United States v. Goodpasture

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

Submitted September 15, 2021 ^[*]

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 3:07-CR-30185-SMY-1 Staci M. Yandle, Judge.

Before DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge, THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

ORDER

James Goodpasture appeals the district court's imposition of various special conditions of supervised release as part of his sentence for violating the conditions of a previously imposed term of supervision. We agree with Goodpasture that the district court did not adequately justify restrictions on his computer and internet use, and we

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vacate just that portion of the revocation sentence and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to reconsider whether to impose that condition. We otherwise affirm.

I

In 2007, law enforcement officers discovered a gun while executing a search warrant at Goodpasture's residence after three teenage boys reported that he had solicited them to perform sexual acts. They told police that Goodpasture asked them to ejaculate into plastic bags, supposedly for him to donate to a sperm bank. One boy also alleged that he slept at Goodpasture's home, and Goodpasture sexually molested him while he slept. Goodpasture denied the boys' allegations, but he admitted that he owned the gun found in his home. Goodpasture pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Illinois to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the district court sentenced him to 108 months' imprisonment plus three years' supervised release.

As relevant to this appeal, Goodpasture has three prior convictions for sex offenses against children under 13 years old. He also has one prior conviction for failing to register as a sex offender. Finally, Goodpasture has two prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and one for possession of a controlled substance.

All these convictions are from the 1980s and 1990s, but Goodpasture's sex offenses, in particular, continue to loom over him. While Goodpasture was in prison for the current firearm conviction, the government petitioned to civilly commit him as a "sexually dangerous person" under 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a). A federal court in North Carolina granted the petition, finding that Goodpasture was likely to reoffend. United States v. Goodpasture, 697 Fed.Appx. 184 (4th Cir. 2017). As part of a modification of his sentence for the firearm conviction, Goodpasture agreed to several conditions of supervision tailored to sex offenders. And, after four years, he successfully petitioned to remove his "sexually dangerous person" status and end that detention. Case No. 5:15-hc-2188-BO (E.D. N.C. Mar. 2, 2020). Although two experts opined that Goodpasture was still dangerous, the district court in North Carolina agreed with a defense expert who testified that Goodpasture no longer suffered from pedophilic disorder or experienced uncontrollable sexual urges toward children.

Shortly after this decision, Goodpasture finished the custodial portion of his criminal sentence and began serving supervised release at a residential reentry center. Eight months later, however, his probation officer petitioned to revoke his supervised release based on nine alleged violations of the conditions. He missed a session of his

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required sex-offender treatment, kept a box-cutter in his locker at the reentry center, and failed a breathalyzer test, violating both his conditions of supervision and the reentry center's rules. Finally, Goodpasture violated his location-monitoring requirements on five occasions by failing to give notice or obtain approval. Goodpasture offered innocent explanations for most of these violations, but he nonetheless admitted them.

The district court revoked Goodpasture's supervision, sentenced him to one year of imprisonment and two years of supervised release, and continued the sentencing hearing to allow Goodpasture time to review the proposed conditions of supervised release. Goodpasture then objected to the following conditions: (1) computer- and internet-monitoring and prohibition of social media use; (2) location monitoring and home confinement; (3) total abstinence from alcohol consumption with remote testing and alcohol treatment for one year; (4) warrantless searches upon reasonable suspicion; and (5) notifying third parties of his criminal history. He argued that these conditions were not warranted by his personal characteristics or anything in his criminal history. The district court overruled Goodpasture's objections.

II

On appeal, Goodpasture renews his challenge to these conditions. We review for an abuse of discretion, looking at whether the district court explained, consistent with the factors under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(d), its reasons for imposing them. United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 845 (7th Cir. 2015). A condition "cannot involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary" to achieve the goals of sentencing. Id. (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 522 (7th Cir. 2013)).

A

We start with the restrictions on computer and internet use, which allow the Probation Office to access all Goodpasture's computing, internet, and electronic storage devices, to install monitoring software, and to conduct random searches. Further, he must notify any current or potential employer of his internet restrictions, as well as any third party who may use the same devices that he uses. Finally, Goodpasture's probation officer can bar him from all activity on "social media sites" and limit him to possessing only one internet-capable device. The district court explained that it imposed these restrictions "[d]ue to Mr. Goodpasture's conviction for Aggravated Criminal Sexual Abuse, his previous designation as a sexually dangerous person, his lack of sex offender treatment, [and] his most recent sex offender evaluation and subsequent

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recommendations." When Goodpasture objected that his previous convictions did not involve the internet, the court responded that they "occurred at such time when access to the internet and internet-based sexual offenses were not prominent as they are today."

We agree with Goodpasture that the district court's findings do not support the imposition of these restrictions. Computer-monitoring conditions are usually tied to computer-facilitated offenses. United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d 515, 525 (7th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Morgan, 987 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 2021). But, as Goodpasture points out, he did not use a computer or social media to effectuate any of his prior offenses. Indeed, there is no evidence that he has ever used a computer or the internet, much less for an illicit purpose such as soliciting minors or viewing child pornography. The presentence investigation report suggests his older convictions involved victims to whom he had in-person access (at least one was a household member), and the conduct in 2007 did not entail computer use. The court's explanation-essentially, that he might have used a computer if internet usage had been more prevalent at the time of his offenses-is merely speculative. The imposition of this condition, at least on the present record, is not reasonably related to the underlying conviction or his history and characteristics. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

Computer-related restrictions should also be "defined to some degree of precision." Kappes, 782 F.3d at 858 (quoting United States v. Cary, 775 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2015)). Yet the district court imposed a blanket restriction against all social-media use, including legal activity for which Goodpasture may have a First Amendment right. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding that statute...