United States v. Felton

587 F.Supp.3d 366

UNITED STATES of America

v.Gregory Antonio Bates FELTON, Defendant.

Case No. 3:03-cr-8-3

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Charlottesville Division.

Signed February 23, 2022

William F. Gould, Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorneys Office, Charlottesville, VA, for United States of America.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NORMAN K. MOON, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Gregory Antonio Bates Felton's motion for resentencing pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018. Dkts. 441, 451. Having reviewed the submissions from both sides, the record, and recent developments in the Fourth Circuit's caselaw, the Court finds that Felton's sentence should be reduced. The Court further finds, based on a recalculation of the Sentencing Guidelines and fresh consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, that a downward variance is appropriate.

I

A

In 2002 law enforcement began investigating a large-scale drug conspiracy in Charlottesville, Virginia. Dkt. 424, Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), ¶ 10. Gregory Felton and Tadashi Keyes served as the conspiracy's "enforcers." Id. at ¶ 14. Both individuals carried and used firearms in conjunction with their role. Id. On August 30, 2002, Keyes and Felton robbed a drug user they suspected of working with the police. Id. at ¶ 15. During the struggle Felton punched the user in the face and took $321 in cash from his person. Id. At some point the user pulled a knife and Keyes fired his gun, wounding the user in the arm. Id. Forensic evidence suggests that Felton also fired his firearm twice during the incident. Id. Two weeks later, on September 14, 2002, Felton, Keyes, and other members of the conspiracy confronted another drug user they believed to have stolen firearms from the group. Id. at ¶ 16. Felton shot and killed him. Id.

A six-count superseding indictment filed on August 7, 2003, charged Felton with, among other things,

• Count One: Conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A) ;

• Count Four: Possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), in connection with the August 30, 2002 shooting; and,

• Count Five: Murder with use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), in connection with the September 14, 2002 murder.

Dkt. 40. Felton was tried and convicted by a jury on the listed counts in April 2004. Dkt. 147.

When Felton was originally sentenced a violation of § 841(b)(1)(A) carried a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. PSR ¶ 95. Felton's Guideline sentence for that count was calculated at an offense level of 43 based on the murder cross-reference in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d). Id. at ¶ 24. An offense level of 43 corresponds to a Guideline sentence of life. Id. at ¶ 96. With respect to the § 924(c) count, the statute provided for an enhanced mandatory minimum of ten years because a firearm was discharged. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).¹ Section 924(c) also provides that sentences imposed under its terms must run consecutive to any other sentence. Id. The Guideline sentence was the term of imprisonment required by statute. PSR ¶ 47. Finally, a violation of § 924(j)(1) carried a maximum sentence of life. Id. at ¶ 95. Again, any sentence on this count had to run consecutive to any other sentence. Id. at ¶ 97. The Guideline sentence for the § 924(j)(1) count was calculated at an offense level of 43, id. at ¶ 30; which, again, corresponds to a Guideline sentence of life, id. at ¶ 96.

The Guidelines were mandatory at the time of Felton's sentencing. Accordingly, the Court sentenced Felton to two life terms plus 120 months. Dkt. 207.

B.

The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 "reduced sentencing disparities between cocaine and crack cocaine offenses, which were widely criticized for producing racially disproportionate sentencing outcomes." United States v. Collington , 995 F.3d 347, 351 (4th Cir. 2021). But the Act only applied prospectively. Congress passed the First Step Act eight years later to allow for resentencing of individuals like Felton who were sentenced too early to benefit from the Fair Sentencing Act's reforms. Id. at 352.

Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018 permits "a court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense" to "impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed." A "covered offense" is defined as "a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010[.]" Id.

