United States v. Garrett, 20-61083

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leondus Garrett, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-61083

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

September 9, 2021

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi No. 1:19-CR-48-1

Before Owen, Chief Judge, Smith and Graves, Circuit Judges.

Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:

Leondus Garrett, an inmate at Oakdale Federal Correctional Institution, filed for compassionate release in 2020 because of the coronavirus pandemic. The district court denied the motion because Garrett had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Garrett moved for reconsideration some months later, which the district court again denied for failure to exhaust. Although, in denying reconsideration, the court misunderstood the exhaustion requirements, it nonetheless reached the correct outcome. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Garrett was convicted in 2019 of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 136 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. Less than a year later, he filed for compassionate release due to the pandemic. Garrett, a 32-year-old African-American male sought early release because he was uniquely susceptible to adverse effects from the virus on account of his underlying health conditions (diabetes, high blood pressure, and obesity) and ethnicity.

Garrett initially sought compassionate release through the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). According to him, "he wrote a letter requesting compassionate release to the staff at Oakdale FCI on April 13, 2020." He claims that he also "made requests for compassionate release with [the] BOP on April 12, 2020, May 26, 2020, and June 10, 2020." He concedes, however, that he did not "submit an official BP-9," the appropriate form on which a formal request for compassionate release must initially be filed. 28 C.F.R § 542.14(a).

Garrett's failure to follow the appropriate procedures notwithstanding the BOP acknowledged receipt of a June 12 request for compassionate release, which it denied officially on July 10. And Garrett does not suggest that the BOP ever received any of his earlier letters.

On May 26-more than a month after he allegedly sent his first informal request, but more than two weeks before the BOP ever acknowledged receipt of any request-Garrett filed a motion for compassionate release in the district court per 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). But, because Garrett had not "filed an official request through a BP-9 form" before filing his motion in the district court, the court concluded that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. Consequently, it denied his motion without prejudice on July 28.

Rather than filing a new motion in the district court, Garrett moved for reconsideration on October 16. The court denied reconsideration because-citing reasons different from those in its initial denial-it determined that Garrett still had failed to exhaust. Garrett appeals that denial.

II.

The judiciary can "modify a term of imprisonment" if,

upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier . . . if it finds that [certain conditions are met].

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Thus, to file a proper motion for compassionate release in the district court, a prisoner must first exhaust the available administrative avenues. That general premise is not controversial-at issue here is not whether exhaustion is required, but only how to satisfy the exhaustion requirement.

Section 3582(c)(1)(A)'s text states plainly that a prisoner has the option to file his motion in the district court upon the expiration of one of two events: (1) once he "has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal . . . or" (2) after "the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden." Id. (emphasis added). And it's just as plain that "whichever" of those events occurs "earlier" triggers the right to file in the district court. Id.

So, an inmate has two routes by which he may exhaust his administrative remedies. Both begin with "requesting that the [BOP] bring a motion on the defendant's behalf." United States v. Franco, 973 F.3d 465, 467 (5th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 920 (2020). Following that initial step, the prisoner has a choice. First, he may wait for a response from the BOP and seek further administrative review of that response (assuming it is adverse). On that path, only once he has "exhausted all administrative rights to appeal" may he bring his motion in the district court. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Second, a prisoner may wait 30 days after filing his request and-whether the BOP has ruled on the request or not-he is free to file a motion in the district court. Id.

III.

As stated above, regardless of what must occur for a prisoner to complete his exhaustion requirements, the process must begin by "requesting that the [BOP] bring a motion on the defendant's behalf." Franco, 973 F.3d at 467 (quotation omitted). To make that request, an inmate must file it in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 542.14. And that regulation requires that he file the request "on the appropriate form"-the BP-9. § 542.14(a). Only after the "lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request" may the prisoner bring a motion in the district court. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).^[1]

If the BOP ever received a proper request, ^[2] it occurred on June 12. That is more than two weeks after Garrett filed his motion in the district court seeking compassionate release. So, Garrett filed his motion in the district court before properly "requesting that the [BOP] bring a motion on [his] behalf." Franco, 973 F.3d at 467 (quotation omitted). In its July 28 order, then, the district court was correct that, when his motion was filed on May 26, Garrett had failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See § 3582(c)(1)(A).

IV.

On October 16, Garrett filed his motion for reconsideration. In its order denying that motion, the district court articulated a different line of reasoning as to why Garrett had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. It held that, so long as the BOP responds to the request within 30 days, an inmate is "required to pursue the administrative appeals process with the BOP to its conclusion before filing a motion for compassionate release" in the district court. Therefore, because the BOP denied Garrett's request on July 10-less than 30 days after it received the request-he could not file his motion in the district court until he pursued his administrative appeals to their conclusion.

For all of the reasons provided above, supra Part II, that understanding is at war with the statute's text.^[3] Section 3582(c)(1)(A) grants to the inmate the choice to take either of the two paths it provides. Once 30 days has "lapse[d] . . . from the receipt of such a request by the warden," the prisoner may file his motion in the district court. § 3582(c)(1)(A). That is so irrespective of whether the BOP has responded to the request or whether the inmate has administrative appeals available to him.

It's not surprising, then, that other courts have agreed that "[p]rison-ers who seek compassionate release have the option to take their claim to federal court within 30 days, no matter the appeals available to them." United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 2020). It is of no conse- quence when the BOP responds to an inmate's request-once "30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden" has passed, the defendant may file in the district court. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Therefore, Gar-rett was not required to pursue his administrative-appeals process to its conclusion merely because the BOP responded to his motion within 30 days. The district court was incorrect to conclude otherwise.

V.

That interpretive question, however, does not resolve the present dispute. As stated above, the district court's initial denial was correct-at that point, Garrett had failed to exhaust because the requisite 30-day period had not yet lapsed. Only after that initial denial did he satisfy the exhaustion requirement. And instead of filing a new motion upon exhaustion, he filed a motion for reconsideration.

The more nuanced question, then, is whether Garrett could cure his exhaustion defect after the court's initial denial and then rely on that cured defect as a justification for reconsideration. He could not. An intervening change in circumstance-such as exhausting previously unexhausted administrative remedies-is not a proper basis for a motion for reconsideration.^[4]

Courts typically construe a motion to reconsider a denial of compassionate release as a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).^[5] But, because Garrett filed his motion more than 28 days after the denial, we treat it "as if it were a Rule 60(b) motion," as long as "the grounds asserted in support of the Rule 59(e) motion would also support Rule 60(b) relief." Frew v. Young, 992 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).

Regardless of how it is construed, the motion for reconsideration properly was denied.^[6] The primary basis on which Garrett justified reconsideration was a purported "manifest error of law." But, as stated above, there was no legal error in the July 28 underlying judgment. Because he filed his motion in the district court before the warden received his request, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

To be sure, after Garrett's first motion was denied without...