United States v. Forrest

316 F.Supp.3d 111

UNITED STATES of America

v.Leonard FORREST, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. 13–328 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed June 11, 2018

Jeffrey Pearlman, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

Jonathan Jeffress, Federal Public Defender for D.C., Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District JudgeThe defendant, Leonard Forrest, is currently serving a seventy-month term of imprisonment that was imposed by this Court following his plea of guilty to two counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). See Plea Agreement at 1 (Dec. 11, 2014); Judgment in a Criminal Case at 3 (Mar. 6, 2015). Currently pending before the Court are the defendant's pro se motions for Post[-]Conviction Relief, 18 U.S.C. [§] 21 [ ]13 ("Def.'s Pet." or "Petition") and his Demand for a Speedy Disposition Review ("Def.'s Demand"), as well as the United States' Motion to Transfer Petitioner's Pro Se Post Conviction Relief Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113 ("Gov't's Mot."), which requests that this Court transfer the defendant's submissions to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana (the "Southern District of Indiana"), see Gov't's Mot. at 1. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions,¹ the Court concludes that it must order further briefing from the parties before rendering a decision on the parties' motions.

I. BACKGROUND

The defendant is currently serving his term of imprisonment at a federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana. See Gov't's Mot., Exhibit ("Ex.") A (Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator Results for Leonard Forrest) (showing that the defendant is incarcerated at the Federal Bureau of Prisons in Terre Haute, Indiana). At the time of his arrest for the conduct underlying the criminal charges in this case, the defendant was on parole for prior criminal convictions under District of Columbia law. Compare Criminal Complaint, Ex. 1 (Statement of Facts) at 1 (indicating that the defendant was arrested on December 6, 2013), with Presentence Investigation Report at 19 (Feb. 19, 2015) (indicating that the defendant was paroled in connection with the District of Columbia convictions on May 10, 2013, with a parole expiration date of December 25, 2020). Consequently, on February 21, 2014, "a parole violator warrant was issued [by the United States Parole Commission (the "Commission") ] ..., and [was] lodged as a detainer with the United States Marshal[ ]s Service" (the "February 21, 2014 detainer"). Id. at 19.²

The defendant alleges that on or about August 9, 2016, he submitted a request to the Commission for removal of the February 21, 2014 detainer. See Def.'s Demand, Ex. 1 (Affidavit of Leonard Forrest (Nov. 16, 2017) ("Forrest Aff.") ) at 1. He further alleges that on October 12, 2016, the Commission responded to his request by letter, in which it "acknowledge[d] [ ] that [it] had received the [request]" and informed him that the request had been "forwarded to the Case Service Office." Id., Ex. 1 (Forrest Aff.) at 1.³ The letter also allegedly "stated ... that a decision would be made [by the Commission] within [forty-five] days." Id., Ex. 1 (Forrest Aff.) at 1. Additionally, it appears that the defendant also "request[ed] a hearing in order to remove the detainer." See Def.'s Pet. at 20 (attachment to the defendant's petition is a letter purporting to be from the defendant to the Commission, but not reflecting a date or otherwise indicating that it was actually sent).⁴

On October 4, 2016, the defendant filed his Petition in this Court, representing that "because ... [the February 21, 2014] detainer w[as] not removed, [he is] not eligible for home-confinement [or] community release/halfway house [placement,] which would greatly assist [him] in returning as a productive member of society." Id. at 1.⁵ Thereafter, on December 12, 2017, the defendant filed his Demand for a Speedy Disposition Review, in which he requests that the Court order the Commission "to recall/dismiss/withdraw/close the warrant pending against him" on the grounds that the detainer "is greatly interfering with [his] rehabilitation efforts," "[h]is ability to participate in [Bureau of Prisons] programs and educational classes," and his "eligib[ility] for home confinement or ... to be moved to a lower custody facility." Def.'s Demand at 1–2. In his affidavit, the defendant additionally asserts that the Commission should remove the February 21, 2014 detainer in light of the fact that more than forty-five days have passed since the Commission sent him the October 12, 2016 letter acknowledging receipt of his request. See id., Ex. 1 (Forrest Aff.) at 1. The government having not responded to either of the defendant's submissions, the Court, on December 18, 2017, ordered the government to respond. See Order at 1 (Dec. 18, 2017), ECF No. 28. In compliance with the Court's Order, the government filed a motion requesting that the Court transfer the defendant's claims to the Southern District of Indiana. See Gov't's Mot. at 1.

