United States v. Garcia

469 F.Supp.3d 1050

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Joshua Omar GARCIA, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. 17-cr-00358-CMA

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Signed June 25, 2020

Jason Antoine St. Julien, U.S. Attorney's Office-Denver, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.

Timothy Patrick O'Hara, Office of the Federal Public Defender-Denver, Denver, CO, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Joshua Garcia's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice for Violation of the Sixth Amendment Right to Speedy Trial. (Doc. # 39.) The Government filed a Response¹ on May 4, 2020 (Doc. # 43), and Mr. Garcia filed a Reply² on June 16, 2020 (Doc. # 48). For the following reasons, the Court grants Mr. Garcia's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 3, 2017, Mr. Garcia was allegedly involved in a shoplifting incident at a Kmart store in Aurora, Colorado. When he exited the store, Mr. Garcia was confronted by Kmart employees who had been surveilling him while he was inside. During his interaction with the employees, the Government asserts that Defendant brandished—and subsequently discharged—a firearm before fleeing the scene. On September 27, 2017, a federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment against Mr. Garcia. The indictment, which was filed under seal, pertained solely to the events at Kmart on July 3, 2017. (Doc. # 1.)

After Mr. Garcia departed the Kmart premises on July 3, 2017, he was not apprehended until July 5, 2017. During the course of his apprehension, Mr. Garcia allegedly discharged a firearm at law enforcement officers. (Doc. # 43 at 3.) Based on the events of July 5, 2017, the Adams County District Attorney's Office filed a complaint against Mr. Garcia on July 11, 2017. (Id . at 4.)

The federal indictment remained sealed for almost two years while Mr. Garcia's criminal case proceeded in Colorado state court. Mr. Garcia ultimately pled guilty to some of the state charges, and he was sentenced to 23 years imprisonment on August 16, 2019. (Id . at 5.) On August 20, 2019, the federal indictment was unsealed, and Mr. Garcia made his initial appearance in federal court after officers arrested him pursuant to an outstanding warrant and a Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum that the Government filed in this Court on August 15, 2019. See (Doc. ## 3–7).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. "[A]lthough the right is somewhat amorphous, the remedy is severe: dismissal of the indictment." United States v. Seltzer , 595 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 2010). "[I]t is the prosecution's burden (and ultimately the court's) and not the defendant's responsibility to assure that cases are brought to trial in a timely manner." Id . at 1175–76.

In Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530–32, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court established a four-part balancing test to determine whether a delay in post-indictment proceedings violates a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. The four factors are: "(1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant." United States v. Medina , 918 F.3d 774, 780 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Yehling , 456 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2006) ), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2706, 204 L.Ed.2d 1101 (2019). "[N]o single factor is determinative or necessary, rather all four are considered to determine whether a violation has occurred." Seltzer , 595 F.3d at 1176. " Barker ’s balancing test thus ‘compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.’ " Medina , 918 F.3d at 780 (quoting Barker , 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 ).

III. DISCUSSION

Application of the Barker factors to the facts of this case demonstrates that Mr. Garcia's right to a speedy trial was violated. The Court will discuss each factor in turn.

A. LENGTH OF THE DELAY

The first factor of the Barker test looks to the length of the delay in pursuing the case against the defendant. This is a double inquiry. First, "[s]imply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay." Seltzer , 595 F.3d at 1176 (quoting Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 651–52, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) ). Second, "[i]f the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim." Id . (quoting Doggett , 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686 ).

1. Date Mr. Garcia's Sixth Amendment Rights Attached

Because the court must determine whether the delay in this case is presumptively prejudicial, it follows that the Court must ascertain, as a preliminary matter, when Mr. Garcia's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial attached. The Tenth Circuit has explained that the right "attaches when the defendant is arrested or indicted, whichever comes first ." United States v. Larson , 627 F.3d 1198, 1207 (10th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).

