United States v. Goodwin

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JAMES C. GOODWIN, Defendant.

Nos. 4:18-cr-00072-DCN-1, 4:21-cv-00344-DCN

United States District Court, D. Idaho

June 9, 2023

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

David C. Nye, Chief U.S. District Court Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court are Defendant James C. Goodwin's Motion for Extension of Time (Dkt. 83), Motion to Seal Case or Alter Language (Dkt. 88), Motion for Temporary Injunction (Dkt 89), Motion for Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. 92) Motion to Compel Government to Return Property and Provide Documents (Dkt. 103), Motion to Reverse and Rescind Order of Restitution and Assessment (Dkt. 108), and Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 112). The Government has filed nothing in opposition; nonetheless, the matter is ripe for the Court's consideration.

Having reviewed the record and briefs, the Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court finds that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court will decide the motion without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B). Upon review, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Extension, DENIES without prejudice the Motion to Return Property, and DENIES all other Motions.

II. BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2019, the Court sentenced Goodwin to 120 months of incarceration for one count of possession of sexually explicit images of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2), to be followed by a life term of supervised release. Dkt. 51, at 1-3. Goodwin was ordered to pay $3,000 in restitution to the Child Pornography Victims Reserve. Dkt. 51, at 7. The Court also imposed a total assessment of $5,000 pursuant to the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22. Id. Goodwin is currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Englewood, Colorado (“FCI Englewood”). Dkt. 77, at 2.

On September 2, 2021, Goodwin filed a Motion for Extension of Time. Dkt. 83. The Government filed no response.

On December 14, 2021, Goodwin filed a Motion to Seal Case or Alter Language. Dkt. 88. The Government filed no response.

On December 17, 2021, Goodwin filed a Motion for Temporary Injunction. Dkt. 89. The Government filed no response.

On May 2, 2022, Goodwin filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal In Forma Pauperis. Dkt. 92. The Government filed no response.

On May 5, 2022, the Court denied Goodwin's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Dkt. 95.

On June 7, 2022, the Court denied Goodwin's Motion for Compassionate Release. Dkt. 98.

On June 28, 2022, Goodwin filed a Motion to Compel Government to Return Property and Provide Documents. Dkt. 103. The Government filed no response.

On July 28, 2022, Goodwin filed a Motion to Reverse and Rescind Order of Restitution and Assessment. Dkt. 108.^[1]

On February 2, 2023, Goodwin filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 112. The Government filed no response.

The Court will address each motion in turn. As an overarching theme, however, the Court notes that Goodwin's current slew of motions do not raise any legitimate matters for adjudication. He is admonished that filing repetitive or frivolous motions may result in restrictions on filing.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“Rule 11 allows for sanctions against an attorney, law firm, or party who violates Rule 11(b) by filing a pleading or motion that is, inter alia, frivolous, for an improper purpose, or lacking in evidentiary support.” Meyer v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2012 WL 4470903, at *12 (D. Idaho Aug. 14, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4458141 (D. Idaho Sept. 26, 2012) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 11). An action is frivolous if it is “both baseless and made without reasonable and competent inquiry,” or “groundless . . . with little prospect of success ....” Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. M & M Petroleum Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). A district court has the discretion to impose sanctions under Rule 11 and under “its inherent authority to curb abusive litigation practices.” DeDios v. Int'l Realty Invs., 641 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).

However, courts should “construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying [] rules strictly.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Extension of Time

In this motion, Goodwin generically asks the Court for additional time for his filings because of restrictions relating to quarantine protocols at FCI Englewood. See Dkt. 83, at 1. Goodwin does not specify any particular motion that is forthcoming, nor does he explain how much additional time he needs. This motion was filed almost two years ago. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the Court has granted the motion in allowing Goodwin to file papers over the last 20 months. Thus, the Motion is GRANTED, but only as to motions filed prior to the date of this decision. Those pending motions are deemed timely.