II. DISCUSSION

The government argues that because the defendant's "claim[s] relate[ ] solely to the execution of [his] sentence and seek[ ] to shorten the duration of his confinement, [they] must be raised through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 2. It further argues that because the defendant "was at the time of filing confined ... in Terre Haute, Indiana, and ... remains confined there today, [his] ... petition cannot be considered by this Court[ ] because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the ‘person having custody of the person detained,’ as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [ (2016) ]." Id. at 3 (collecting cases). In response to the government's motion, the defendant argues that "having a detainer removed has nothing to do with post[-]conviction relief" because it "does not get [him] out of prison sooner than [seventy] months," see Def.'s Resp. at 1, and that the Court may properly hear his claims because he is "from the [D]istrict of Columbia[,] [ ] the U.S. Parole Commission is in Washington[,] D.C.[,] and [he] will be returning to Washington[,] D.C.," Def.'s Supp. Resp. at 1.

As an initial matter, the Court concludes that it need not resolve at this time the issue of whether the defendant's request for removal of the February 21, 2014 detainer may only be raised in a habeas petition, because although the defendant insists that his request for removal of the detainer "has nothing to do with post[-]conviction relief," Def.'s Resp. at 1, he has not provided the Court with any legal authority that would otherwise permit the Court to grant or even consider the relief he is requesting.⁶ Thus, no other legal authority that would permit the Court to consider the defendant's request is readily apparent to the Court. Because a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is an available and appropriate remedy for the defendant's challenge to the detainer, see, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 148 F.Supp.3d 38, 41 (D.D.C. 2015) (recognizing that "[a]n inmate may seek habeas [relief under § 2241 ] to challenge a detainer lodged against him by an authority that would be his future custodian should the detainer be honored" (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 486–87, 488–89, 500–01, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973) ) ), at least two other potential causes of action are foreclosed, including a petition for a writ of mandamus, see Chatman–Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("Because ... habeas is an available and potentially efficacious remedy, it is clear beyond reasonable dispute that mandamus will not appropriately lie."), or a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), see Stern v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 601 F.Supp.2d 303, 305 (D.D.C. 2009) (concluding that the availability of habeas relief under § 2241 precluded an APA claim because "the APA does not allow a claim unless ‘there is no other adequate remedy in a court’ " (internal quotation marks omitted) ). Therefore, in the absence of any other basis for considering the defendant's request, the Court will construe the defendant's request as a petition for habeas relief pursuant to § 2241.⁷

Having construed the defendant's request for removal of the detainer as a request for habeas relief, the Court must determine whether this Court is the proper forum to consider that request. The government is correct that in general, the proper respondent in a prisoner's habeas challenge is a prisoner's immediate custodian, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–35, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004) ; see also Blair–Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and district courts "may not entertain a habeas petition involving present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is within its territorial jurisdiction," Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004). However, the Supreme Court has instructed that "a habeas petitioner who challenges a form of ‘custody’ other than present physical confinement may name as [a] respondent the entity or person who exercises legal control with respect to the challenged ‘custody.’ " Padilla, 542 U.S. at 438, 124 S.Ct. 2711.

Based on this Court's review of relevant case law, whether a challenge to a detainer constitutes a challenge to present physical custody, as opposed to some other form of custody, depends on the nature of the challenge. Specifically, if a prisoner seeks to attack the "[e]ffect of a detainer," i.e., "the adverse impact created by the immediate custodian's imposition of a special ‘form of custody’ on the prisoner as a result of the filing of the detainer," Norris v. Georgia, 522 F.2d 1006, 1011 (4th Cir. 1975), the prisoner is challenging his present physical confinement, and therefore, his challenge must be brought against his immediate custodian in "a federal district court in the state or...