United States v. Garcon

54 F.4th 1274

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Julian GARCON, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-14650

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed: December 6, 2022

Scott Dion, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, Jason Wu, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Lisa Tobin Rubio, Gregory Schiller, U.S. Attorney Service - SFL, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brenda Greenberg Bryn, Timothy Day, Gail M. Stage, Federal Public Defender's Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Southern District of Florida, West Palm Beach, FL, Tracy Michele Dreispul, Federal Public Defender's Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before William Pryor, Chief Judge, Wilson, Jordan, Rosenbaum, Jill Pryor, Newsom, Branch, Grant, Luck, Lagoa, and Brasher, Circuit Judges.

William Pryor, Chief Judge, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Wilson, Jill Pryor, Newsom, Luck, and Lagoa, Circuit Judges, join.

Rosenbaum, Circuit Judge, filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

Newsom, Circuit Judge, filed a concurring opinion, in which Lagoa, Circuit Judge, joins.

Jordan, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.

Branch, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Grant and Brasher, Circuit Judges, join, and Jordan, Circuit Judge, joins as to Parts I, II, III.A, and III.B.

Brasher, Circuit Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.

William Pryor, Chief Judge:

The question presented in this appeal of a grant of safety-valve relief is whether, in the First Step Act, the word "and" means "and." The Act empowers a court to grant a criminal defendant relief from a mandatory minimum sentence, but that relief is available only if "the defendant does not have" "more than 4 criminal history points," "a prior 3-point offense[,] ... and ... a prior 2-point violent offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added). Julian Garcon, who pleaded guilty to attempting to possess 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, has a prior 3-point offense but does not have more than 4 criminal history points or a prior 2-point violent offense. The district court concluded that Garcon remained eligible for relief under the Act because he did not have all three characteristics. We agree. Because the conjunctive "and" joins together the enumerated characteristics, a defendant must have all three before he is ineligible for relief. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Julian Garcon was indicted in 2019 for attempting to possess 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846. The offense carried a statutory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). Garcon pleaded guilty.

At sentencing, Garcon asked the district court to apply the so-called "safety valve" of the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Section 3553(f) provides that, for certain crimes, including the crime Garcon committed, the sentencing court "shall impose a sentence pursuant to [the United States Sentencing] [G]uidelines ... without regard to any statutory minimum sentence, if the court finds at sentencing" that the defendant satisfies each of five numbered subsections. See id. § 3553(f)(1)–(5). The first subsection—the requirement in dispute here—provides as follows:

(1) the defendant does not have—

(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;

(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and

(C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines[.]

Id. § 3553(f)(1).

Garcon has a prior 3-point offense, and the parties disagreed about whether that prior offense disqualified Garcon from receiving safety-valve relief. Garcon argued that the use of the conjunctive "and" to join the subsections, see id. § 3553(f)(1)(B), meant that he would be ineligible for relief only if he had more than 4 criminal history points, a prior 3-point offense, and a prior 2-point violent offense. And because he does not have a prior 2-point violent offense or more than 4 criminal history points, Garcon argued that he remained eligible for safety-valve relief. The government took the opposite view, arguing that Garcon was ineligible because, "if any of th[e] three [subsections] apply, ... the defendant doesn't qualify for the safety valve ...." (Emphasis added.)

The district court agreed with Garcon. It ruled that "[t]he plain meaning of the statute requires all three subsections of [ section] 3553(f)(1) to be met before the defendant becomes ineligible for [the] safety valve." To hold otherwise, the district court explained, would require it to replace the word "and" with the word "or." And although it considered the "result" "absurd" and the legislative history supportive of the government's reading, the district court explained that those considerations did not alter its analysis because "[t]he statute, as written, is unambiguous." So, the district court applied the safety valve, calculated the applicable guidelines range, and imposed a sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment.

A panel of this Court disagreed. United States v. Garcon , 997 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2021). The panel reasoned that the word "and" in subsection (f)(1) means "or." See id. at 1305. We voted to vacate the panel opinion and to rehear the appeal en banc. United States v. Garcon , 23 F.4th 1334 (11th Cir. 2022).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation." United States v. Jones , 962 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020).

III. DISCUSSION

We divide our discussion in two parts. We first explain why Garcon was eligible for safety-valve relief despite his prior 3-point offense. We then reject the government's arguments to the contrary.

A. "And" Means "And."

We begin, as we must, with the text of the statute. See Ross v. Blake , 578 U.S. 632, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016). And we are guided in our interpretation of the text by the ordinary-meaning canon, "the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation." ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS § 6, at 69 (2012). The command of the canon is simple: "our job is to interpret the words consistent with their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute," Wis. Cent. Ltd v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2070, 201 L.Ed.2d 490 (2018) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted), "unless the context in which the word[s] appear[ ]" suggests some other meaning, Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd. , 566 U.S. 560, 569, 132 S.Ct. 1997, 182 L.Ed.2d 903 (2012).

The parties’ dispute turns on the meaning of the word "and" in section 3553(f)(1), so we consider the ordinary meaning of that word. "And" means "along with or together with." And, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (1993). So when "and" is used to connect a list of requirements, the word ordinarily has a "conjunctive" sense, meaning that all the requirements must be met. See United States v. Palomar-Santiago , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S. Ct. 1615, 1620–21, 209 L.Ed.2d 703 (2021). For example, if a statute provides, "You must do A, B, and C," it is not enough to do only A, only B, or only C; "all three things are required"—A, together with B, together with C. See SCALIA & GARNER , supra , § 12, at 116.

The word "and" retains its conjunctive sense when a list of requirements follows a negative. See id. § 12, at 119. Consider the prohibition, "You must not drink and drive." To comply, a person may do either activity by itself but may not do both. Id.; see also United States v. Palomares , 52 F.4th 640, 653 (5th Cir. 2022) (Willett, J., dissenting). Similarly, consider the command, "You must not do A, B, and C." A person violates that prohibition only by doing all three prohibited acts—by doing A, together with B, together with C. See SCALIA & GARNER , supra , § 12, at 119. A person who does only A, only B, or only C is in the clear.

Applying these principles to section 3553(f)(1), Garcon's prior 3-point offense does not disqualify him from safety-valve relief. Section 3553(f)(1) begins with a negative—"the defendant does not have"—and the three requirements that follow are joined by an "and." See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1). So a defendant runs afoul of the provision and loses eligibility for relief only if all three conditions in subsections (A) through (C) are satisfied. That is, to lose eligibility for relief, a defendant must have "more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any ... 1-point offense," together with "a prior 3-point offense," together with "a prior 2-point violent offense." See id. Because Garcon has a prior 3-point offense but does not have 4 criminal history points (excluding any 1-point offense) or a prior 2-point violent offense, he is eligible for safety-valve relief.

Context confirms this reading. Ordinarily, we presume that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning." Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. Env't Prot. Agency , 573 U.S. 302, 319, 134 S.Ct. 2427, 189 L.Ed.2d 372 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). The five numbered subsections of section 3553(f) are joined by the word "and" in subsection (f)(4):

[T]he court shall impose a sentence pursuant to [the] guidelines ... if the court finds at sentencing ... that—

(1) the defendant does not have—

(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;

(B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and

(C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines;

(2) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon ... in connection with the offense;

(3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person;

(

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