United States v. Favela

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. GUADALUPE FAVELA, Defendant.

No. 1:94-cr-05044-DAD-1

United States District Court, E.D. California

September 22, 2022

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (DOC. NOS 607, 609)

Pending before the court is defendant Guadalupe Favela's motion for a reduction of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Doc. Nos. 607, 609.) The motion is based, in part, on the purported risks posed to defendant by the coronavirus (“COVID-19”) pandemic. On June 30 2021, the court held a hearing on the motion and took it under submission. (Doc. No. 642.)^[1] For the reasons explained below, defendant's motion will now be granted.

BACKGROUND

On August 25, 1994, defendant Favela and his six co-defendants were charged in a second superseding indictment with the following: one count of continuing a criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848; two counts of conspiracy to manufacture, distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and 841(a)(1); one count of distribution of methamphetamine and aiding and abetting the same in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and aiding and abetting the same in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and one count of manufacturing methamphetamine and aiding and abetting the same in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. (Doc. No. 83; see also Doc Nos. 609 at 3; 615 at 3.)^[2]

On January 17, 1995, defendant's jury trial was commenced. (Doc. No. 117.) At that trial, the jury heard testimony that defendant Favela conspired with his co-defendants to manufacture and distribute large amounts of methamphetamine and that he ran a criminal enterprise to manufacture methamphetamine from 1991 to 1994, including operating a methamphetamine laboratory located on property he owned in Dunlap, California called the Millwood Road ranch. (PSR at 5-6.) Specifically, when California Department of Justice Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (“BNE”) agents executed a search warrant at the Millwood Road ranch, they found liquid methamphetamine that a BNE criminal analyst determined would have produced 10-15 pounds of methamphetamine. (Id. at 6-9.) One of defendant Favela's codefendants, Ramiro Ramirez, eventually cooperated with the government and testified at defendant's trial that he (Ramirez) had participated in six or seven methamphetamine “cooks” at the Millwood Road ranch and kept track of the number of reaction vessels used in each cook. (Id. at 8.) The trial court ultimately determined that approximately 224 pounds of methamphetamine had been produced at the Millwood Road ranch during just a portion of the criminal enterprise's activity that, in total, covered three years. (Id. at 8, 10-11.) Defendant Favela derived substantial income from this drug manufacturing and trafficking activity and used large amounts of the cash made from the manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine to purchase real estate. (Id. at 5-6.)

On February 2, 1995, following a ten-day trial, the jury found defendant Favela guilty on all counts. (Doc. Nos. 139, 142.) According to the presentence report prepared in preparation for his sentencing, defendant Favela continued to deny any participation in the crime of conviction, maintained that he did not know that anything was going on at the ranch, and that he wanted the court to know that co-defendant Ramirez had lied during his testimony before the jury. (PSR at 9.) Following his conviction, it was determined that under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines then in effect, defendant Favela's total offense level was 43 and his criminal history category was I, resulting in a sentencing guideline range calling for a sentence of life imprisonment. (PSR at 1213.) On July 31, 1995, the court adopted the PSR's recommendation and sentenced defendant to life imprisonment as to count one, life imprisonment as to counts two through six with those terms to run concurrently with each other and to the life sentence imposed as to count one and to any other federal or state sentence imposed upon defendant Favela, and a $300 mandatory special assessment. (Doc. Nos. 322; 327.)^[3]

In 1998 defendant Favela filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence (Doc. No. 492), which he supplemented or amended several times (Doc. Nos. 510, 517, 518, 531.) The then-assigned district judge denied that § 2255 motion on January 24, 2000. (Doc. No. 532.) Following the Sentencing Commission's promulgation of Amendment 782, which generally revised the drug quantity table and chemical quantity tables and which applied retroactively to previously sentenced defendants, on June 18, 2015, defendant Favela filed a motion seeking a reduction of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1), and Amendment 782. (Doc. No. 597.) The then-assigned district judge denied that motion, concluding that “the amount of methamphetamine attributable to Defendant is 224 pounds, which is considerably greater than the minimum amount to subject a defendant to a base offense level of 38, even after Amendment 782 is taken into account.” (Doc. No. 604 at 3.) Thus, the court at that time found that “[i]n conjunction with his criminal history category of I, the two-level increase pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(1), and the four-level increase under § 2D1.5(a), the applicable sentence guideline is life imprisonment, which is the same as the previous range applicable to his case before Amendment 782 took effect.” (Id. at 4.) As a result, the court determined that “defendant's sentence was not ‘based on a sentencing range that has been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission,' as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).” (Id.) (citing United States v. Leniear, 574 F.3d, 668, 673 (9th Cir. 2009)).

Nevertheless, in denying defendant's motion seeking a reduction of his sentence in November 2015, the then-assigned district judge noted:

Although the Court is without authority to reduce Defendant's sentence, the Court commends Defendant for the impressive efforts he has taken towards self-improvement, and his many accomplishments while in prison, which include completing several educational and lifestyle courses, mentoring his fellow inmates, engaging in various volunteer activities, providing financial support to his family members, becoming proficient in English, and earning his GED. The Court's denial of the instant motion is in no way a reflection of Defendant's character, but is a matter of law.

(Id.)

Today, defendant remains in the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is serving his life sentence at Federal Correctional Institution, Victorville Medium I (“FCI Victorville Medium I”). (Doc. No. 609 at 2.) On May 5, 2020, defendant filed a pro se motion seeking a reduction of his sentence and his immediate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Doc. No. 607.) The court referred defendant's motion to the Federal Defender's Office (“FDO”) for this district. (Doc. No. 608.) On July 6, 2020, the FDO filed a supplemental motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) on behalf of defendant. (Doc. No. 609.) While defendant's motion was pending, he contracted COVID-19 in July 2020. (Doc. Nos. 615 at 7, 9; 622 at 3.) The government filed its opposition to the pending motion on August 6, 2020, and on September 3, 2020, defendant filed his reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 615, 622.)

As noted, the court held a hearing on the pending motion on June 30, 2021. (Doc. No. 642.) To address inquires raised by the court at that hearing, defendant filed updated medical records and a supplemental brief on July 1, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 643, 647, 648.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A court generally “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010) (“‘[A] judgment of conviction that includes [a sentence of imprisonment] constitutes a final judgment' and may not be modified by a district court except in limited circumstances.”). Those limited circumstances include compassionate release in extraordinary cases. See United States v. Holden, 452 F.Supp.3d 964, 968 (D. Or. 2020). Prior to the enactment of the First Step Act of 2018 (“the FSA”), motions for compassionate release could only be filed by the BOP. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2002). Under the FSA, however, imprisoned defendants may now bring their own motions for compassionate release in the district court. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (2018).

In this regard, the FSA specifically provides that a court may upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf^[4] or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that

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(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or (ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison, pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is

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