United States v. Gaskins

6 F.4th 1350

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

v.Alvin GASKINS, Appellant

No. 20-3005

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued April 6, 2021

Decided August 3, 2021

Daniel Hornal, Washington, DC, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Katherine M. Kelly, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Elizabeth Trosman and James S. Sweeney, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Srinivasan, Chief Judge, Henderson and Pillard, Circuit Judges.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Pillard, Circuit Judge:

Alvin Gaskins seeks a certificate of innocence under 28 U.S.C. § 2513. A certificate of innocence is not only a formal declaration of innocence but also a prerequisite to a claim against the United States for compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Gaskins served almost eight years of a twenty-two-year sentence of imprisonment on a narcotics conspiracy charge before we reversed his conviction on direct appeal for insufficient evidence. See United States v. Gaskins , 690 F.3d 569, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2012). At his criminal trial, Gaskins had invoked his constitutional right not to testify. But, after this court reversed his conviction, he sought limited discovery and a chance to testify in support of his motion for a certificate of innocence. The government opposed the certificate of innocence but not Gaskins’ procedural requests. The district court denied the certificate of innocence without acting on Gaskins’ motion for discovery and a hearing.

A failure to prove criminal culpability beyond a reasonable doubt requires acquittal but does not necessarily establish an individual's innocence. On a motion for a certificate of innocence, the burden is on the claimant to prove his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence. Presented with an acquittal on the ground that the evidence failed as a matter of law to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court deciding the innocence question must at least apply the distinct burden allocation and standard of proof to the relevant evidence.

We hold that the district court erred by denying Gaskins’ motion for a certificate of innocence without addressing his procedural motion. The key issue bearing on whether Gaskins is entitled to the certificate concerns his state of mind, that is, whether he agreed to work with co-conspirators with the specific intent to distribute drugs. The actions the trial evidence shows he took do not add up to the charged offenses unless he agreed to join the conspiracy. In the circumstances, the district court's sub silentio denial of Gaskins’ unopposed request for an opportunity to augment the record was error. We accordingly vacate the denial of the certificate of innocence and remand for further proceedings.

We deny the request to reassign the case and decline to reach Gaskins’ merits argument that the existing record requires an innocence finding. We need not now canvass the record of Gaskins’ criminal trial to determine whether it alone might allow, or even require, a finding of innocence. The precise question whether the district court erred in holding on the current record that Gaskins was not innocent may be obviated, depending on how the district court responds to Gaskins’ requests for limited discovery and an evidentiary hearing. As for reassignment, trial judges routinely must and do revisit their own prior rulings with an open mind to redress errors identified on appeal; we have no reason to think the district judge will not do so here.

BACKGROUND

1. Statutory Context

Since 1938, Congress has offered relief in the form of compensation to any innocent person "unjustly convicted of an offense against the United States and imprisoned." 28 U.S.C. § 1495 ; see also Act of May 24, 1938, ch. 266, 52 Stat. 438 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 729-732 (1940)). Judging from the paucity of decided cases, claims for such compensation have been infrequent. Most of those cases post-date Congress's 2004 statutory amendment raising the compensation cap from a $5,000 total to a maximum of $50,000 for each year of incarceration, or up to $100,000 per year of incarceration awaiting a sentence of death. See 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e).

To establish a right to compensation, a claimant must "allege and prove" certain "requisite facts." Id. § 2513(a) - (b). First, the claimant must show that "[h]is conviction has been reversed or set aside on the ground that he is not guilty of the offense of which he was convicted." Id. § 2513(a)(1). Second, the claimant must establish either that "[h]e did not commit any of the acts charged" or that "his acts, deeds, or omissions in connection with such charge constituted no offense against the United States, or any State, Territory or the District of Columbia." Id. § 2513(a)(2). Finally, he must show that "he did not by misconduct or neglect cause or bring about his own prosecution." Id .

