United States v. Good

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JONATHAN GOOD, Defendant.

No. 21-00180-01-CR-W-HFS

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, Western Division

November 18, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

W. BRIAN GADDY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is currently before the Court on Defendant Jonathan Good's Motion to Dismiss filed on July 27 2022.^[1]Doc. 29. After extensions of time were granted for both parties, the Government filed Suggestions in Opposition on August 30, 2022, and Defendant filed Reply Suggestions on October 11, 2022. Docs. 42, 47. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be DENIED.

I. INTRODUCTION

On July 21, 2021, the grand jury returned an indictment charging Defendant Good with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). Doc. 1. Count One states as follows:

On or about July 29, 2020, in the Western District of Missouri, the defendant, JONATHAN GOOD knowing he had previously been convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment for terms exceeding one year, knowingly possessed a firearm, to wit: a Taurus, 9mm handgun bearing Serial Number TL083403, and the firearm was transported in interstate commerce. All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1).

Id. (emphasis in original).

On August 2, 2022, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment. Doc. 37. The superseding indictment charges the same offense as alleged in the original indictment but included additional allegations concerning Defendant's prior convictions as follows:

On or about July 29, 2020, in the Western District of Missouri, the defendant, JONATHAN GOOD, knowing he had previously been convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment for terms exceeding one year, knowingly possessed a firearm, to wit: a Taurus, 9mm handgun bearing Serial Number TL083403, and the firearm was transported in interstate commerce.

Prior to committing this offense, the defendant had the following felony convictions for violent felonies committed on occasions different from one another including: (1) Domestic Assault Second Degree, committed on November 3, 2012, in Jackson County, Missouri, convicted on November 20, 2013, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri; (2) Domestic Assault in the Second Degree, committed on April 23, 2014, in Jackson County, Missouri, convicted on June 4, 2015, in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri; (3) Domestic Assault in the Third Degree committed on January 25, 2019, in Jackson County, Missouri, convicted on July 25, 2019, in Jackson County, Missouri Circuit Court.

All contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1).

Id. at 1-2 (emphasis in original). As the superseding indictment is the most recent charging document, the Court considers Defendant's motion as applying to the offense alleged therein.

II. DISCUSSION

The felon in possession of a firearm statute states:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person -

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). According to Defendant, “[u]nder the new framework mandated” by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022), the Court should dismiss the superseding indictment as possession of a firearm is presumptively protected under the Second Amendment. Doc. 29 at 1-2. The Government argues “nothing in Bruen casts doubt on the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1),” and moreover, the Second Amendment “does not protect a right of a felon to possess a gun.” Doc. 42 at 1.

A. Second Amendment Decisions Prior to Bruen

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Prior to 2008, the Supreme Court had not conducted an “in-depth examination” of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see also United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2010).

1. District of Columbia v. Heller

In 2008, the Supreme Court decided Heller, which reviewed the constitutionality of a District of Columbia ordinance banning handguns.^[2]Heller rejected the argument that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess and carry firearms only in connection with militia service. Heller, 554 U.S. at 580-81, 586-87, 589. Instead, the Court found the Second Amendment guarantees an individual the “right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 595.

The Court in Heller, however, clarified the Second Amendment right to possess firearms belongs to “law-abiding citizens.” Id. at 635 (observing the Second Amendment guarantee as the “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”); see also id. at 625 (explaining the “Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”). Heller also recognized the Second Amendment right was “not unlimited, just as the First Amendment's right of free speech was not.” Id. at 595 (citation omitted); 626 (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”). Drawing further comparisons to free speech, the Court stated it did “not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.” Id. at 595 (emphasis in original). The Court identified certain gun laws that should not be called into doubt by its Second Amendment ruling:

lthough we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

Id. at 626-27. The Court identified these laws as “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 627 n.26.

2. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois

Approximately two years later, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of local ordinances banning firearms in Chicago and a surrounding suburb.^[3]McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). The municipalities contended the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms did not apply to the States. See id. The Court's majority disagreed, concluding the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In doing so, the Court, reemphasized its observations in Heller and affirmed its Second Amendment decisions should not be read to invalidate many of the longstanding laws regulating firearms:

We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” We repeat those assurances here. Despite municipal respondents' doomsday proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.

Id. at 786 (emphasis added).

3. Eighth Circuit Precedence after Heller and McDonald

After the Supreme Court's decisions in Heller and McDonald, criminal defendants raised both facial^[4] and as-applied^[5]challenges to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and similar gun statutes on Second Amendment grounds. The Eighth Circuit has consistently rejected facial challenges to section 922(g)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Woolsey, 759 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Irish, 285 F. App'x. 326, 327 (8th Cir. 2008). The Eighth Circuit has also routinely denied as-applied challenges to section 922(g)(1). United States v. Williams, 24 F.4th 1209, 1211 (8th Cir. 2022) (rejecting argument that firearms located inside a home for self-defense renders section 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as-applied to defendant); United States v. Adams, 914 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2019) (rejecting as-applied challenge where the defendant failed to address whether the Second Amendment protects a right to carry a weapon concealed in a vehicle); Woolsey, 759 F.3d at 909 (rejecting as-applied challenge to section 922(g)(1) as the defendant did not show he was “no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen.”); United States v. Taylor, 695 F. App'x. 988, 991 92 (8th Cir. 2017) (rejecting as-applied challenge where the defendant failed to show he was a “non-violent felon”); United States v. Hughley, 691 Fed.Appx. 278, 279-80 (8th Cir. 2017).

B. The Bruen Decision

In Bruen, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a New York gun licensing law requiring a showing of a “special need for self-defense” to obtain a permit to carry a gun in public. 142 S.Ct. at 2122. In the opening paragraph of the opinion, the Court stressed Heller and McDonald remained good law, and its holding in Bruen was consistent with both opinions. See id.

Reviewing a test developed by the lower courts to evaluate the constitutionality of gun...