United States v. Gonsalves

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DESHAWN GONSALVES, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. 19-cr-0011

DISTRICT COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS DIVISION OF ST. CROIX

March 10, 2020

Attorneys:

Daniel H. Huston, Esq.,

St. Croix, U.S.V.I.

For the United States

Michael A. Rogers, Esq.,

St. Croix, U.S.V.I.

For Defendant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lewis, Chief Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Deshawn Gonsalves' ("Defendant") Motion to Suppress ("Motion") (Dkt. No. 26); the Government's Opposition thereto (Dkt. No. 29); the evidence and arguments presented at the suppression hearing; and the parties' supplemental memoranda and their respective responses thereto (Dkt. Nos. 40, 41, 43, 44). For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 21, 2019, Defendant was charged with the following counts in an Amended Information: (1) Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); (2) Possession of a Firearm in a School Zone, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(2)(A) and 924(a)(1)(B); (3) Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and (4) Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Distribute Near a School, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(D) and 860(a). (Dkt. No. 18).¹

On July 9, 2019, Defendant filed a motion seeking to suppress all physical evidence seized and statements made in this matter. (Dkt. No. 26 at 1). During the subsequent suppression hearing, the Government presented the testimony of two witnesses from the Virgin Islands Police Department ("VIPD"): Lieutenant Cecil Gumbs ("Lt. Gumbs") and Officer Juan Bermudez ("Officer Bermudez"). The following evidence emerged from the testimony of the two witnesses.²

On October 31, 2018, Lt. Gumbs and Officer Bermudez were dispatched to Lorraine Village Apartments, Building 19, Apartment B, in Frederiksted, St. Croix, Virgin Islands. (Hr'g Tr. 6-7, 34). They were responding to a 911 call regarding a potential domestic dispute incident. Id. at 34. En route to Lorraine Village Apartments, the 911 dispatch operator ("dispatcher") notified Lt. Gumbs and Officer Bermudez that, while on the phone with the female caller ("Complainant"), she heard an argument in the background and heard a male inform the Complainant that he had a gun in his car. Id. at 13.

When Lt. Gumbs arrived at the parking lot of Lorraine Village Apartments, he was in full uniform and had been driving a marked police vehicle. Id. at 9-10. He saw Defendant, who he described as being very angry and irate, and asked him if he was okay. Id at 10. Defendant responded that, while everything was okay, he had just gotten into an argument with his girlfriend.Id. According to Lt. Gumbs, Defendant continued to act angry and irate and to pace back and forth, so he told him to calm down. Id. Lt. Gumbs then inquired about Defendant's vehicle, and Defendant told him that it was his mother's car and that she had allowed him to use it. Id. at 10-11. The vehicle's engine was running in the parking lot in front of Building 19. Id. at 15.

Meanwhile, Officer Bermudez was speaking with the Complainant, who advised him that she and her boyfriend had recently broken up and that she no longer required police assistance. Id. at 52. When Officer Bermudez met the other officers outside, Defendant was continuing to pace back and forth and Lt. Gumbs told him to stand still and stop moving. Id. at 11. Officer Bermudez testified that as Defendant was pacing, he appeared to "continuously walk[] toward Building 19 . . . where the female called for assistance." Id. at 35. Per Lt. Gumbs' instructions, Defendant sat on the police car. Id. at 11. However, Defendant soon got up and started cursing and pacing back and forth again, and at one point appeared to attempt to get inside his vehicle. Id. At that point, Lt. Gumbs directed Officer Bermudez to handcuff Defendant, telling Defendant: "For your safety and mine, I'm going to handcuff you. You're not under arrest, I'm just handcuffing you, and I'm going to detain you until we find out what was going on. Until we find out that the lady inside, the caller inside is safe." Id. at 11-12.

Officer Bermudez inquired as to whether Defendant had a weapon in his vehicle, and Defendant did not respond. Id. at 37. Then, Officer Bermudez asked for consent to search the vehicle and Defendant proceeded to execute a written consent to search form. Id. Lt. Gumbs testified that he loosened Defendant's handcuffs so that Defendant could sign the form with his free hand, and that he held Defendant's other arm to ensure that Defendant remained restrained. Id. at 15. Officer Bermudez testified that while he was walking toward the vehicle, Defendant stated that he had a firearm and ammunition in a camouflage bag on the right rear passenger seatof the vehicle. Id. at 39-40. Members of the VIPD conducted a search of the vehicle and found a gun along with some other physical evidence. Id. at 15. Approximately two minutes passed between Defendant being handcuffed and the commencement of the search of his vehicle. Id. at 31. Throughout the entire encounter, there were approximately 5-6 officers at the scene. Id.

Subsequent to the search of his vehicle, Defendant was transported to the Wilbur H. Francis Police Station ("Police Station") for further investigation. Id. at 41. At the Police Station, Officer Bermudez read Defendant his Miranda rights and Defendant provided a two-minute videotaped statement regarding the events that led up to his arrest. Id. After Defendant concluded the statement, he was placed under arrest. Id.

In his Motion, Defendant seeks to suppress "the physical evidence seized and statements made in this matter." (Dkt. No. 26 at 1). Specifically, he "requests that the Court order the suppression of the firearm, cartridges, ammunition, magazines, ballistic vest, balaclava, and marijuana seized in connection with his arrest, as well as any and all statements made by [him] to law enforcement." Id.

II. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. Miranda Custodial Interrogation and Terry Stops

The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), held that the "prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 444. Miranda warnings are required whenever a suspect has been (1) "taken into custody" and (2) subject to "interrogation" by the government. Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 798 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 731 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010) (plurality opinion). Because the defendant must be both takeninto custody and subject to an interrogation to trigger Miranda warnings, "in the absence of one or the other, Miranda is not implicated." Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Christopher, 990 F. Supp. 391, 393-94 (D.V.I. 1997). The issue of custody turns on whether the defendant's freedom of movement was restrained to the "degree associated with a formal arrest" and whether the environment he was in simulated the "same inherently coercive pressures" that exist in a station house. United States v. Leese, 176 F.3d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Arena, 629 F. App'x 453, 457 (3d Cir. 2015).

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court established the principle that "police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause." United States v. Mathurin, 561 F.3d 170, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has found that "the temporary and relatively nonthreatening detention involved in a traffic stop or Terry stop . . . does not constitute Miranda custody." Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 113 (2010); see also United States v. Lewis, 2008 WL 2625634, at *6 (D.V.I. July 2, 2008) (finding that since the defendants were "initially detained pursuant to a lawful Terry stop . . . '[s]uch Terry-stops do not render a person in custody for purposes of Miranda.'") (quoting United States v. Galberth, 846 F.2d 983, 994 (5th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 865 (1988)); United States v. Denson, 2006 WL 3144857, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2006) ("Miranda warnings are not required . . . during a valid Terry stop.") (citing Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 184 (2004)). Thus, in the context of a Terry stop, the fact that the officers "failed to giveantecedent Miranda warnings would not render their subsequent questions impermissible." United States v. Bennett, 2000 WL 1358480, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2000).³

In determining the legality of an alleged Terry stop, courts determine "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception"—that is, whether the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion at the outset. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. It is well established that "[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause." Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). Because "probable cause means a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found, the level of suspicion necessary to justify a Terry stop is somewhat lower and can be established with information that is different in quantity or content from that required for probable cause." United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 330).

"A reasonable suspicion of criminal activity may be formed by observing exclusively legal activity." United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2000). However, the police officer must demonstrate that the stop was based on something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or...