United States v. Gassaway

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JAMAL GASSAWAY, Defendant.

No. 1:21-cr-550-RCL

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 16, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge.

On August 31, 2021, a grand jury charged defendant Jamal Gassaway with one count of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Person Convicted of Crime Punishable by Imprisonment for a Term Exceeding One Year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ECF No. 1. At Gassaway's initial appearance, the government orally moved for detention pending trial. 9/8/2021 Min. Entry. The government's oral motion was supplemented by a memorandum in support of pretrial detention filed on the docket. ECF No. 3.

A magistrate judge in this district ordered Gassaway released to home confinement. 9/10/2021 Min. Entry. Immediately after the magistrate judge entered that order, this Court heard argument on the government's appeal of the release order. See 9/10/2021 Min. Entry. Upon consideration of the government's filing, ECF No. 3, and the arguments and evidence proffered at the hearing, the Court granted the government's motion and ordered Gassaway detained pending trial.

Set out below are the written findings and reasons underlying that order. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1) (requiring that a detention order “include written findings of fact and a written statement of the reasons for the detention”); United States v. Nwokoro, 651 F.3d 108, 109, 112 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (remanding to the district court for a preparation of “findings of fact and a statement of reasons in support of [defendant's] pretrial detention” when a transcription of the detention hearing failed to “evince[] a clear and legally sufficient basis for the court's determination” (citation omitted)).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

The government proffers the following factual allegations in support of its motion for detention pending trial. At approximately 7:04 P.M. on August 21, 2021, inside of a supermarket in Southeast Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) Officer Donald Green observed Gassaway pass by with an unusually large bulge in the front of his waistband. ECF No. 3 at 3. Officer Green witnessed a large and distinct “L” shape protruding from the front right side of Gassaway's waistband, which was not consistent with any part of the human anatomy. Id. Officer Green recognized this to be a pistol. Id. After locking the supermarket door, Officer Green approached Gassaway and asked if there was a pistol in the front of Gassaway's waistband. Id. Gassaway replied, “I don't got nothing.” Id.

Gassaway then attempted (unsuccessfully) to escape the supermarket. Id. He began to kick the door that Officer Green had locked and struggled against Officer Green. Id. As Gassaway was kicking the door and struggling with the officer, a Glock 19 9mm semi-automatic handgun fell from Gassaway's pants onto the floor. Id. at 3-4. Officer Green held Gassaway by his waistband until additional MPD officers arrived on the scene, who assisted with placing Gassaway in handcuffs. Id. at 4. A surveillance camera inside of the store captured this entire interaction. Id.

The firearm was recovered by MPD and processed at the Seventh District. Id. It was loaded with 15 rounds of 9mm ammunition in the magazine and one round in the chamber. Id. Law enforcement determined that the firearm had been stolen on December 26, 2018. Id.

B. Procedural History

On August 31, 2021, a grand jury indicted Gassaway with one count of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Person Convicted of Crime Punishable by Imprisonment for a Term Exceeding One Year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ECF No. 1. Gassaway was arrested on September 8, 2021. See ECF No. 5. That same day, the government filed a memorandum in support of pretrial detention in which it explained that it intended to orally move for Gassaway's detention pending trial. ECF No. 3. Following a continuance in the detention proceedings, a magistrate judge in this district ordered Gassaway released to home confinement. 9/10/2021 Min. Entry. After the government moved for a stay of that order and appealed, this Court immediately held a hearing on the government's request for Gassaway's detention. The Court revoked the magistrate judge's release order and ordered Gassaway detained pending trial. 9/10/2021 Min. Entry.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act

The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., authorizes the detention of a defendant in two scenarios. First, the government may seek a defendant's pretrial detention if the charged offenses fall into any of five enumerated categories, including a “crime of violence” or a felony that involves the possession or use of a firearm or dangerous weapon. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1).^[1]Second, the government may also seek detention-or the court may hold a detention hearing sua sponte to determine whether pretrial detention is appropriate-when the case involves “a serious risk” that the defendant will flee or “will attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness or juror.” § 3142(f)(2).

If the Bail Reform Act authorizes pretrial detention, the judicial officer must hold a hearing to determine whether there are any conditions of release that would reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of any person in the community. Id. § 3142(f). At the hearing, both the government and the defendant may offer evidence or proceed by proffer. United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam). If the judicial officer finds that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, ” the judicial officer “shall order” the person detained pending trial. § 3142(e)(1). A finding that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. § 3142(f). And a finding that no conditions would reasonably assure the defendant's appearance as required must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Xulam, 84 F.3d 441, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Under some circumstances that are not present here, the Bail Reform Act may establish a rebuttable presumption of detention. See § 3142(e). But where, as here, the presumption is not implicated, the court instead must consider the following factors to determine whether there are conditions that would reasonably assure the defendant's appearance and the public's safety:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, a violation of Section 1591, a Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device

(2) the weight of the evidence against the person

(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including-

(A) the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings

(B) whether, at the time of the current offense of arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, state, or local law; and

(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release.

§ 3142(g).

The D.C. Circuit has also held that, for pretrial detention based on dangerousness, the government must “prove[ ] by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community.” United States v. Munchel, 991 F.3d 1273, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987)). This inquiry is “forward-looking.” United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, 3 F.4th 449, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Notably, “[a] person [may] be deemed a danger to the community sufficient to justify detention even without posing a threat of committing violence in the future.” Id.

The applicable standard of review when a district court judge assesses a magistrate judge's detention order under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 is de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Fairlamb, No. 21-cr-120 (RCL), 2021 WL 1614821, at *3 n.2 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2021); United States v. Henry, 280 F.Supp.3d 125, 128 (D.D.C. 2017).

III. DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

Because the indictment alleges that Gassaway unlawfully possessed a firearm, the government may seek his detention pending trial. § 3142(f)(1)(E); see ECF No. 1.

The government does not argue that Gassaway is a flight risk.^[2] Instead, the government argues only that “the Court should order the defendant's detention during the pendency of this case to protect the community.” ECF No. 3 at 7. Accordingly, at issue in this case is whether the government has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that pretrial detention is warranted because no condition or combination of release conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the community. See § 3142(f)(2). Upon consideration of the four-factor test in the Bail Reform Act, see Id. § 3142(g), the Court orders Gassaway detained pending trial.

A. The Nature And Circumstances Of Gassaway's Offense

The nature and circumstances of Gassaway's charged offense are serious. The government's factual proffer is that Gassaway illegally possessed,...