In the instant case, the grand jury returned the indictment on September 27, 2017. (Doc. # 1.) The indictment was sealed until August 20, 2019, which is the same date Mr. Garcia was arrested. (Doc. # 7.) The Government argues that "[t]he triggering mechanism for computing delay in a case where the indictment is sealed is the date the indictment is unsealed." (Doc. # 43 at 6) (citation omitted). The Court disagrees.

The Tenth Circuit has not directly addressed when a defendant's speedy trial rights attach if an indictment is initially filed under seal. Other circuits are split on the issue. See United States v. Williams , 683 F. App'x 376, 383 (6th Cir. 2017) (recognizing circuit split). The Second Circuit has adopted the view for which the Government advocates, i.e., that a defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights are triggered "by the unsealing of a sealed indictment ...." United States v. Moreno , 789 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Watson , 599 F.2d 1149, 1156 (2d Cir. 1979) ).

The First Circuit, on the other hand, rejected that view, noting that such a "bright line rule is inconsistent" with the balancing test that the Supreme Court established in Barker . United States v. Casas , 356 F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 2004). In Casas , the court persuasively reasoned:

It is easy to imagine a situation where, by the time an indictment is unsealed, the defendant suffers prejudice —important documents may be destroyed or key witnesses may die as a result of a delay caused by sealing the indictment. This is true whether the government's reasons for sealing the indictment are good or bad, see United States v. Thompson , 287 F.3d 1244, 1252–56 (10th Cir. 2002). The reasons for sealing may certainly be relevant to the analysis.

We see no reason why a defendant should not be able to make a speedy trial claim when the government has delayed the trial by sealing the indictment, regardless of the government's reasons. Instead, we adhere to the Barker rule that these facts must be considered under the four-part inquiry. Prosecutors bear the primary burden of bringing a case to trial; they may not hide behind the sealing of an indictment to avoid examination of the delay that they cause .

Id . at 113 (emphasis added).

Although the Tenth Circuit has not squarely addressed this issue, it has excluded time from speedy trial calculations if, among other reasons, an indictment has been sealed before a defendant's arrest. Specifically, in United States v. Hay , 527 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1975), a grand jury returned an indictment on August 18, 1972, which was filed under seal. There, the defendant was not arrested until May 18, 1973, because: he traveled to Mali, Africa; the United States did not have an extradition treaty with Mali; and the State Department had to negotiate an agreement with Mali to have the defendant "declared persona non grata," so that he would be forced to return to the United States. Id . at 993.

In determining when the defendant's speedy trial rights attached, the Tenth Circuit did not include the time from appellant's indictment to his arrest because he "was not available for prosecution and because none of the interests protected by the sixth amendment guarantee were endangered during this time." Id . In a footnote, the court explained that the defendant "was subject to neither restraints on his liberty nor public accusation before his arrest." Id . at 993 n.4.

However, courts have recognized that there has been an "evolution in speedy trial jurisprudence" since the Tenth Circuit's 1975 decision in Hay . United States v. Leaver , 358 F. Supp. 2d 255, 268 n.106 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Specifically, in Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), the Court held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights are "triggered by arrest, indictment, or other official accusation," even if the defendant is unaware of the accusation.

Courts have observed that Hay and Doggett stand for inconsistent propositions. See, e.g. , United States v. Alvarado-Rico , No. 14-cr-00464-PAB, 2020 WL 2128737, at *2 n.1 (D. Colo. May 5, 2020) (recognizing inconsistency); Leaver , 358 F. Supp. 2d at 268 n.106 (same). Hay , and other pre- Doggett cases reflect an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment that emphasizes protecting defendants from the "major evils" implicated by the Speedy Trial Clause, i.e., "anxiety to the accused and public obloquy." Leaver , 358 F. Supp. 2d at 268. Doggett , on the other hand, "makes it clear that the major purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to protect against the impairment of the accused's defense ." Id . (...