United States v. Gould

672 F.Supp.3d 167

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. James GOULD, Defendant.

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:22-cr-00095

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Charleston Division

Signed May 5, 2023

Negar M. Kordestani, United States Attorney's Office, Charleston, WV, Timothy D. Boggess, United States Attorney's Office, Beckley, WV, for Plaintiff.

Lex A. Coleman, Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Charleston, WV, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS E. JOHNSTON, CHIEF JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant James Gould's ("Defendant") Bruen-Based Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 40.) For the reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

For nearly a decade, Defendant struggled with his mental health so much that he was involuntarily committed to treatment facilities four separate times. He was first involuntarily committed on May 12, 2016. (ECF No. 43 at 6 n.2.) Then, he was again involuntarily committed on February 14, 2018. (Id.) Shortly after that, on June 28, 2019, Defendant was committed for a short-lived third time. (Id.) Finally, Defendant was committed one more time on June 30, 2019. (Id.)

Because of these involuntary commitments, Defendant was prohibited from possessing firearms under federal and state law. Yet in April 2019 and again in November 2020, Defendant was charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm under state law. (ECF No. 24 at 6-7.) He pleaded guilty to the 2019 offense, but the 2020 charge was dismissed. (Id.)

Defendant's habitual involuntary commitments and firearm violations intertwine with his turbulent relationship with his family. For instance, on June 4, 2019, a domestic violence emergency protection order was filed against Defendant by his wife and children, shortly before Defendant was involuntarily committed on June 28, 2019. (Id. at 2.) Then, on October 16, 2021, Defendant was charged with two counts of domestic battery and one count for brandishing a deadly weapon. (Id. at 7.) Although those charges were dropped, (id.), his wife and children filed another domestic violence emergency protection order against him on October 22, 2021, (id. at 2). Defendant's wife filed a final domestic violence emergency protection order against him on April 13, 2022, (id.), and, just seven days later, Defendant was arrested on April 20, 2022, for four violations of the protective order, (id. at 8). On March 24, 2022,¹ he pleaded guilty to one count, and the other three counts were dismissed. (Id.)

Shortly before the final protective order was filed, though, Defendant was found in possession of a Remington, 11-87, 12-gauge shotgun on February 18, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) Defendant was then indicted by a federal grand jury on May 3, 2022, and arrested on August 23, 2022, for unlawfully possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(4), 924(a)(2). (ECF Nos. 1, 19.) However, on June 23, 2022—after Defendant's indictment was returned, but prior to his arrest—the Supreme Court of the United States rendered its decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022).

On February 17, 2023, Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss, arguing that Bruen invalidated § 922(g)(4). (See ECF No. 40.) The United States filed a response on March 17, 2023.² (ECF No. 43.) As such, this motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12, the court should dismiss criminal charges in an indictment "where there is an infirmity of law in the prosecution[,]" such as when the statute charged is unconstitutional. United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 415 (4th Cir. 2012). Typically, "[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). However, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Government carries the burden in Second Amendment cases. See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2130.

After the Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), courts applied the two-part test developed by circuit courts, including the Fourth Circuit, to Second Amendment challenges. Under that test, courts conducted a historical inquiry into whether a law regulated conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment, then conducted an intermediate scrutiny analysis to evaluate the fit between the law and the governmental objective. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680-83 (4th Cir. 2010). This intermediate scrutiny analysis determined whether the state's interest in the regulation was sufficient to overcome whatever burden the law placed on one's Second Amendment right. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 669 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2012).

In Bruen, however, the Supreme Court determined that the lower courts had been incorrect in applying this "means-end scrutiny" test because it was inconsistent with the Second Amendment, and the appropriate methodology centers on the "constitutional text and history." Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2127-29. The Court articulated that the proper standard is as follows:

In keeping with Heller, we hold that when the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's "unqualified command."

Id. at 2129-2130 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50 n.10, 81 S.Ct. 997, 6 L.Ed.2d 105 (1961)).

Phrased another way, this test has two steps. The first step is determining whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the conduct at issue. Id. at 2129, 2134-35. The second step is determining whether the Government has established the regulation is consistent with the historical tradition of firearms regulation in the United States. Id. at 2129-30.

III. DISCUSSION

On March 30, 1981, John W. Hinckley, Jr. attempted to assassinate then-President Ronald Reagan. Hinckley v. United States, 163 F.3d 647, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1999). During his criminal trial, a jury found Hinckley not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. He was then involuntarily committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital in 1982, id., until his release in June 2022, United States v. Hinckley, No. CR 81-306, 2021 WL 8200009, at *4 D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2021.

Because he has been involuntarily committed, Hinckley—like Defendant—cannot possess a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). However, Defendant argues that § 922(g)(4) is unconstitutional under Bruen. (ECF No. 40.) Thus, Defendant claims full stop that he, Hinckley, and others like them who have been determined to be a danger to themselves or society, have a constitutional right to possess a firearm despite the danger they pose. (See id.) Even under Bruen's more demanding standards, the Court disagrees.

A. The plain text of the Second Amendment

The first step of a Second Amendment challenge is deciding whether the regulated conduct falls within the scope of the Second Amendment's plain text. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2129-30. The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." In interpreting this text, courts are guided by the principle that "[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning." United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731, 51 S.Ct. 220, 75 L.Ed. 640 (1931). "Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation." Heller, 554 U.S. at 576-77, 128 S.Ct. 2783.

The Supreme Court has explained that the operative clause of the Second Amendment—"right of the people to keep and bear Arms"—protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense. See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2122 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008) and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010)). Bruen further clarified that the Second Amendment also protects such conduct outside of the home. Id.

As to whose conduct is protected by this right, the Supreme Court has explained that the words "the people" in the Second Amendment "unambiguously refer[ ] to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset." Heller, 554 U.S. at 580, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (stating that "the people" "refer[ ] to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community"). Based on this, Heller began its analysis with the "strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans," id. at 581, 128 S.Ct. 2783, and then confirmed that presumption, id. at 595, 128 S.Ct. 2783.

Still, the Heller Court made clear that "the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited." Id. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Specifically, the Heller Court cautioned that "nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill." Id. The Court went so far as to say that such prohibitions are "presumptively lawful regulatory measures." Id. at 626-27 n.26, 128 S.Ct. 2783. The Court's assurances on these prohibitions' presumptive constitutionality confirm that the Second Amendment is not an absolute barrier to congressional regulation of firearms and that some...