United States v. Gage

462 F.Supp.3d 822

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff

v.Aaron L. GAGE, Defendant

Case No. 1:19 CR 705

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed May 27, 2020

Scott C. Zarzycki, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.

Charles E. Fleming, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Cleveland, OH, Carlos Warner, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Akron, OH, for Defendant.

ORDER

SOLOMON OLIVER, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Currently pending before the court in the above-captioned case is Defendant Aaron L. Gage's ("Defendant" or "Gage") Motion for Bond and Motion for Emergency Intervention by the Court ("Motion"). (ECF No. 16.) For the following reasons, the court denies Gage's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 7, 2019, a federal grand jury charged Defendant with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(2). (Indictment, ECF No. 6.) This charge stemmed from Defendant's arrest from a Motel 6 in North Ridgeville, Ohio, and a search his room, which revealed a loaded .380 caliber handgun. (Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") at PageID #45–46, ECF No. 13.) Three small children and two adults were also inside the motel room. (Id. at PageID #46.) Gage admitted that he possessed the handgun to protect his family. (Id. ) Leading to this arrest and search, Defendant was allegedly involved in two shootings that took place in Elyria, Ohio and Lorain, Ohio, the latter of which resulted in Defendant's father being shot. (Id. )

Defendant waived a detention hearing and, pursuant to the Government's motion, the Magistrate Judge ordered Defendant detained pending trial. (Order, ECF No. 8.) But now, Defendant maintains that there are "compelling reasons" under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) —namely, the ongoing public health crisis caused by COVID-19—warranting his release. (See Mot. at PageID #60, ECF No. 16.) The Government filed a Response in Opposition (ECF No. 21) on May 6, 2020. Gage filed two Supplements to his Motion, which provide detailed qualifications of experts and/or expert reports concerning the conditions at Northeast Ohio Correctional Center ("NEOCC"), where Gage is being held. (See ECF Nos. 17 and 22.) Gage filed his Reply on May 12, 2020. (ECF No. 23.)

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e), pretrial detention is required if the court finds that no condition or combination of conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of the community or that defendant will appear as required at future proceedings. While the government must show clear and convincing evidence that the defendant poses a risk to the community if released, it needs to show only a preponderance of evidence that defendant is a flight risk. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e) – (f) ; see also, e.g. , United States v. Tortora , 922 F.2d 880, 883–84 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant poses a danger to community); United States v. Sabhnani , 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that government must prove by preponderance of the evidence that defendant presents a flight risk); United States v. Hinton , 113 F. App'x 76, 77 (6th Cir. 2004) (same). A finding that the defendant is either a flight risk or a danger to the community supports a detention order; proof of both is not necessary. See United States v. Ferranti , 66 F.3d 540, 543–44 (2d Cir. 1995).

To determine whether any conditions exist that will reasonably assure the community's safety and the defendant's appearance at trial, courts consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). These factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including their character, mental and physical condition, family and community ties, employment status, financial resources, criminal history, substance-abuse history, and probation or supervised release status; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger posed to the community by the defendant's potential release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

In his Motion, Defendant asks this court to order that he be temporarily released pursuant to § 3142(i).¹ (Mot. at PageID #61, ECF No. 16.) This request essentially asks the court revoke the Magistrate Judge's detention order. A district court reviews a magistrate judge's detention order "de novo and must make an independent determination of the proper pretrial detention or conditions for release." United States v. Amir , No. 1:10-CR-439, 2011 WL 2711350, at *3 (N.D. Ohio July 13, 2011) (quoting United States v. Rueben , 974 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) ). This means "the district court should engage in the same analysis, with the same options, under § 3142 as the magistrate judge." United States v. Yamini , 91 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1129 (S.D. Ohio 2000).