Requisite factual findings must appear in either a presidential pardon, see id. § 2513(a)(1), (b), (c), or, as relevant here, a certificate of innocence from a court, id. § 2513(b) —together with the record, including the acquittal decision itself, id. § 2513(a)(1). A petition for a judicial certificate of innocence may be filed "under the existing criminal docket number" or "as a separate, miscellaneous civil case." Abu-Shawish v. United States , 898 F.3d 726, 736 (7th Cir. 2018). A claimant who succeeds in obtaining such certificate or pardon may then submit it to the Court of Federal Claims for an award of compensation from the United States. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2513, 1495.

2. Gaskins’ Criminal Case

We described in detail the background of Gaskins’ criminal case in our opinion reversing his conviction, see Gaskins , 690 F.3d at 571-76, and recount it only briefly here.

In 2006, "[a] jury convicted Gaskins of being a member of a conspiracy [to distribute drugs] that was alleged to have consisted of more than twenty individuals and to have taken place over a period of five years." Id. at 571. Gaskins was tried with three of the other defendants, including the two alleged leaders of the conspiracy, who were found guilty on most counts, and an individual charged as a supplier of phencyclidine (PCP) for the conspiracy, who was acquitted. Id. at 572, 576. The jury acquitted Gaskins of five of the six counts against him: four related to using a communication facility to facilitate a drug trafficking offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), and one charging conspiracy to participate in a racketeer influenced corrupt organization in violation of the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Id.

The jury found Gaskins guilty on the charge of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The jury initially returned the verdict form with "guilty" checked as to the general question regarding narcotics conspiracy, but "not proven" checked as to each of the four controlled substances—heroin, cocaine, cocaine base, and PCP—charged as objects of the conspiracy. Id. at 576 ; see also Verdict Form at 48-51, United States v. Gaskin s, No. 04-cr-00379 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2006), ECF No. 904. The district court denied Gaskins’ request for a judgment of acquittal and sent the narcotics conspiracy charge back to the jury, which again marked "guilty" of narcotics conspiracy, but this time identified heroin distribution as the "proven" object of the conspiracy. Gaskins , 690 F.3d at 576 ; see also New Verdict Form, United States v. Gaskin s, No. 04-cr-00379 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2006), ECF No. 905.

In 2008, the district court sentenced Gaskins to 262 months, or nearly twenty-two years, in prison for his role in conspiring to distribute heroin. Gaskins , 690 F.3d at 576. By that time, because he was held without bond before trial, he had already served nearly three and a half years in prison.

In 2012, on Gaskins’ direct appeal, we overturned his conviction for evidentiary insufficiency. See id. at 571-72. We recounted that, during a trial that lasted for three months, see id. at 576, "the government proffered eight cooperating witnesses, more than 14,000 intercepted telephone conversations, visual and video surveillance, and evidence seized during the execution of search warrants," id. at 571-72. The government presumably could have pinned down any bases for Gaskins’ knowledge of the drug transactions by asking the cooperators to recount in detail the nature of his involvement. After all, every cooperator save one faced a life sentence if he did not obtain a downward departure for testimony useful to the government. Id. at 573. Given the depth of the investigation and character of the evidence amassed, we thought it remarkable that

[n]ot one piece of evidence put Gaskins together with drugs, or conversations about drugs, involved in the conspiracy. None of the cooperating witnesses, many of whom pled guilty to participating in the conspiracy, described Gaskins as having any knowledge of the conspirators’ drug trafficking activities. None of the recorded telephone conversations in which Gaskins participated mentioned drugs or drug transactions, whether in clear or coded language. Nor did any of the conversations of any other conspirators mention drugs or drug transactions in connection with Gaskins. No surveillance detected Gaskins engaging in drug transactions, in the presence of drugs, or engaging in any conspiratorial meetings. And despite the execution of multiple search warrants, including one at the apartment in which Gaskins lived, the government found no guns, drugs, or drug paraphernalia associated with Gaskins. Moreover, although there was substantial evidence of the wealth amassed by other conspirators, there was no such evidence regarding Gaskins. To the contrary, the only evidence was that he lived in a modest apartment with his mother.

Id. at 572. We therefore reversed Gaskins’ conviction. We concluded that, on the...