articulated in his first motion, he is also entitled to release because the conditions of confinement during the pandemic have led to “significantly harsher punishment than could have been anticipated at the time of sentencing.” Id. at 9. The Government filed a response (Dkt. 130), arguing that (i) Farnsworth failed to properly exhaust some of his claims, (ii) Farnsworth's stated reasons for release are not extraordinary and compelling, and (iii) the § 3553(a) factors do not support release (Dkt. 130). Farnsworth filed a reply (Dkt. 133). Having considered all briefing and record materials submitted by the parties, the Court concludes that Farnsworth has failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for release and, further, the § 3553(a) factors do not favor release. Accordingly, the Court denies Farnsworth's motions.^[1]

I. ANALYSIS

The First Step Act (FSA) modified the statute concerning the compassionate release of federal prisoners, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), such that district courts may entertain motions filed by incarcerated defendants seeking to reduce their sentences. United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000,

1003-1004 (6th Cir. 2020). Before granting a compassionate release motion, a district court must engage in a three-step inquiry: (i) the court must find that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant [a sentence] reduction”; (ii) it must ensure “that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and (iii) it must “consider[] all relevant sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). If all of those requirements are met, the district court “may reduce the term of imprisonment, ” but it need not do so. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Regarding the first step of the inquiry, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that, with respect to motions for compassionate release filed by imprisoned individuals, “extraordinary and compelling” reasons are not limited to those set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Jones, 980 F.3d at 1109. It has further held that “[u]ntil the Sentencing Commission updates § 1B1.13 to reflect the [FSA], district courts have full discretion in the interim to determine whether an ‘extraordinary and compelling' reason justifies compassionate release when an imprisoned person files a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion.” Id.

The Court considers (i) whether Farnsworth properly exhausted his claims, (ii) whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances compel Farnsworth's release, and (iii) whether the § 3553(a) factors support Farnsworth's release.

A. Exhaustion

Before an inmate moves for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), the inmate must either exhaust his or her administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) or wait thirty days from when the inmate filed a request with his or her warden. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 2020).

By way of background, Farnsworth sought compassionate release from the warden of his correctional facility before filing his first motion for compassionate release in May 2020 and again before filing the instant motions in 2021. On April 10, 2020, Farnsworth filled out a form to request compassionate release and submitted it to the warden. See BOP Records at PageID.928 (Dkt. 96-1). He checked a box on the form indicating that his request was based on “[d]ebilitated [m]edical [c]ondition.” Id. In the section of the form asking about the extraordinary and compelling circumstances that warrant his release, Farnsworth referenced his statement that he attached to the form. Id. In this statement, Farnsworth explained that he seeks release based on fear that his age and his asthma rendered him vulnerable to COVID-19. Id. at PageID.929. Farnsworth also explained that if released, he could live with his mother and “assist her with activities of daily life.” Id. The warden denied this request on April 24, 2020. Id. at PageID.931. Farnsworth appealed the denial, submitting a request for administrative remedy in which he argued that he should be released because his asthma and obesity increased his vulnerability to COVID-19. Id. at PageID.932. The warden denied this request on May 29, 2020. Id. at PageID. 934.

On December 17, 2021, Farnsworth submitted a new request for compassionate release to the warden. 12/17/20 Request at PageID.1105 (Dkt. 117-2). In this request, Farnsworth again checked the box indicating that his requested was based on debilitated medical condition. Id. He stated that he sought compassionate release because he “contracted COVID-19, ” and he suffered “long term [e]ffects of the virus, ” including “chest pain and shortness of breath.” Id. He also mentioned that contracting COVID-19 affected his asthma. Id. In the section of the form asking about his proposed release plan, Farnsworth wrote that he planned to reside with his mother and he would “be a caregiver” for her. Id. The warden denied Farnsworth's request on December 31, 2020. Id. at PageID.1104.

The Government argues that § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires issue-specific exhaustion. The Government concedes that Farnsworth has met this requirement with respect to his request based on his own health conditions. Resp. to 2d Mot. at 4 (Dkt. 130). However, the Government contends that Farnsworth has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his request based on his desire to care for his mother, arguing that Farnsworth mentioned his mother only in his requests as part of his re-entry plan. Id. at 5.

The Sixth Circuit has never held that issue-specific exhaustion is required in the compassionate release context. Nor does the statutory text contain an issue exhaustion requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1); United States v. Williams, 473 F.Supp.3d 772, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (noting that issue exhaustion “is not mandated in any plain terms of the statute”). Further, several courts within this District have rejected the notion that issue-specific exhaustion is required in the compassionate release context. See, e.g., United States v. Sherrod, No. 19-20139, 2021 WL 3473236, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2021) (“[T]his Court will join the majority of district courts in holding that issue exhaustion is not required.”); United States v. Ferguson, No. 10-20403, 2021 WL 1685944, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2021) (“The Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the courts which have held § 3582(c)(1)(A) does not require issue exhaustion.”).

Even assuming that § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires issue-specific exhaustion, the requirement is likely satisfied here. Farnsworth clearly mentioned his desire to be released to care for his mother in both requests to the warden, albeit in the re-entry plan section of his most recent compassionate release request form. Further, even if Farnsworth has not satisfied issue-specific exhaustion, this failure is of no consequence, as his motion nevertheless fails for the reasons discussed below.

B. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances i. COVID-19

With respect to motions for compassionate release premised on a defendant's fear of contracting COVID-19, the Sixth Circuit has held that “generalized fears of contracting COVID-19, without more, do not constitute a compelling reason” to grant compassionate release. United States v. Ramadan, No. 20-1450, 2020 WL 5758015, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 2020). Courts generally consult the guidance on high-risk factors published by the Centers for...