United States v. Griggs

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DAVID C. GODBEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on defendant Raymond Griggs' motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or, in the alternative, a motion for a 90-day continuance of the trial. (Doc. 25.) On October 4, 2021, the government filed an opposition (doc. 30). The issues have been fully brief, and the matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, Griggs' motion is granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, Griggs' request for dismissal of the indictment is denied, and his request for a 90-day continuance of the trial date is granted.

I. Background

On February 26, 2020, Griggs was charged in a one-count indictment with making a false statement on an income tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). (Doc. 1.) That same day, an arrest warrant was issued for his arrest. (Doc. 3.) Then, on February 28, 2020, the Court held Griggs' initial appearance and arraignment. (Docs. 6, 8.) On March 6, 2020, the Court issued its Pretrial Order and scheduled Griggs' trial to begin on May 4, 2020, and it was anticipated to last for one week. (Doc. 12.)

On March 13, 2020, Chief Judge Lynn issued Special Order No. 13-5, which suspended all trials in the Northern District of Texas from that date until May 1, 2020, and it also excluded

all time periods pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). (Doc. 30, Ex. 1.) Then, on April 22, 2020, Chief Judge Lynn extended all continuances under Special Order No. 13-5 until May 31, 2020. (Doc. 30, Ex. 2.) On March 19, 2020, the government filed a motion to continue (doc. 14), and on March 23, 2020, the Court issued an Amended Pretrial order (doc. 15). The Court found that the ends of justice would be served by a continuance and set a new trial date of July 6, 2020.

On June 19, 2020, Chief Judge Lynn issued an Amended Special Order 13-5, and it suspended all trials through July 17, 2020. (Doc. 30, Ex. 3.) On July 8, 2020, in a Second Amended Special Order 13-5, Chief Judge Lynn extended that date to July 31, 2020. (Doc. 30, Ex. 4.) On September 14, 2020, the government requested that the Court set a new trial date. (Doc. 22.) On September 18, 2020, the Court issued an Amended Pretrial Order, and a new trial date of April 5, 2021 was set. (Doc. 23.) In support of its Amended Pretrial Order, the Court referenced § 3161(h)(7)(A) and Chief Judge Lynn's Special Orders and determined that the ends of justice served by a continuance outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. On March 25, 2021, the Court issued another Amended Pretrial Order and set a new trial date of October 25, 2021. (Doc. 24.) The Court, once again, found that the ends of justice served by a continuance outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial under § 3161(h)(7)(A).

II. Discussion

A. Griggs' Speedy Trial Act rights have not been violated.

The Speedy Trial Act is found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. Under the Speedy Trial Act, a defendant must be brought to trial “within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial

official of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.” Untied States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 281 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)). “The Speedy Trial Act is designed to ensure a federal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, and to reduce the danger to the public from prolonged periods of the defendant's release on bail.” United States v. Johnson, 29 F.3d 940, 942 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 1312, 1315 (5th Cir. 1990)). Under the Speedy Trial Act, a defendant must be tried within seventy non-excludable days of the indictment. Id. When more than seventy non-excludable days pass between the indictment and the trial, the “indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); United States v. Forester, 836 F.2d 856, 858 (5th Cir. 1988)). Certain days are excluded from the calculation if they fall within the Speedy Trial Act's definition of “excludable days.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1); Gonzales, 897 F.2d at 1315). “[T]he [Speedy Trial] Act recognizes that criminal cases vary widely and that there are valid reasons for greater delay in particular cases.” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 497 (2006). When a defendant moves to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, “[t]he defendant has the burden of proof of supporting [his] motion [to dismiss].” Johnson, 29 F.3d at 942 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); United States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d 370, 372 n.11 (5th Cir. 1987)). If a defendant is not brought to trial within seventy non-excludable days, the indictment must be dismissed. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).

In this case, fourteen days ran on Griggs's speedy-trial clock between his initial appearance on February 28, 2020 and the Court's issuance of Special Order No. 13-5 on March 13, 2020. For purposes of Griggs's speedy-trial calculation, forty-nine days expired between the expiration of Special Order No. 13-5 (the clock started to run on August 1, 2020) and the Amended Pretrial Order on September 18, 2020.

The Speedy Trial Act includes a list of automatic exclusions for delays caused by pretrial proceedings, the absence or unavailability of a defendant or an essential witness, interlocutory appeals, and similar instances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(7). The Speedy Trial Act allows a court to continue a trial and exclude the resulting delay from the speedy trial calculation when it determines that “the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). This specific provision applies to each time period excludable from Grigg's speedy-trial clock.

Two lengthy continuances (a total of 403 days) are excludable from Griggs's speedy trial computation under § 3161(h)(7)(A).

“The ‘ends of justice' provision furnishes ‘[m]uch of the Act's flexibility' because it ‘gives the district court discretion-within limits and subject to specific procedures-to accommodate limited delays for case-specific needs.” United States v. Dignam, 716 F.3d 915, 921 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Zedner, 547 U.S. at 498-99)). The district court must make findings on the record to support a continuance under § 3161(h)(7)(A):

No such period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A)). In deciding whether to grant an ends-of-justice continuance, a court must consider the following list of non-exhaustive factors:

(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice.

(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by this section.

(iii) Whether, in a case in which arrest precedes indictment, delay in the filing of the indictment is caused because the arrest occurs at a time such that it is unreasonable to expect return and filing of the indictment within the period specified in section 3161(b), or because the facts upon which the grand jury must base its determination are unusual or complex.

(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B).

In this case, the Court allowed continuances between September 18, 2020 and March 24, 2021 and then between March 25, 2021 and October 25, 2021. The Court also allowed Special Order continuances ordered by Chief Judge Lynn between March 13, 2020 and May 31, 2020, June 1, 2020 and June 18, 2020, and June 19, 2020 and July 31, 2020. Each of these continuances is excludable because they were supported with the end-of-justice findings required by the Speedy Trial Act. These continuances were based on circumstances caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. When allowing each of these continuances, the Court and Chief Judge Lynn considered the health and safety of the trial participants, in addition to the ability of both sides to be able to properly prepare for a trial under the restrictions imposed by COVID-19.

B. Griggs fails to show his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated.

The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI; see also United States v. Frye, 372 F.3d 729, 734 (5th...