Less clear is the scope of relief available under the First Step Act for defendants with a covered offense. Felton argues that the First Step Act authorizes resentencing on all counts of conviction, as opposed to covered offenses alone, on the theory that sentences are imposed as part of a package that cannot be unbundled. This approach is not without precedent. In United States v. Hudson , for example, the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant with at least one covered offense qualifies for resentencing on the aggregate penalty. 967 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2020) ("[A] court may consider a defendant's request for a reduced sentence, including for non-covered offenses that are grouped with the covered offenses to produce the aggregate sentence."). See also e.g., United States v. Pettaway , No. 4:06-cr-00098, 2021 WL 5566158, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 11, 2021) (Davis C.J.) ("Because Count Three is a covered offense [within the meaning of § 404(b) of the First Step Act], the ‘sentencing package doctrine’ renders it unnecessary for the Court to decide whether [petitioner's other conviction] is also a covered offense."); Wright v. United States , 425 F.Supp.3d 588, 598 (E.D. Va. 2019) (holding that the First Step Act authorizes resentencing on all counts of conviction, including counts not modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act, since the alternative would "unbundl[e] the entire sentence package.") (quoting United States v. Hadden , 475 F.3d 652, 669 (4th Cir. 2007) ).

While these cases are not controlling, their reasoning is consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent. In general, the Fourth Circuit has endorsed the view that a sentence resulting from multiple counts of conviction should be determined by considering all counts together rather than by calculating the appropriate sentence for each count in isolation and aggregating the results. See e.g., United States v. Ventura , 864 F.3d 301, 309 (4th Cir. 2017) ("The sentencing package doctrine accounts for the holistic approach that a district court should employ when sentencing a defendant convicted of multiple offenses."); Hadden , 475 F.3d at 669 (acknowledging the "sentence-package theory of sentencing", under which "a sentence is not merely the sum of its parts"). See also Dean v. United States , 581 U.S. 62, 137 S.Ct. 1170, 1176, 197 L.Ed.2d 490 (2017) ("As a general matter, [federal law] permit[s] a court imposing a sentence on one count of conviction to consider sentences imposed on other counts.").

Specifically addressing resentencings under the First Step Act, the Fourth Circuit has stated that "the First Step Act tasks district courts with making a holistic resentencing determination as to whether the original sentence remains appropriate in light of the Fair Sentencing Act's reforms." Collington , 995 F.3d at 355 (emphasis added). To be sure, "[a] First Step Act proceeding is not a plenary resentencing." United States v. Webb , 5 F.4th 495, 498 (4th Cir. 2021). But the Fourth Circuit has already determined that "holistic resentencing" under the First Step Act must include recalculation of the Guideline sentence range in light of intervening caselaw and fresh consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. Collington , 995 F.3d at 355. Given the Fourth Circuit's past association of the sentencing package doctrine with "the holistic approach that a district court should employ when sentencing a defendant convicted of multiple offenses", Ventura , 864 F.3d at 309, Felton's proposed interpretation fits logically alongside the Fourth Circuit's more recent elaborations on the "holistic resentencing" required by the First Step Act.

Felton's interpretation also aligns with the text of the First Step Act, which says that a court may impose a reduced sentence on eligible defendants "as if" the Fair Sentencing Act "were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed." § 404(b). Precisely because "[s]entences for covered offenses are not imposed in a vacuum, hermetically sealed off from sentences imposed for non-covered offenses", Hudson , 967 F.3d at 611, the entire bundle would be different if the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time of the original sentencing.

On the other hand, the rule Felton proposes leads to a morass of quandaries for district courts. Does intervening caselaw apply when recalculating non-covered offenses too? If so, serious arbitrariness issues present themselves. But if not, district courts are faced with the discomfiting task of resentencing a defendant to a term of imprisonment using bad law.

A few examples illustrate the problem. Before Congress passed the First Step Act in 2018, a defendant charged with two or more counts of possessing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence was subject to a mandatory minimum of five years incarceration (more if the firearm was brandished or discharged) on the first count and 25 consecutive years on each additional count. This practice, referred to as sentence "stacking," was criticized for its often-draconian consequences. See United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 285 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting the "sheer and unusual length of sentences" resulting from § 924(c) "stacking," which "were about twice as long as federal sentences...