United States v. Hamilton

95 F.4th 171

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Martin William Luther HAMILTON, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 21-4434

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Argued: September 20, 2023

Amended: March 6, 2024

Decided: March 6, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:20-er-00310-LCB-1)

ARGUED: Kathleen Ann Gleason, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Craig Matthew Principe, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before THACKER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Traxler wrote the opinion in which Judge Thacker and Judge Quattlebaum joined.

TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge:

This case presents another permutation of a question we frequently face: whether a prior conviction—here, a North Carolina conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon—qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). As we will explain, we agree with the district court that the prior offense qualifies as a violent felony, and we therefore affirm the 180-month sentence imposed by the district court.

I.

Martin William Luther Hamilton pleaded guilty under a written plea agreement to one count of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1). The probation agent preparing Hamilton's presentence report (PSR) determined that three of Hamilton's prior North Carolina convictions qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA: assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill; common law robbery; and attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon. Hamilton objected to the ACCA classification. While he did not dispute that the first two convictions met the requirements of the ACCA, he contended that attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon under North Carolina law does not amount to a violent felony under the ACCA.

When considering Hamilton's objection, the district court recognized the somewhat confusing and sometimes contradictory body of North Carolina law addressing the elements of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon and determined that it should follow this court's unpublished decision in United States v. Hinton, 789 F. App'x 956 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-4612), which held that a North Carolina conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the career-offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines.¹ The district court therefore concluded that Hamilton qualified as an armed career criminal and sentenced Hamilton to 180 months' imprisonment, the minimum sentence required by the ACCA. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Hamilton appeals, challenging only the district court's determination that the attempted robbery conviction was a predicate offense under the ACCA.

II.

A.

While violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) typically carry a maximum sentence of fifteen years, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8),² the ACCA mandates a minimum fifteen-year sentence for defendants who have three prior convictions for offenses that qualify as a "violent felony or a serious drug offense." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). As is relevant to this case, the ACCA defines "violent felony" as "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." Id. § 924(e)(2). As used in the ACCA, " 'physical force' means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010).

To determine whether a prior offense satisfies the requirements of the ACCA's force clause, we apply the categorical approach, which examines the elements of the offense only, not the defendant's conduct when committing the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Dozier, 848 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2017). Focusing on the minimum conduct required to commit the offense, we must determine whether the "statutory elements necessarily require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force." United States v. Mack, 56 F.4th 303, 305 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up) (emphasis added). "If there is a realistic probability that the state would apply the statute to conduct that does not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force against another, then the offense is not categorically a 'violent felony' under the ACCA's force clause . . . ." United States v. Jones, 914 F.3d 893, 901 (4th Cir. 2019).

When applying the categorical approach to a state-law offense, we are "bound by the interpretation of such offense articulated by that state's courts." United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 684 (4th Cir. 2017); see Johnson, 559 U.S. at 138, 130 S.Ct. 1265. We focus on the decisions of "the state's highest court" when determining the elements of the offense. United States v. Aparicio-Soria, 740 F.3d 152, 154 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc). If the state's highest court has not addressed the elements of the criminal offense at issue, the "state's intermediate appellate court decisions constitute the next best indicia of what state law is." Castillo v. Holder, 776 F.3d 262, 268 n.3 (4th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). We may nonetheless disregard the decisions of an intermediate court if we are "convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise." Id. (cleaned up).

B.

The offense at issue in this case is North Carolina's statutory offense entitled "Robbery with firearms or other dangerous weapons." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87(a). The statute provides:

Any person or persons who, having in possession or with the use or threatened use of any firearms or other dangerous weapon, implement or means, whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened, unlawfully takes or attempts to take personal property from another or from any place of business, residence or banking institution or any other place where there is a person or persons in attendance, at any time, either day or night, or who aids or abets any such person or persons in the commission of such crime, shall be guilty of a Class D felony.

Id. Conviction under § 14-87(a) thus requires proof of "(1) an unlawful taking or an attempt to take personal property from the person or in the presence of another, (2) by use or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, (3) whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened." State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 573 S.E.2d 870, 889 (2002); see State v. Oldroyd, 380 N.C. 613, 869 S.E.2d 193, 197 (2022) ("A person is guilty of the offense of robbery with a dangerous weapon, or an attempt to commit the crime, if he or she (1) takes or attempts to take personal property from another, (2) while possessing, using, or threatening to use a firearm or other dangerous weapon, (3) whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened.") (cleaned up); accord State v. Murrell, 370 N.C. 187, 804 S.E.2d 504, 509 (2017); State v. Williams, 335 N.C. 518, 438 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1994).

These elements appear to meet all the requirements of a violent felony. The use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon is a use of force within the meaning of the ACCA, and the requirement of a taking or attempted taking "from the person or in the presence of another" ensures that the force is directed at another person. See Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1825, 210 L.Ed.2d 63 (2021) ("The phrase 'against another,' when modifying the 'use of force,' demands that the perpetrator direct his action at, or target, another individual. Reckless conduct is not aimed in that prescribed manner."). And because the state statute requires that the use of the dangerous weapon must endanger the life of another, the level of force required by the statute is violent force. See Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140, 130 S.Ct. 1265. Indeed, this court has already concluded that armed robbery under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87(a) is a violent felony under the ACCA. See United States v. Burns-Johnson, 864 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2017)

Hamilton, however, insists that the analysis is different when the underlying crime is attempted armed robbery rather than completed armed robbery. In making this argument, Hamilton points to various North Carolina cases that describe attempt offenses as involving only two elements—the intent to commit the substantive offense and an overt act going beyond mere preparation for the offense. See State v. Davis, 340 N.C. 1, 455 S.E.2d 627, 632 (1995) ("The two elements of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon are: (1) an intent to commit the substantive offense, and (2) an overt act done for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation but falls short of the completed offense."); State v. Allison, 319 N.C. 92, 352 S.E.2d 420, 423 (1987) ("An attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon occurs when a person, with the specific intent to unlawfully deprive another of personal property by endangering or threatening his life with a dangerous weapon, does some overt act calculated to bring about this result."); State v. May, 292 N.C. 644, 235 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1977) ("An attempted armed robbery occurs when a defendant with the requisite intent to rob, does some overt act calculated and designed to bring about the robbery, thereby endangering or threatening the life of a person.") (cleaned up). Under this formulation, Hamilton...