After de novo review of the parties’ arguments and other relevant portions of the record, the court finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the community's safety. As an initial matter, the court notes that Defendant's Motion does not mention the § 3142(g) factors at all. (See Mot., ECF No. 16.) Rather than engage with those factors, Gage's Motion focuses almost entirely on the "compelling reasons" for release under § 3142(i) brought about by the ongoing pandemic. (Id. at PageID #61–64.) But COVID-19 has no bearing on whether Defendant is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Accordingly, it does not factor into the court's § 3142(e) analysis. By contrast, the Government argues "[t]he facts of Defendant's underlying case, his criminal history of trafficking, firearms, violent crimes, gang designation, and repeated reoffending shortly upon release from prison demonstrates that no combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the community." (See Opp'n at PageID #135–38, ECF No. 21; see PSR at PageID #45–51 (describing the instant offense conduct and Gage's extensive criminal history).)

Having reviewed the parties’ arguments and evidence, the court finds that Defendant is a flight risk and a danger to the community. The nature of the charges, which involves Defendant's possession of a loaded handgun in a motel room with three small children, supports a finding that he presents a danger to the community. The PSR's indication that Gage was involved in two shootings, one of which resulted in his own father being shot, further supports this finding. (See PSR at PageID #46.) Moreover, as the Government points out, Gage has an extensive criminal history involving, among other things, drug trafficking, escape, and resisting arrest. (Id. at PageID #47–51.) In addition, Defendant does not allege that he has any COVID-19 symptoms or that he has been exposed to any individuals with the virus or symptoms of the virus. His bare assertion that he has a body mass index over 40, which creates the risk of severe COVID-19 disease, is insufficient. (See Mot. at PageID #60, ECF No. 16.)

In his Motion and Reply, Gage maintains that Dr. Venktesh R. Ramnath ("Dr. Ramnath") opined that he has "a 3.6x risk of severe COVID[-]19 disease" because he is obese. (Id. at PageID #62; Reply at PageID #247, ECF No. 23.) Dr. Ramnath's report further provides that obese persons are likely to have asthma and metabolic syndrome. (See Ramnath Report at PageID #81, ECF No. 16-1.) Because the report is redacted, however, the court cannot ascertain whether Dr. Ramnath is actually referring to Gage. (See Ramnath Report, ECF No. 16-1.) In any event, as explained below, the court does not find that Defendant's obesity alone is sufficiently compelling to warrant release.

Based on the § 3142(g) factors, no condition or combination of conditions of release can reasonably assure the community's safety or Defendant's presence at trial. Consequently, the court finds that § 3142(e) requires pretrial detention.

B. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)

Defendant argues that the ongoing public health crisis surrounding COVID-19 constitutes a "compelling reason" justifying his release. (Mot. at PageID #61, ECF No. 16.) The Government counters that release is not appropriate because Gage is 26 years old and has failed to produce evidence indicating that he has any health conditions that would increase his risk of contracting COVID-19. (Opp'n at PageID #144, ECF No. 21.) The court will address their arguments in turn.

Pursuant to § 3142(i), a district court can order the temporary release of a defendant awaiting trial "to the extent that the [court] determines such release to be necessary for preparation of the [defendant's] defense or for another compelling reason." Defendants seeking release due to COVID-19 increasingly have turned to this compelling–reason provision for relief. See United States v. Wilburn , No. 2:18-CR-115, 2020 WL 1899146, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2020) ("[U]ntil the emergence of the coronavirus pandemic, there was relatively little case law on interpreting § 3142(i) ’s ‘compelling reason’ prong.") Facing a flood of these motions, many district courts across the country, including several within the Sixth Circuit, have adopted the framework from United States v. Clark , No. 19-40068, 448 F.Supp.3d 1152 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 2020), which weighs

(1) the original grounds for the defendant's pretrial detention, (2) the specificity of the defendant's stated COVID-19 concerns, (3) the extent to which the proposed release plan is tailored to mitigate or exacerbate other COVID-19 risks to the defendant, and (4) the likelihood that the defendant's proposed release would increase COVID-19 risks to others.

Id. at 1157 ; see also, e.g. , United States v. Morale , No. 5:19-CR-741, 2020 WL 1984900, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2020) (applying Clark factors and denying release); United States v. Smoot , No. 2:19-CR-20, 2020 WL 1501810, at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2020) (same); United...