B. Motion to Seal or Alter Language

Here, Goodwin motions the Court, “to seal and/or alter language of this case and all cases, filings, papers, and matters pertaining to it.” Dkt. 88, at 1. However, this is the only sentence in the motion besides a footnote citing caselaw that courts should liberally construe filings made by pro se litigants. Id., at 1 n.1. As the Court always does, it will liberally construe Goodwin's motion. Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150.

The problem, however, is that even liberally construed, the Court does not know what Goodwin is asking or why. Presumably he wants his entire criminal case sealed, but he provides no explanation, caselaw, or analysis for his request.^[2] Goodwin's single sentence cannot provide the Court adequate information to rule on the request. This motion is frivolous and offers no basis upon which the Court could make a reasoned ruling.

Thus, the Court DENIES this motion.

C. Motion for Temporary Injunction

Goodwin motions the Court for a temporary injunction regarding the Bureau of Prisons deducting too much money from his BOP trust account. Dkt. 89, at 2. Goodwin wishes to stop the BOP from deducting the disputed funds until the Court resolves this matter. Id., at 3.

The BOP is currently taking money out of Goodwin's account pursuant to the restitution and assessment imposed on Goodwin by the Court's Judgment. Dkt. at 51, at 7. Goodwin argues that the BOP is overstepping its authority to take more money than the minimum amount as stated by their policy and cites several cases to back up this contention: United States v. Lee, 950 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2020); U.S. v. Block, 2023 WL 2242672 (D.S.D. Feb. 27, 2023); Hughey v. U.S., 495 U.S. 411 (1990); U.S. v. Rich, 603 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2010); U.S. v. Hardy, 707 F.Supp.2d 597 (W.D. Pa. 2010); U.S. v. Ross, 279 F.3d 600 (8th Cir. 2002); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); and U.S. v. Tallent, 872 F.Supp.2d 679 (E.D. Tenn. 2012). Goodwin cites several cases from other Circuit, and District, Courts, but these cases are only persuasive authority to the Court. The two U.S. Supreme Court cases and the one Ninth Circuit case that Goodwin cites are precedential authority, so the Court will consider them here.

The three precedential cases that Goodwin cites deal with issues surrounding restitution. In Hughey, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded a decision stating that the defendant had to pay restitution for his conviction because the lower courts misinterpreted a provision of the Victim and Witness Protection Act pertaining to restitution. 495 U.S. at 422.

In Kelly, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's restitution obligations, imposed by a state court, were not subject to discharge in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy proceedings. 479 U.S. at 53.

And in Rich, the Ninth Circuit held that a deceased Defendant's restitution obligations were to be abated because the assets attached to the restitution were not gained by fraud. 603 F.3d at 726.

While binding, none of these cases relate to Goodwin's situation. The BOP is rightfully deducting money from Goodwin's account pursuant to the Court's Judgment. There is no evidence of fraud by the BOP. There is no evidence that the Court, or the Government, has misinterpreted any federal laws and Goodwin does not provide any specific examples. Lastly, there is no evidence that Goodwin is a party to any bankruptcy proceedings.

It is not “unconstitutional” as Goodwin states nor is it “unethical” for the BOP to comply with the Court's orders. Dkt. 89, at 2. The Court issued a valid Judgment, and the BOP is following its policy pursuant to the Judgment. The Judgment stated, “[w]hile in custody, the defendant shall submit nominal payments of not less than $25 per quarter pursuant to the Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.” Dkt. 51, at 8 (emphasis added). The BOP taking more than the minimum of $25 from his payment account is not restricted by the Judgment or BOP policy. The BOP policy clearly states that adjustments in the payment plan are up to the “discretion of the Unit Manager and is to be decided on a case-by-case basis.” Dkt. 89, at 7; BOP Program Statement 5380.08.

Goodwin does not provide any information on his plight other than voicing his disapproval that the BOP is taking out more money than he was expecting and inconsistencies in the amount it deducts each month. Id., at 2. But this is of no import. Goodwin can disagree with the Judgment and BOP policy, but the BOP's actions are in line with both and do not violate any of his rights. Based on the limited information available to the...