United States v. Hambrock

520 F.Supp.3d 827

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Nathaniel HAMBROCK, Defendant.

Criminal No. 4:20cr26

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Newport News Division.

Signed February 19, 2021

Peter G. Osyf, United States Attorney Office, Newport News, VA, for United States of America.

ORDER

Arenda L. Wright Allen, United States District Judge

Before the Court is a Motion for a Reduction in Sentence by Nathaniel Hambrock. Mot. for Reduction, ECF No. 36. For the following reasons, Petitioner's Motion (ECF No. 36) is GRANTED .

I. BACKGROUND

On August 20, 2020, Mr. Hambrock pleaded guilty to one count of Receipt of Child Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2). Plea Agreement, ECF No. 19. Mr. Hambrock was sentenced on January 8, 2020 to the mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months' imprisonment. Judgment at 2, ECF No. 33. He is scheduled to self-surrender on February 26, 2020. Id.

Prior to his self-surrender date, Mr. Hambrock filed the instant Motion for a Reduction in Sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Mot. for Release, ECF No. 36. He argues that his sentence should be reduced to home confinement because he suffers from medical conditions—obesity and autism—that place him at increased risk of severe illness from COVID-19, which is prevalent throughout the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"). Id. at 2–4.

The Court ordered the Government and the United States Probation Office to advise the Court of their positions regarding Mr. Hambrock's Motion. Both oppose the Motion. Recommendation, ECF No. 40; Resp. in Opp'n, ECF No. 41. The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides that a court may reduce a term of imprisonment after it has been imposed "upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier ...." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has yet to fully evaluate the impact of these preconditions, other federal Courts of Appeals have ruled that satisfying one of them is a mandatory claim-processing rule. United States v. Alam , 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2020) (ruling that although the "exhaustion requirement does not implicate [a court's] subject-matter jurisdiction," the statute provides that a prisoner may bring a motion on his own behalf only if he fully exhausts administrative rights to appeal with the prison or "wait[s] 30 days after his first request to the prison"); see also United States v. Raia , 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding the petitioner's failure "to comply with § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement" to be a "roadblock foreclosing compassionate release at this point").

"When ‘properly invoked,’ mandatory claim-processing rules ‘must be enforced.’ " Alam , 960 F.3d at 834 (quoting Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 13, 17, 199 L.Ed.2d 249 (2017) ). "Because ‘Congress sets the rules’ when it comes to statutory exhaustion requirements, the judiciary has a role to play in exception-crafting ‘only if Congress wants [it] to.’ Nothing in § 3582(c)(1)(A) suggests the possibility of judge-made exceptions." Id. at 834 (quoting Ross v. Blake , 578 U.S. 632, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1857, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) ). Therefore, the 30-day waiting period is mandatory unless the Government waives or forfeits the requirement. Id. ("[M]andatory claim-processing rules bind the courts only when properly asserted and not forfeited.").

If a motion satisfies the statutory preconditions, a court may reduce the sentence if the Court finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction" and concludes "that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit has ruled recently that there are no applicable policy statements for the Court to consider in defining extraordinary and compelling reasons; it is within the Court's discretion to assess whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist. United States v. McCoy , 981 F.3d 271, 281 (4th Cir. 2020).

Courts must also consider the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A "court may deny a motion for compassionate release if the § 3553(a) factors override what would otherwise be extraordinary and compelling circumstances" meriting compassionate release. Easter v. United States , No. 4:16-cr-49(7), 2020 WL 3315993, at *4 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2020) (citing United States v. Doumas , No. 13-cr-120 (JMA), 2020 WL 3256734, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2020) ).

III. APPLICATION

A. Statutory Precondition

Mr. Hambrock has satisfied the thirty-day waiting period. Defense counsel submitted a request to the warden of FCI Seagoville on January 19, 2021. Ex. 5, ECF No. 42-1. The thirty-day waiting period lapsed on February 18, 2021.

The Government suggests that this Court cannot consider the Motion because Mr. Hambrock is not in custody and the BOP cannot physically evaluate his condition. The statute does not require this. The statute provides that a defendant may seek compassionate release from the Court after the defendant "has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility, whichever is earlier. " 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

Nothing in the plain language of the statute requires the defendant to be in custody presently or to have served any portion of his sentence. Mr. Hambrock has submitted a request to the warden of his facility. The request was denied. At least 30 days have passed. This is all that is required by the statute. The Court finds that the statutory precondition is satisfied. The Court has the statutory authority to consider Mr. Hambrock's request and proceeds to evaluate the merits of the Motion.

B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

"[W]hile the COVID-19 pandemic is undoubtedly serious and of great concern, numerous courts have found that the risks posed by the pandemic alone do not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for release, absent additional factors such as advanced age or serious underlying health conditions that place a defendant at greater risk of negative complications from the disease." United States v. Nwankwo , No. 12-CR-31(VM), 2020 WL 2490044, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2020). Therefore, "compassionate release motions amid the COVID-19 pandemic have required a ‘fact-intensive’ inquiry, made in the ‘unique circumstances’ and ‘context’ of each individual defendant.... [C]ourts ... have considered the age of the prisoner; the severity and documented history of the defendant's health conditions, as well as the defendant's history of managing those conditions in prison; the proliferation and status of infections in the prison facility; [and] the proportion of the term of incarceration that has been served by the prisoner ...." United States v. Brady , No. 18-CR-316, 2020 WL 2512100, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2020) (citations omitted). Considering these factors, the Court finds that the COVID-19 pandemic in combination with Mr. Hambrock's health and risk factors rise to "extraordinary and compelling" reasons for a reduction in sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

Mr. Hambrock's age weighs against finding that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction in sentence. Mr. Hambrock is 31. Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") at 2, ECF No. 39. He is not in an age category that is at an increased risk from COVID-19. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), Weekly Updates by Selected Demographic and Geographic Characteristics, https://www.cdc.go-v/nchs/nvss/vsrr/covid_weekly/index.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2021) (noting the jump in risk to begin around forty-five to fifty-four age category). When compassionate release is granted, the defendant is often older than Mr. Hambrock. Compare United States v. Mangum , No. 2:17-CR-50 (E.D. Va. June 22, 2020) (granting compassionate release to a seventy-three-year-old defendant), with Brown v. United States , No. 4:18-CR-96, 2020 WL 3129573, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 12, 2020) (quoting United States v. Belle , 457 F.Supp.3d 134, 139 (D. Conn. 2020) ) (denying a twenty-eight-year-old defendant's motion in part because he was "substantially younger than many of those who have been granted compassionate release for [underlying] conditions during the pandemic").

However, "the proliferation and status of infections in the prison facility" in which Mr. Hambrock is intended to be incarcerated weighs strongly in favor of finding that his circumstances are "extraordinary and compelling." Brady , 2020 WL 2512100, at *3. Mr. Hambrock is designated to serve his sentence at FCI Seagoville. Letter, ECF No. 37. There are 8 positive cases currently (4 staff and 4 inmates), and there was a severe outbreak previously. BOP, Coronavirus, Full Breakdown and Additional Details, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (updated daily at 3:00 P.M.) (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). At one time, this facility had 1,239 inmates and 45 staff test positive. Id. This is the second highest number of infections to occur in any BOP facility. Id. It constitutes more than 70 percent of the facility's inmate population. BOP, FCI Seagoville, https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/sea/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). Four inmates have died. BOP, Coronavirus, Full Breakdown and Additional Details, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/. This facility has been unable to prevent the spread of the virus among its population. This factor weighs strongly in...